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 Summary 
This thesis studies the internal governance of pension funds with evidence from Switzerland. It is 
composed of four chapters. Chapter 1 describes the current Swiss occupational pension system with a 
focus on its governance aspects. It documents in details how the various and different Swiss pension funds 
are organised and identifies six key structure characteristics to classify them. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on pension fund governance by focusing on the internal agency problems induced by the board 
of trustees and the sponsoring employer in pension funds around the world. It also uses insights from the 
corporate governance literature as a way to improve our current understanding of the topic. The last two 
chapters are empirical studies. The tests are conducted with a unique hand-collected dataset of Swiss 
pension funds as well as a new measure of pension board effectiveness. Chapter 3 aims to analyse the 
sources and determinants of an effective pension board. The results show that fund size is the key 
explanatory variable of the wide dispersion in the levels of board effectiveness and its dimensions including 
integrity, commitment, and competence. Moreover, fund size seems to matter beyond other potentially 
relevant sources. Chapter 4 examines whether and to what extent it really matters and may impact pension 
fund asset allocation. The results show that competent pension boards with a clear and detailed framework 
to take investment decisions seems to be what matters. In particular, they are associated with more equity 
and less cash, translating in a higher investment risk-taking behavior. 
 
Keywords: Pension funds, Governance, Swiss system, Plan beneficiaries, Board of trustees, Dataset of Swiss 
pension funds, Measure of pension board effectiveness, Determinants, Asset allocation 
JEL classification: G23, G28, G34, G11 
 

 Résumé 
Cette thèse porte sur la gouvernance interne des caisses de pension (institutions de prévoyance) avec 
une application en Suisse. Elle est composée de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 décrit l’actuel système 
suisse de prévoyance professionnelle en se concentrant sur les éléments liés à la gouvernance. Il 
documente en détails comment les différentes caisses de pension suisses sont organisées et identifie six 
caractéristiques structurelles clés pour les classifier. Le chapitre 2 passe en revue la littérature sur la 
gouvernance des caisses de pension en mettant l’accent sur les problèmes d’agence internes induits par le 
conseil de fondation (ou d’administration) et l’employeur dans les caisses de pension à travers le monde. Il 
utilise également des idées propres à la littérature de la gouvernance d’entreprises afin d’améliorer notre 
compréhension actuelle du sujet. Les deux derniers chapitres sont des études empiriques. Les tests sont 
effectués à l’aide d’un ensemble de données uniques de caisses de pension suisses collectées 
manuellement ainsi qu’une nouvelle mesure de l’efficacité du conseil dans les caisses de pension. Le 
chapitre 3 vise à analyser les sources et déterminants d’un conseil efficace. Les résultats montrent que la 
taille de la caisse est la variable clé pour expliquer la grande dispersion dans les niveaux d’efficacité du 
conseil et de ses dimensions incluant intégrité, engagement et compétence. De plus, la taille de la caisse 
semble compter au-delà d’autres sources potentiellement pertinentes. Le chapitre 4 examine si, et dans 
quelle mesure, cela a réellement de l’importance et peut avoir un impact sur l’allocation d’actifs des caisses 
de pension. Les résultats montrent que des conseils compétents avec un cadre clair et détaillé pour 
prendre des décisions d’investissement semblent être ce qui importe. En particulier, ils sont associés avec 
plus d’actions et moins de liquidités, représentant un comportement de prise de risque d’investissement 
plus élevé. 
 
Mots-clés : Caisses de pension (institutions de prévoyance), Gouvernance, Système suisse, Bénéficiaires de 
plans, Conseil de fondation (ou d’administration), Données de caisses de pension suisses, Mesure de 
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 “(…) being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance (…)” 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chap. I, Part III, Art. I, p.311 (1776) 
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General introduction 
Are you sure that you will get your promised pensions at retirement? Can you really trust the people 
who manage and are responsible for your pension assets? Pension funds are the major investors around 
the world. They hold more than USD 26 trillion of assets under management1. Pension assets also usually 
represent the largest part of the wealth of households. However, researchers, policymakers, legislators, 
regulators, and most importantly, you, their plan beneficiaries, still do not understand well how pension 
funds really function, are organised, who manage them, and if those persons have the competence and 
proper incentives to behave in your interests. This is the starting point of this thesis: to understand better 
the internal governance of pension funds and those in charge of managing your retirement assets.  
Few research has been conducted on pension fund governance, in contrast with the abundant 
corporate governance literature. Specific and complex institutional settings around the world as well as a 
lack of transparency and data availability in most countries may explain this scarce literature, despite a 
large interest. For this thesis, I have collected exclusive data on Swiss pension funds and can thus 
investigate in details their governance. I provide evidence from Switzerland, although parts of my insights 
and findings could be transposed to other countries with a similar institutional environment. In the end, my 
thesis and its results are particularly dedicated to all Swiss workers actually worrying about their future 
pensions. 
This thesis is composed of four and distinct chapters. Chapter 1 describes the current Swiss 
occupational pension system with a focus on its governance aspects by emphasizing on the minimum 
guarantees established by the law, the governance-related requirements, and the most recent supervision 
framework. It documents in details how the various and different Swiss pension funds are organised and 
identifies six key structure characteristics to classify them. The major distinction with other country’s 
pension systems is that pure defined-contributions plans do not exist in Switzerland. Finally, this chapter 
highlights some of the regulatory measures implemented recently to strengthen the trust of Swiss people in 
the present pension system. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on pension fund governance by focusing on the internal agency 
problems induced by the board of trustees and the sponsoring employer in pension funds around the world. 
It also uses insights from the corporate governance literature as a way to improve our current 
understanding of the topic. Overall, previous research places board effectiveness at the centre of pension 
fund governance and emphasizes on the employer’s influence over pension fund asset allocation decisions. 
                                                          
1 For this estimation, see e.g., the report Pension Markets in Focus (2016) from the OECD. 
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However, pension fund governance remains a new area of research. Little is known or investigated outside 
the U.S., only a few datasets are available in specific countries, additional explanatory work and more 
robustness in empirical studies are needed, and there is definitely the need to learn more about pension 
boards.  
This literature review gives me the foundation to study the internal governance and board 
effectiveness of pension funds. It particularly leads me to several questions. What really makes a strong 
pension board? What drives and shapes its effectiveness? Does it matter for pension funds? And if yes, how 
and what matters exactly? These questions are empirically addressed in the following chapters with 
evidence from Switzerland. Chapter 3 aims to analyse the sources and determinants of an effective pension 
board. Chapter 4 examines whether and to what extent it really matters and may impact pension fund asset 
allocation. I focus on these two points as they are key to understand the effectiveness of pension boards 
but still need new rationale and empirical work. To conduct the empirical tests, I use a unique hand-
collected dataset of Swiss pension funds describing their various structure characteristics as well as a new 
measure of pension board effectiveness including its different dimensions and directly applicable to Swiss 
pension funds. The results are presented below. 
In Chapter 3, I show that there is heterogeneity in the Swiss pension fund landscape and that fund size 
is the key explanatory variable of the wide dispersion in the levels of board effectiveness and its dimensions 
including integrity, commitment, and competence. Large pension funds managing their administration 
internally seem to be associated with more effective and committed boards by investing in the desirable 
best-practices attributes. Moreover, fund size matters beyond other potentially relevant sources such as the 
legal form or plan type and seems to hold on the provisions voluntary chosen by Swiss pension boards. 
Overall, the results give to some extent support for the consolidation of the pension fund industry in 
Switzerland and other countries with still small dispersed pension funds. However, due to the data collection 
process and associated measurement, I cannot exclude transparency as an alternative explanation to the 
findings.  
In Chapter 4, as part of a project with Carolina Salva, we empirically evaluate the relation between 
pension board effectiveness and its different dimensions with measures of asset allocation. We show that 
competent pension boards with a clear and detailed framework to take investment decisions seems to be 
what matters. In particular, such pension boards appear to be associated with more equity and less cash, 
translating in a higher investment risk-taking behavior. We also highlight the seemingly high levels of cash 
in Swiss pension funds and relate it with the lack of an investment framework. These results hold beyond 
known determinants of pension fund asset allocation while we cannot control and exclude liquidity needs 
reasons for our findings. 
3 
Along this thesis, I express the limitations of my analysis and results as well as point to several 
avenues for more research on the topic. Important ones should aim to answer the following questions: 
Does consolidation generally benefit the plan beneficiaries? What determines the optimal pension fund 
size? Is more investment risk necessarily better for plan beneficiaries? How Swiss pension funds manage 
their cash? Furthermore, additional empirical tests are needed with extended datasets and alternative 
measures of board effectiveness to validate my findings in Switzerland. Other empirical studies outside 
Switzerland are also necessary to generalize and expand them worldwide. 
Lastly, I have conducted additional tests on operating costs and performance measures that I do not 
present in my thesis as their investigation resulted inconclusive. They have however the merit of opening 
more paths for further research. First, I used both the administration and investment costs as disclosed by 
Swiss pension funds in their annual financial statements [see OPP2 art. 48a]. Yet, there are measurement 
and transparency issues associated with pension fund costs in general [see e.g., Tan and Cam (2013); Tan 
and Cam (2015)] and particularly in Switzerland [see e.g., Mettler and Schwendener (2011) for investment 
costs; Hornung et al. (2011) for administration costs]. Recently has the High Supervision Commission 
(CHS/OAK) issued new instructions to increase the transparency of investment costs disclosed by Swiss 
pension funds [see the D-02 (2013) based on OPP2 art. 48a-1 and 3]. Therefore, further tests on the 
investment costs of Swiss pension funds should be examined after this new directive. 
Second, I used several investment performance measures including net returns, abnormal returns 
(over the pension fund asset allocation as in the literature), returns on assets, as well as averaged and 
cumulated returns over the period of my sample. However, there are still important limitations associated 
with my measures of performance such as a short sample period and no adjustment for the pension fund 
liabilities side [see e.g., Plantinga and Huijgen (2000); Plantinga (2005); Bolla, Wittig, and Kohler (2016)]. 
Improved measures should still be included and applied to validate the current findings on the investment 
performance of pension funds around the world. 
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Chapter 1. 
 
The Swiss occupational pension system: 
A governance view 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Switzerland has a long-standing and well-developed old-age system that is highly regulated. It is one 
of the most sound and sustainable system around the world2, partly due to its design along three pillars. 
The occupational or employer-based pension system is mandatory for Swiss workers since 1985 and 
represents the second pillar. It complements a state-based pay-as-you-go pension that aims to cover the 
minimum basic needs at retirement or in the case of disability or death (first pillar). The third pillar consists 
of voluntary and individual pension schemes with tax incentives that individuals can privately set up in 
financial institutions. Several papers present and detail the Swiss pension system over the years [see e.g., 
Queisser and Vittas (2000); Bütler and Ruesch (2007); Bütler (2014); Gerber and Weber (2007); Rocha, 
Vittas, and Rudolph (2010)]. This chapter differs from these studies and contributes to the existing 
literature by focusing on the current Swiss second pillar with a governance view. It aims to provide to 
researchers and practitioners the most recent information about the organisation and functioning of Swiss 
pension funds with respect to their institutional setting. 
                                                          
2 See e.g., the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (2014) from Australian Centre for Financial Studies and 
Mercer, the Pension Sustainability Index (2014) from Allianz, or the Global Pension Finance Watch (2014) from Towers 
Watson. 
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The particularity of the Swiss occupational pension system is that Swiss people cannot choose either 
their pension fund or an investment strategy to be implemented on their accumulated retirement savings. 
This is the sole responsibility and decision of the employer, alongside with the board of trustees of the 
pension fund. Therefore, Swiss plan beneficiaries must trust their pension fund and its board to deliver the 
promised pensions. Though, this concern might be mitigated by their equal representation in the board as 
legally required in Switzerland [see LPP art. 51-1]. Indeed, the employees and employer must be equally 
represented in Swiss pension boards. 
Moreover, the Swiss pension fund landscape is highly fragmented, dispersed, and heterogeneous 
[see e.g., Gerber and Weber (2007)]. At the end of 2014, there are 1,866 pension funds managing CHF 777 
billion of assets on behalf of more than 5 million of beneficiaries3. And each of these pension funds has 
different structure characteristics and its own governance mode. This specific setting coupled with the 
actual challenging environment of low expected returns and population ageing place governance aspects 
on the top of agendas. The guarantees, governance tools, and supervision setups are key to ensure that the 
guardians of Swiss people retirement money keep their promises. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 presents the main Swiss legal requirements and 
institutional supervision framework. In Section 1.3, I detail the six key structure characteristics shaping 
Swiss pension funds and their organisation. This classification may also exist in other country’s pension 
systems but sometimes differs in the exact definitions and implications. Additionally, Section 1.4 highlights 
particular regulatory measures taken recently, and their possible reasons, to strengthen the trust of Swiss 
people in the actual pension system. I then conclude in Section 1.5. 
1.2. Legal requirements and institutional framework 
1.2.1. Minimum guarantees 
Since 1985, the Law on Occupational Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Pension Plans (LPP) 
establishes a set of minimum requirements (LPP art. 6 ss) in order to maintain the standards of living (LPP 
art. 1-1) for Swiss workers. As shown in Table 1.1, more than 5 million of Swiss plan beneficiaries are 
currently covered by the LPP, including about 4 million of active and contributing employees and more than 
1 million of pensioners4. All pension accounts and promises are managed by 1,866 pension funds and 
represent CHF 777 billion of assets, without accounting for the collective insurance contracts. Over the last 
                                                          
3 See OFS (Office Fédéral de la Statistique), 2016. La prévoyance professionnelle en Suisse : Principaux résultats de la 
statistique des caisses de pensions 2008-2014. 
4 The total employed population in Switzerland is about 5 million [see OFS (Office Fédéral de la Statistique), 2016. 
Indicateurs du marché du travail 2016.]. This means that approximatively 80% of the working population is covered by 
the Swiss second pillar. 
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years, the assets under pension fund management have kept increasing while it has been concentrated in a 
smaller but still large number of pension funds. 
[Table 1.1: Main statistics of the Swiss second pillar] 
Swiss pension funds are annually financed by the contributions made both by the employees and 
employers as well as the returns on investments (called “third” contributor). The LPP art. 16 settles 
minimums to be contributed from 7% to 18% depending on employees’ age. However, the exact amount of 
contributions by each party is settled in the internal rules of the pension fund and the total contribution of 
the employer should be at least equal to the sum of the contributions of the employees (LPP art. 66). The 
benefits in case of retirement or following a disability or death event can be given under the form of 
annuities or as a lump sum payment with at least one-quarter of the available capital and prior notice (LPP 
art. 37). Withdrawals from each pension account are possible for targeted purposes such as housing, self-
employment, or a permanent move out of Switzerland. As presented in Table 1.1, the total contributions 
into Swiss pension funds persistently exceeded their benefits to be paid, explaining in part the increasing 
total assets under management. As an order of magnitude, at the end of 2014, contributions and benefits 
amount for respectively CHF 54 billion and CHF 34 billion. And the difference remained constant over the 
past years. 
To sustain the Swiss occupational pension system, funding requirements and its measurement are 
settled by legislators (OPP2 art. 44 and annex). In sum, the coverage ratio (or also called technical funding 
ratio) is defined as the pension assets available over the committed pension liabilities. A pension fund with 
a coverage ratio of 100% thus indicates that all its assets can today cover all its promises to the affiliated 
employees and pensioners. Every Swiss pension fund should be fully funded (LPP art. 65), except public 
entities that can be partially underfunded if they benefit from the government guarantee and have 
adopted the partial funding regime (LPP art. 72a ss). An annual survey by Swisscanto (2017) monitors the 
funding level of the major Swiss pension funds according to those legal requirements. As reported in Table 
1.2, private pension funds constantly exhibit a coverage ratio above 100%. At the end of 2016, it is 
estimated to be on average of 109.7%. On the contrary, some public pension funds are at this time still 
underfunded with an average of respectively 102.1% and 77.5% for total and partial funding regimes.  
[Table 1.2: The funding status of Swiss pension funds] 
The value of the coverage ratio has to be taken with caution as its computation is sensitive to 
previous investment performance, depends on the liabilities structure as the proportion of pensioners 
among plan beneficiaries, and is subject to several assumptions as the technical rate and mortality table to 
be applied on the valuation of pension liabilities. In particular, the technical rate used in Switzerland is not 
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linked to current market rates and varies for each pension fund. For these different reasons, the “real” 
funding status of Swiss pension funds might actually be lower [see e.g., PPCmetrics (2016)]. 
On top of that, explicit minimum guarantees are specified in the LPP. The current level and historical 
evolution of the key ones are presented in Table 1.3. First, there is a legal entrance salary to the Swiss 
second pillar. According to LPP art. 11, all employees working in Switzerland with an annual salary of 
minimum CHF 21,150 (LPP art. 7-1) are obliged to be affiliated to an employer-based pension fund. This 
ensures that most Swiss workers are embedded into the occupational pension system, although it 
discriminates part-time and low-income workers. Second, a minimum annuity conversion factor to be 
applied on the mandatory portion of the accumulated retirement savings is set for defined-contributions 
pension plans (LPP art. 14-2) in order to smoothen pensions at retirement5. While a lot of discussions are 
still pending on this number, it is currently set at 6.80% for an ordinary retirement age and will have to 
decrease in the near future [see e.g., Cosandey (2013)]. Third, the Swiss Federal Council also sets a 
minimum interest rate to be applied on the pension investments to increase annually each beneficiary’s 
account (LPP art. 15-2). Although kept at 4.00% for a long period, it today reflects more market conditions. 
For 2017, it has been set at a minimum of 1.00%. 
[Table 1.3: History of the LPP minimum guarantees] 
Moreover, in Switzerland, there is no binding requirements for the technical rate used to discount 
the future commitments and value pension liabilities. The Swiss Chamber of Pension Actuaries (CSEP/SKPE) 
establishes a national reference rate [see DTA 4 (2015)]. This rate is computed annually and based on the 
10-year Swiss government yield as well as the past performance over 20 years of the pension fund industry. 
Swiss pension funds have then discretion to set their applied technical interest rate based on their 
expected return on pension assets as long as it does not exceed the national reference rate. For the 
financial statements of 2017, it has been set at 2.00% and has kept decreasing over the last years as a 
reflection of the evolution of the economic and financial environment. 
In the end, the LPP provides minimum guarantees to the second pillar of Swiss people. Employers are 
free to offer more than these mandatory minimums and usually do so in practice [see e.g., Queisser and 
Vittas (2000); Swisscanto (2014)]. The enveloping part above the minimum requirements settled by the law 
(called above-mandatory benefits) represents a significant part of the beneficiaries’ accounts in 
Switzerland. As mentioned in the annual survey of Swisscanto (2014), about 90% of the Swiss pension funds 
                                                          
5 For example, a newly retired person who accumulated CHF 500,000 on its LPP account over its working life and can 
benefit from a conversion factor of 6% over all its savings will receive an annuity of CHF 30,000 during its retirement. 
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offer above-mandatory benefits to their plan beneficiaries. Moreover, 75% of them offer benefits of at 
least 20% higher than the LPP minimums. Public pension funds are also the most generous. 
1.2.2. Governance and supervision 
Governance considerations are also required by regulation. Since 2010, a structural reform of the 
Swiss occupational pension scheme has been implemented and in 2012, the LPP, OPP2 (Ordinance on 
Occupational Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Pension Plans), and OPP1 (Ordinance on Supervision of 
Occupational Pension Funds) include new and updated requirements with the goal of improving the 
transparency and governance of the whole system through a better supervision. An important modification 
is that Swiss pension funds have now to certify to the supervision authorities that executive boards and 
asset managers have the depth theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of occupational pensions 
(OPP2 art. 48f-l). Also, they must ensure the integrity and loyalty of the responsible persons (LPP art. 51b) 
and that there are no conflicts of interests for the transactions with related parties (LPP art. 51c). 
The main change of this reform is related with supervision and concerns the direct supervision of all 
Swiss pension funds by regional supervision authorities (LPP art. 61 ss and OPP1 art. 2 ss), that report to the 
High Supervision Commission (CHS/OAK) for occupational pension funds (LPP art. 64 ss and OPP1 art. 5 ss)6. 
The Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO/OFAS) is part of the regulation process and, among other duties, 
in charge of preparing the projects for the laws and ordinances. Figure 1.1 summarizes the new Swiss 
institutional supervision and regulation framework with these entities. Three other entities are also under 
the direct supervision of the CHS/OAK. These include the investment foundations through which Swiss 
pension funds can invest their assets under management, the LPP Guarantee Fund, and the Substitute 
Occupational Benefit Institution. The LPP Guarantee Fund helps to secure all plan beneficiaries and their 
second pillar pension assets in the case of employer’s insolvency. It also provides subsidies for pension 
funds with an unfavorable beneficiaries’ age structure and act as a central office for lost pension accounts. 
The Substitute Occupational Benefit Institution act as a safety net for the second pillar by accepting all 
unaffiliated employers and employees meeting the LPP legal requirements. 
[Figure 1.1: Swiss institutional supervision and regulation framework] 
Finally, since 2005, all Swiss pension funds must comply with the Swiss GAAP RPC 26 (2013) that 
imposes binding accounting rules for the presentation of their annual reports. According to OPP2 art. 47, 
they must prepare their financial statements annually including a balance sheet, an income statement, and 
                                                          
6 The CHS/OAK also has the authority to issue directives for the regional supervision authorities, experts in 
occupational pensions, and auditors. 
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notes to the accounts in accordance with these accounting standards. The verification of the compliance 
has then to be done by both an auditor and an expert in occupational pensions (LPP art. 52a-1). Each year, 
an auditor must control the annual financial statements and monitor that the organisation, management, 
and investments comply with the law (LPP art. 52c and OPP2 art. 35). Periodically, an expert in occupational 
pensions must review the technical commitments of the fund to the plan beneficiaries (LPP art. 52e and 
OPP2 art. 41a). The independence of these two parties is reviewed and guaranteed by the related 
supervision authorities to ensure that their judgments remain objective (OPP2 art. 34 and OPP2 art. 40). 
Eventually, common accounting standards coupled with verification by two independent specialists 
improve the reliability in the reported numbers and the comparability across the various and different 
Swiss pension funds. 
1.3. Pension fund structure characteristics 
In Switzerland, pension funds differ according to several structure characteristics shaping their 
organisation. Figure 1.2 gives a simplified and synthetic representation of the organisation of Swiss pension 
funds with respect to their six most important structure characteristics. These include (1) private vs. public, 
(2) single-employer vs. multi-employer, (3) defined-benefits vs. defined-contributions, (4) autonomous vs. 
reinsurance, (5) administration: internal vs. external, and (6) investments: internal vs. external. Each of 
them is described in details in the following Sub-sections with their representative proportions in the Swiss 
pension fund landscape as reported in Table 1.4. The proportions for each structure characteristic are given 
relative to the number of pension funds. Note that these features also exist in other country’s pension 
systems and that this classification may also be applicable to countries with a similar institutional setting to 
Switzerland. Only the exact definitions and implications may vary. This is particularly the case for the 
distinction between defined-benefits and defined-contributions as developed in Sub-section 1.3.2. 
[Figure 1.2: Swiss pension fund organisation and structure characteristics] 
[Table 1.4: Main statistics of pension fund structure characteristics] 
1.3.1. Private vs. public and single-employer vs. multi-employer 
Initially, Swiss pension funds are independent legal entities, separated from the employer, under the 
form of a foundation (or more rarely a cooperative society) for private pension funds founded by a 
corporation or under the form of a public institution for pension funds founded by a public authority (LPP 
art. 48-2). There are only 78 public pension funds in Switzerland, representing 4% of the whole population, 
but concentrating a large portion of assets and beneficiaries. Public pension funds are further separated 
according to whether they follow a total or partial funding regime. In the latest, with a government 
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guarantee, they are allowed to be partially underfunded (LPP art. 72a ss). Additionally, a private or public 
entity can be created in the own name of the employer (single-employer) or can be linked to multiple 
employers through affiliation contracts between each sponsor and the pension fund. Multi-employer 
pension funds can be organised as collective or common pension funds. The difference depends on 
whether the financial accounts are presented separately or not for the affiliated employers. In Switzerland, 
37% of the pension funds are still considered as single-employer pension funds, despite the decreasing 
trend. 
1.3.2. Defined-benefits vs. defined-contributions 
Pension funds can offer various plans to its beneficiaries. These pension plans can refer to different 
hierarchical levels of employees or layers of additional benefits above the minimums required by the law. A 
key distinction among the types of plan is whether the beneficiaries enjoy secured benefits or not. In 
defined-benefits plans, the employer guarantees in advance the benefits to the beneficiaries that are 
computed by a formula based on salary evolution, tenure of service, and age. Such plans usually offer a 
good protection for beneficiaries as only the employer bears the direct costs of deficits and underfunding 
[see e.g., McCarthy and Miles (2013)]. Alternatively, in typical defined-contributions plans, benefits depend 
on the investment returns of pension assets each year. In that case, the employee faces uncertainty at 
retirement as the benefits are not guaranteed and depend on the performance of pension assets. The 
beneficiaries bear to some extent the risk related to the investments [see e.g., Besley and Prat (2003)]7. 
The distinction between defined-benefits and defined-contributions as for long and extensively been 
studied [see e.g., Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988); Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise (2007); Besley and 
Prat (2003); Gerrans and Clark (2013); Farrell and Shoag (2016)]. Previous literature is mainly U.S.-oriented, 
discusses the global shift from defined-benefits to defined-contributions, and cannot really conclude on 
which the best model is for plan beneficiaries. However, this distinction is of less relevance in Switzerland. 
The differences between the two plan types is smaller due to the minimum guarantees embedded by the 
law and the general employer responsibility [see e.g., Bütler (2014); Bütler and Ruesch (2007); Gerber and 
Weber (2007); Queisser and Vittas (2000)]. This is the reason why Swiss defined-contributions plans are 
often considered as like defined-benefits plans or cash-balance plans on the international ground [see e.g., 
Whitehouse (2006); OECD (2009); Willis Towers Watson (2016)]. In terms of system design, this is the key 
difference with other country’s pension systems. 
                                                          
7 There also exist hybrid plans that offer a mixture of defined-benefits and defined-contributions features depending 
on the type of treatment given to the retirement savings part and the risks of disability and death. 
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Although pure defined-contributions plans do not exist in Switzerland8, the portion representing 
above-mandatory benefits is not guaranteed by all same LPP minimums and as such is subject to some 
extent to the same mechanisms as traditional defined-contributions plans9. As above-mandatory benefits 
remain an important part of Swiss beneficiaries’ accounts [see e.g., Swisscanto (2014)], it is still a distinction 
worth making within the Swiss pension fund landscape. By looking at the representative proportions, there 
are today only 5% of the Swiss pension funds offering pure defined-benefits plans and about the same 
number that switched to defined-contributions plans during the last 4 years. Overall, this means that today 
95% of the Swiss pension funds may add some uncertainty in the above-mandatory retirement benefits of 
Swiss plan beneficiaries. 
1.3.3. Autonomous vs. reinsurance 
Another important differential aspect across Swiss pension funds is how they hedge the risks there 
are exposed to. Pension funds have different options to hedge financial risks such as market and asset 
volatility, but also actuarial risks such as longevity, death, and disability (OPP2 art. 42). An autonomous 
pension fund is one that assumes or directly hedges itself all these risks (LPP art. 67-1). Alternatively, these 
risks can be partially or totally covered by an insurance company through a range of reinsurance products. 
This reinsurance could be from a limitation of the potential loss in the case of bad market and economic 
conditions (called stop-loss and excess-of-loss), or a partial insurance of the risks of disability and death, to 
a total reinsurance of the pension assets. In Switzerland, 20% of the pension funds are still autonomous in 
hedging their risks, while the others are reliant on insurance companies. 
1.3.4. Administration and investments: internal vs. external 
Finally, Swiss pension funds have their own competence for their organisation, investments, and 
benefits schemes as long as they comply with the minimum requirements established by the law (LPP art. 
49). The board of trustees is the supreme body and has the fiduciary duty to serve and act in the best 
interests of the plan beneficiaries (LPP art. 51b-2). As legally required in Switzerland by LPP art. 51-1, 
pension boards are characterized by an equal representation between the employees and employer. All 
trustees are also personally and jointly responsible for the decisions they make, the administration of the 
pension fund, and the investment of its assets (LPP art. 52). In particular, in Switzerland, the board of 
trustees is responsible for the investment strategy and its related decisions (OPP2 art. 49a and OPP2 art. 
50). Their tasks are common to all pension funds and precisely stated in the law (LPP art. 51a). However, on 
                                                          
8 There is the exception of the “1e plans” (called after OPP2 art. 1e), which can be considered as pure defined-
contributions plans as they do not apply on any minimum requirements.  
9 One important safeguard mechanism is the guarantee of the capital. Accordingly, a remuneration below 0% cannot 
be granted on retirement accounts, even for above-mandatory benefits over minimum requirements. 
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an operational basis, the board has to delegate internally or externally both the management of the 
pension fund administration and investments (LPP art. 51a-2-j). Therefore, Swiss pension funds could be 
managed internally through specialized committees and/or an internal manager and team and/or 
outsource to external experts such as asset managers. These possible delegations result in various 
governance modes and different types of management in practice10. 
1.4. The trust of Swiss people in the system 
Within the Swiss occupational pension system, the retirement benefits granted to plan beneficiaries 
seem to be high and secured. The legal and regulatory setting is generally respected, funding is on average 
sufficient across all pension funds, and mechanisms are in place to control and avoid misaligned behaviors. 
For instance, measures are taken by the supervision authorities in case of law violations or pension 
underfunding. During the last years, particular regulatory measures have been implemented in order to 
sustain the pension system and strengthen the trust of Swiss people. Three important possible reasons and 
their resulting measures are described below.   
First, governance scandals have clouded the Swiss landscape and the integrity of their pension fund 
managers. Probably the biggest one is the Gloor corruption and mismanagement scandal at the Zurich 
public pension fund (BVK) in 2010, where the chief investment officer lost and diverted an estimated 
amount of CHF 1.5 billion to the plan beneficiaries and taxpayers. For more than 15 years, the authority 
over investment decisions in one of the country’s largest pension funds was in the hands of one man, no 
investment plan or strategy was available, and no thorough control was exercised by the government and 
authorities11. This major scandal gave rise, among other reasons, to the 2010-2012 structural reform of the 
Swiss occupational pension scheme with the main goal of improving the governance, transparency, and 
supervision of the system. 
Second, citizen around the world may be concerned that asset managers and insurance companies 
might favor their personal gains over their interests and charge them with too high fees. In Switzerland, 
two particular measures have been implemented in the recent past in order to force transparency and 
restore public trust in finance professionals. The 2004 revision of the LPP particularly emphasized on the 
transparency of life insurance companies and introduced a legal quote of 90% to redistribute profits to 
Swiss pension funds [see e.g., Bütler and Ruesch (2007)]. More recently, based on OPP2 art. 48a-1 and 3, a 
                                                          
10 To my knowledge and as alleged in Table 1.4, information on whether pension funds are managed internally or 
externally for both their administration and investments is not available. 
11 For more information about this scandal, please refer to newspapers articles such as “Le gouvernement sèchement 
remis à l’ordre”, Tribune de Genève, 04.10.2012; “Switzerland: How to avoid Gloor 2.0”, Investment & Pensions 
Europe, 01.12.2012; “Korrupter boss arrested at Swiss BVK fund”, Top1000funds.com, 16.06.2010. 
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directive by the High Supervision Commission (CHS/OAK) clarifies that all fund asset managers with 
collective investments in Swiss pension funds to compute and disclose separately their fund total expense 
ratio (TER), increasing investment costs transparency in Swiss pension fund annual reports [see the D-02 
(2013)]. 
Third, by law, some Swiss public pension funds can benefit from a preferential funding treatment 
[see LPP art. 72a ss]. The resulting underfunding situation [see e.g., Swisscanto (2017)] is sometimes so 
important that the cantonal governments, and by extension their taxpayers, have to pay extra 
contributions on top of other drastic measures. For instance, since 2014, the State of Neuchatel pays an 
extra CHF 30 million each year for at least the next 20 years to resorb an overdraft of about CHF 2 billion12. 
The Geneva public pension fund, which has one of the lowest funding level in Switzerland in which about 
CHF 6 billion are missing, currently costs to the State of Geneva an additional CHF 100 million each year13. 
One aspect of the 2010-2012 structural reform was to introduce clear rules for the financing of public 
pension funds. In particular, they had to decide whether to adopt a total or partial funding regime. Then, 
underfunded public pension funds under a partial funding regime are required to create a recapitalization 
plan to attain a minimum target funding level of 80% within a transition period of 40 years [see the LPP 
transitional provisions of the amendment of 17.10.2010]. In the meantime, underfunding situations in 
some Swiss public pension funds are pending and its costs might carry on to the next generations.  
In addition, an ageing population and low expected returns threaten the current sustainability of the 
Swiss pension system. One highly-politicized solution is to decrease the minimum annuity conversion factor 
to a level that reflects better the current environment [see e.g., Cosandey (2013)]. However, it is difficult 
for Swiss workers to understand and accept a potential reduction of the promised retirement annuities if 
they do not trust the system and its participants. Bütler (2014) provides evidence to explain why Swiss 
voters refused at 73% the direct last attempt to reduce the annuity conversion factor to 6.4% in March 
2010. The author shows that distrust was probably the most important factor in explaining the “no” vote. In 
September 2017, with the federal project “Prévoyance vieillesse 2020”, Swiss people had to vote again on a 
reduction of the annuity conversion factor to 6%, among other aspects14. Similarly, the “no” result might be 
a reflection of a continuing mistrust of Swiss people in the actual pension system, despite the regulatory 
measures taken to restore it. 
                                                          
12 See e.g., “La recapitalisation de Prévoyance.ne coûtera 30 millions par an à l’Etat”, Arcinfo, 11.02.2013. 
13 See e.g., “Genève réforme ses caisses de pension sous tension”, Le Temps, 03.05.2012; “Caisses de pension 
publiques : Genève lanterne rouge”, L’Extension, 19.01.2013. 
14 For more details about the entire project, please refer to e.g., OFAS (Office Fédéral des Assurances Sociales), 2017. 
Prévoyance vieillesse 2020 : Le projet adopté; “Pensions in Switzerland: Make or break”, Investment & Pensions 
Europe, May 2017. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter describes the current Swiss occupational pension system with a focus on its governance 
aspects by emphasizing on the minimum guarantees established by the law, the governance-related 
requirements, and the most recent supervision framework. It documents in details how the various and 
different Swiss pension funds are organised and identifies six key structure characteristics to classify them. 
The major distinction with other country’s pension systems is that pure defined-contributions plans do not 
exist in Switzerland. Finally, this chapter highlights some of the regulatory measures implemented recently 
to strengthen the trust of Swiss people in the present pension system. 
In order to ensure that Swiss pension funds and their boards deliver the promised pensions, three 
avenues could be pursued by regulators. First, more flexibility could be granted to the many decentralized 
Swiss pension funds. With each pension fund having its unique organisation and needs, they are in a good 
position to find their own tailor-made solutions. Second, the promises made to Swiss plan beneficiaries 
should not be set too high and based on reasonable assumptions so they can be kept in the future. Third, 
there is the need to make sure that the guardians of Swiss people retirement money have the proper 
incentives and competence to keep and deliver their promises. Governance improvements in that last 
matter are important to sustain the Swiss pension system. 
 
16 
Figure 1.1. 
Swiss institutional supervision and regulation framework. 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
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Figure 1.2. 
Swiss pension fund organisation and structure characteristics. 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
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Table 1.1. 
Main statistics of the Swiss second pillar. 
Source: OFS (Office Fédéral de la Statistique), 2016, 2015. La prévoyance professionnelle en Suisse : Principaux résultats de la 
statistique des caisses de pensions. 
This table presents the main statistics of the Swiss occupational pension system over the last years. Total assets include all assets 
under management by the Swiss pension funds, but exclude the assets/liabilities from collective insurance contracts. Contributions 
include all inputs from the employers and employees (K, Swiss GAAP RPC 26). Benefits include both regulatory and extra-regulatory 
annuities and lump sum payments (M+N, Swiss GAAP RPC 26). Employees include all active and contributing beneficiaries during 
the year. Pensioners include all passive beneficiaries who received benefits during the year. Beneficiaries is the sum between 
employees and pensioners.  
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
         
Number of pension funds 1,866 1,957 2,073 2,191 2,265 2,351 2,435 2,543 
 
-4.65% -5.60% -5.39% -3.27% -3.66% -3.45% -4.25% 
 
         
Total assets (CHF million) 777,340 720,237 672,785 625,295 621,234 598,930 538,524 605,459 
 
7.93% 7.05% 7.59% 0.65% 3.72% 11.22% -11.06% 
 
         
Contributions (CHF million) + 53,581 + 54,253 + 48,399 + 47,823 + 47,504 + 45,352 + 45,059 + 44,455 
Benefits (CHF million) - 33,584 - 32,543 - 32,010 - 30,973 - 30,268 - 29,463 - 28,388 - 27,454 
         
Beneficiaries 5,116,187 5,025,699 4,926,118 4,828,112 4,712,433 4,642,061 4,624,355 4,487,325 
Employees 4,000,077 3,932,187 3,858,803 3,787,263 3,696,045 3,643,340 3,651,984 3,545,571 
Pensioners 1,116,110 1,093,512 1,067,315 1,040,849 1,016,388 998,721 972,371 941,754 
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Table 1.2. 
The funding status of Swiss pension funds. 
Source: Swisscanto, 2016, 2017. Etude sur les caisses de pension en Suisse. 
This table presents the funding level of the major Swiss pension funds from the Swisscanto survey over the last years. The funding 
level is computed following the legal requirements as the coverage ratio (OPP2 art. 44 and annex) and averaged by weighting over 
total assets. Coverage ratio is given separately for private pension funds and for public ones under the two legal regimes (total 
funding regime or partial funding regime). 
 
  2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
        
Coverage ratio (assets-weighted) 
      
        
Private 109.7% 110.4% 113.6% 110.3% 107.6% 102.8% 105.9% 
        
Public (total funding regime) 102.1% 98.1% 103.5% 100.7% 100.0% 95.3% 98.1% 
        
Public (partial funding regime) 77.5% 78.1% 83.6% 74.6% 73.7% 71.5% 74.1% 
 
20 
Table 1.3. 
History of the LPP minimum guarantees. 
Sources: (1) OFAS (Office Fédéral des Assurances Sociales), 2017. Chiffres repères dans la prévoyance professionnelle. (2) CSEP/SKPE 
(Swiss Chamber of Pension Actuaries), 2015. DTA 4 – Taux d’intérêt technique. (*) website disclosure. 
This table presents the historical evolution of the key minimum guarantees given by the LPP from its implementation in 1985. Note 
that between 2005 and 2013, the annuity conversion factor was separated between men (m) and women (w). 
 
  
Legal entrance 
salary (CHF) 
Annuity conversion 
factor 
Minimum 
interest rate 
National 
reference rate 
     
2017 21,150 6.80% 1.00% 2.00% (*) 
2016 21,150 6.80% 1.25% 2.25% (*) 
2015 21,150 6.80% 1.75% 2.75% (*) 
2014 21,060 6.80% 1.75% 3.00% 
2013 21,060 6.85% (m) / 6.80% (w) 1.50% 3.00% 
2012 20,880 6.90% (m) / 6.85% (w) 1.50% 3.50% 
2011 20,880 6.95% (m) / 6.90% (w) 2.00% 3.50% 
2010 20,520 7.00% (m) / 6.95% (w) 2.00% 4.25% 
2009 20,520 7.05% (m) / 7.00% (w) 2.00% 3.75% 
2008 19,890 7.05% (m) / 7.10% (w) 2.75% 4.00% 
2007 19,890 7.10% (m) / 7.15% (w) 2.50% 4.50% 
2006 19,350 7.10% (m) / 7.20% (w) 2.50% 4.50% 
2005 19,350 7.15% (m) / 7.20% (w) 2.50% 4.50% 
2004 25,320 7.20% 2.25% 
 
2003 25,320 7.20% 3.25% 
 
2002 24,720 7.20% 4.00% 
 
2001 24,720 7.20% 4.00% 
 
2000 24,120 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1999 24,120 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1998 23,880 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1997 23,880 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1996 23,280 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1995 23,280 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1994 22,560 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1993 22,560 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1992 21,600 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1991 19,200 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1990 19,200 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1989 18,000 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1988 18,000 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1987 17,280 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1986 17,280 7.20% 4.00% 
 
1985 16,560  7.20% 4.00%   
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Table 1.4. 
Main statistics of pension fund structure characteristics. 
Source: OFS (Office Fédéral de la Statistique), 2016, 2014. La prévoyance professionnelle en Suisse : Statistique des caisses de 
pensions. 
This table presents the number and percentage of Swiss pension funds under the different structure characteristics and over the 
last years. Information is given for pension funds which are public (vs. private), single-employer (vs. multi-employer), defined-
benefits (vs. defined-contributions), autonomous (vs. reinsurance). Information on whether pension funds are managed internally 
or externally for both their administration and investments is not available. 
 
  2014 2013 2012 2011 
     
Pension funds (number) 1,866 1,957 2,073 2,191 
     
inc. Public 78 89 91 92 
 
4.18% 4.55% 4.39% 4.20% 
     
inc. Single-employer 686 754 821 892 
 
36.76% 38.53% 39.60% 40.71% 
     
inc. Defined-benefits 99 133 154 183 
 
5.31% 6.80% 7.43% 8.35% 
     
inc. Autonomous 376 400 414 428 
  20.15% 20.44% 19.97% 19.53% 
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Chapter 2. 
 
Pension fund governance: 
A literature review around the board and the employer 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I review the literature on pension fund governance. Although corporate governance 
has been widely studied, previous research on pension fund governance is still scarce and at its early stages 
of development. This is mainly due for two reasons. First, very specific and complex country’s institutional 
settings make it difficult to study the organisation and functioning of their pension funds. The large 
differences across pension systems also do not allow to develop a complete framework or draw general 
conclusions. Second and not least, there is a lack of available data to build empirical work resulting from 
low transparency in most countries. Despite these shortcomings, there are still significant studies 
examining the governance of pension funds for specific aspects and countries. Some findings from the 
corporate governance literature may also be applicable to pension funds and thereby bring fruitful insights 
for further research.  
A review on pension fund governance is of particular interest in today’s challenging environment 
where many governments and pension funds have put governance questions and issues on the top of their 
agenda. With different financial markets and economic conditions, the increase of the administrative 
burden and complexities, the general ageing of the population, and examples of fraud and excessive costs, 
appropriate governance is key to safeguard pensions to plan beneficiaries. There is also a growing interest 
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among researchers and practitioners. Many professional codes of best-practices pension fund governance 
and recommendations have been issued recently15. Worldwide regulatory reforms have been elaborated 
following, among others, the Myners Report (2001) in the U.K. or the Clapman Report (2007) in the U.S. 
Datasets have been made available in some countries and empirical work have been conducted on 
questions surrounding the governance of pension funds. In order to conduct further research, there is 
definitely the need to make the point on what has been done, what we know, and what is still missing.  
To review the literature on this topic, I rely on the agency theory [see e.g., Eisenhardt (1989) for a 
review]. Following this approach, pension fund governance can be defined as the set of structures, 
processes, and incentives that help organising, managing, and monitoring a pension fund in order to 
protect pension assets and act on the interest of the plan beneficiaries16. The ultimate goal of any pension 
fund is thus the welfare of its plan beneficiaries and the security of their pensions. However, there are 
various agents at play with different interests who create variety of conflicts which could hinder this 
objective. As a reflection of previous research, two agents, and their resulting agency problems, have been 
shown to be key in the governance of pension funds around the world. Papers focusing on these two 
agents also share most of the literature on the topic. First, the board of trustees is the delegated entity to 
plan beneficiaries which is responsible for the pension fund management and may be subject to similar 
agency problems as corporate boards and managers. Second, the sponsoring employer is the major 
contributor to its workers’ pension plans and is expected to limit its contributions, minimize the operating 
costs, or use pension assets for other company’s desires. 
Following the literature, I structure this review around the main agency problems of the board and 
the employer. Section 2.2 first concentrates on the board of trustees. Previous research highlights the 
importance of the board as an agent and its effectiveness as a control mechanism for the governance of 
pension funds. I then review the main empirical findings related with pension board effectiveness and 
elaborate further avenues for research on the topic. Finally, I list and classify common agency problems in 
pension boards around the world, including opportunism, shirking, and incompetence. Section 2.3 then 
focuses on the sponsoring employer. Based on previous literature, I describe potential misaligned behaviors 
by the employer that could impact its pension plans and their beneficiaries’ interests. These agency 
                                                          
15 These include for example the CFA Code of Conduct for Members of a Pension Scheme Governing Body (2008), the 
IOPS Guidelines for the Supervisory Assessment of Pension Funds (2008), the IOPS Principles of Private Pension 
Supervision (2010), the OECD Core Principles of Private Pension Regulation (2016), the OECD Guidelines on Pension 
Fund Asset Management (2006), the OECD Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance (2009), or the OECD-IOPS Good 
Practices for Pension Funds Risk Management Systems (2011). 
16 This definition is similar to others in the literature as Carmichael and Palacios (2004) who state that “governance 
refers to the systems and processes by which a company or government manages its affairs with the objective of 
maximizing the welfare of and resolving conflicts of interests among its stakeholders” or Clark (2004) who defines 
governance as “formal mechanisms by which an institution makes decisions, is held accountable to its stakeholders 
and beneficiaries, and acts in accordance with public and private standards”.  
25 
problems relate to either a diversion of pension assets or a misconduct in financial distress. In particular, I 
present in details the case of own company stock as it has been extensively studied in the U.S. literature. To 
conclude, I briefly summarize in Section 2.4. 
Many other agents that could play a role in pension systems and their governance have been left of 
this appraisal of the literature as only few research have been focusing exclusively on them so far [see e.g., 
Bird and Gray (2013) for an attempt]. This is for instance the case of pensioners who represent today a 
significant and growing part of the beneficiaries of pension plans. Previous studies are often interested in 
the best interests of the beneficiaries in its entirety or focus on the employees’ welfare such as the 
literature on own company stock. However, these two groups of beneficiaries have in fact very different 
interests and insufficient distinction has been made between them in previous literature. Moreover, in 
practice, the board of trustees can and usually delegates the governance of the pension fund to an 
executive management. This delegation may then result in other types of agency problems which are left 
beyond the scope of this literature review. Finally, there is still a large literature focusing on the 
relationship with external asset managers mandated to invest beneficiaries’ retirement assets [see e.g., 
Besley and Prat (2003); Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992); Bauer, Lum, Frehen, and Otten (2008); Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002); Dvorak (2015)]. A PhD thesis by Cotellon-Rigot (2012) also examines the 
delegation of the investment of pension assets to external parties and in particular to hedge fund managers 
[see also Bouvatier and Rigot (2013)]. This chapter complements their approach as it focuses on the 
internal governance of pension funds and the proper incentives needed to hire, monitor, and fire external 
asset managers. In the end, this chapter aims to review what can potentially go wrong inside pension funds. 
To my knowledge, there is no previous literature review on pension fund governance in a general and 
worldwide matter as it is still a new area of research. Few papers though aim to build in that direction and 
are worth mentioning. Hess and Impavido (2004) adopt a similar approach by applying the agency theory to 
public pension funds specifically and conclude on recommendations for pension boards. Besley and Prat 
(2003) build a model based on contract theory to show the different optimal governance arrangements 
depending on the plan type (defined-benefits vs. defined-contributions). Stewart and Yermo (2008) 
describe governance weaknesses, challenges, and possible solutions for policymakers worldwide. Other 
closely-related papers define best-practices pension fund governance generally [see e.g., Clark (2004); Clark 
and Urwin (2008, 2010)] or for national public pension funds [see e.g., Carmichael and Palacios (2004); 
Impavido (2002); Souto and Musalem (2012)]. 
Finally, this review tries to cover most of the literature, including all leading papers and working ones 
with important results as well as different views or methods. In addition, I include key papers from the 
corporate governance literature and the agency theory as a way to improve our current understanding of 
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pension fund governance. Both literature combined, the goal of this review is to provide a framework to 
study and develop more empirical work on the governance of pension funds. Though, its generality is 
limited by three important points. First, it necessarily reflects my own interests and includes mainly papers 
from the finance-related research. Second, pension funds present very different structure characteristics 
across and inside countries, limiting the general study of their governance. Therefore, some aspects 
reviewed in this chapter may only be applicable for certain types of pension funds such as whether there 
are public vs. private or offer defined-benefits vs. defined-contributions plans. These distinctions are 
particularly important for the agency problems of the employer and are mentioned in this review when 
relevant. Third, although it aims to remain applicable to worldwide pension funds, it is still biased towards 
specific countries. Indeed, a substantial amount of research is drawn from the U.S. environment and, as a 
result of my knowledge, some interpretation and insights are influenced by the Swiss pension system. 
2.2. The board of trustees 
Plan beneficiaries are the ultimate owners of the assets of pension funds and entrust the board of 
trustees to manage their retirement assets in their best interest. This delegation results in a classic agency 
problem of “separation of ownership and control” as first identified for modern corporations by Smith 
(1776) and Berle and Means (1932). In this setting, the beneficiaries delegate the management of the 
pension fund administration and investments to a board of trustees and expect that it will act in their 
interest. However, as for the relationship between shareholders and the manager in corporations, interests 
might diverge between the plan beneficiaries (principal) and the board of trustees (agent). As detailed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs necessarily result from such a “principal-agent relationship” with 
conflicting objectives. In particular for pension funds, this delegation leaves trustees with the greatest 
management power and discretion to initiate any misaligned behavior. In fact, they have more room to act 
in their self-interest and pursue other actions that maximize their own utility. On the other side, 
beneficiaries must trust the board to deliver the pensions at retirement. This is a typical “moral hazard 
problem”, as trustees do not directly bear all the risks and any significant wealth effect associated with 
their decisions.  
2.2.1. Why board effectiveness is key 
As shown by Fama and Jensen (1983), when there is separation of the risk-bearing functions and the 
decision management, there is the need for an internal control mechanism. In this way, the authors justify 
the need of a board as a decision control system in any type of organisation, and especially when the 
principal is dispersed. Therefore, the board exists as an extra layer in the relationship between the plan 
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beneficiaries and the pension fund management to make sure that those managers act in their interests17. 
Yet, in pension funds, the board is not only a monitor and advisor as in corporations, but it is also the direct 
manager [see e.g. also, Hess and Impavido (2004)]. This is its role and responsibility. For example, in 
Switzerland, the board of trustees is the supreme body with the fiduciary duty, responsibility, and tasks of a 
manager as it is the case for a corporate manager [see e.g., LPP art. 51b-2; LPP art. 52; LPP art. 51a]. Then, 
in turn, the board of trustees delegates some tasks to other agents. In practice, it can and usually delegates 
to specialized committees, an internal manager and team, or external experts such as asset managers. In 
sum, the fact that both functions of decision control and decision management, as distinguished by Fama 
and Jensen (1983), are carried by the same agent is the main difference with modern corporations. In 
pension funds, the board of trustees is at the same time a control mechanism and the main agent. 
Any trustees’ misaligned behavior could be intensified when there is little transparency, when 
monitoring is costly, or when replacement is not easy. Remarkably, these three situations have 
characterized the pension fund environment till very recently, and still do in many jurisdictions. First, there 
is a general lack of transparency illustrated by the absence of integrated pension fund information and 
common accounting standards, the complexity and diversity of pension systems across countries, or the 
recent regulatory reforms that promote disclosure as in Finland, the Netherlands or Switzerland18. Second, 
direct monitoring by the plan beneficiaries is costly since they often do not have the necessary financial 
literacy [see e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell (2011); Lusardi and Mitchell (2014)], lack any immediate interest in 
future retirement considerations, have relatively small and dispersed stakes, and cannot usually freely 
choose their pension fund. Third, the firing and replacement of trustees is difficult or impossible due to the 
inherent connection with the employer, the limited market for pension managers, and a relatively low 
compensation offered in comparison with other financial and corporate institutions [see e.g., 
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008); Ambachtsheer and McLaughlin (2015)]19. In the end, this scenery 
may translate into inefficiencies, lower trust in the system, high costs, and ultimately threats to the 
performance, funding, and sustainability of pension funds. Establishing effective board governance is 
crucial for pension funds and for the agents involved in order to mitigate conflicts and align incentives. 
                                                          
17 In Fama and Jensen (1983), the board is seen as an internal discipline device to align incentives in the same way as 
managerial ownership in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the external wage revision process in Fama (1980). 
18 See for instance in Switzerland the 2010-2012 structural reform of the occupational pension scheme or the directive 
by the High Supervision Commission (CHS/OAK) for investment costs disclosure and transparency [see the D-02 (2013) 
based on OPP2 art. 48a-1 and 3], the 2014 pension fund governance reinforcement act and code in the Netherlands 
[see e.g., European Pensions, 16.07.2014. “Netherlands focus: Under pressure”], or the 2015 revision of the 
foundation law for pension funds in Finland [see e.g., Investment & Pensions Europe, 18.08.2014. “Finnish 
government submits bill on pension fund transparency, governance”; Investment & Pensions Europe, 09.12.2015. 
“Finnish foundation law set to strengthen governance”]. 
19 For more discussion on compensation particularly in public pension funds, see also e.g., Pensions & Investments, 
10.06.2013. “Paying for performance”. 
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Effective board governance corresponds to a high degree of accountability, diligence, and should give 
the proper incentives to the trustees. Although there are many control mechanisms that can be put in place 
to achieve that, the effectiveness of the board of trustees itself plays a crucial role. Indeed, for pension 
funds, external factors are rather limited [see e.g. also, Hess and Impavido (2004)]. Instruments such as the 
market pressure, investor scrutiny, and even the law that plays an important role in corporate 
governance20, are mostly absent or only recently developed in some countries. For example, important 
guidelines on best-practices pension fund governance as the Myners Report (2001) in the U.K. and the 
Clapman Report (2007) in the U.S. have come into the attention of the public and regulators, issues related 
to a lack of professionalism, unjustified investment costs, and significant conflicts of interests. Diverse 
guides have been issued by regulators as in the U.K. and Ireland in order to give some guidance to the 
pension board of trustees21. However, there does not seem to be control per se as there are usually no 
obligations and enforcement from the supervisors regarding governance considerations. For instance, 
speaking for the U.K. case, Clark (2004) argues that trustees have still scope for discretion, event after 
specific legislation targeting pension fund governance passed in the U.K. On top of that, most pension funds 
do not face a competitive environment, fear threats from a takeover market, have financial analysts to 
monitor them, or have large interested owners. In such setting, board effectiveness constitutes the key and 
only instrument to ensure and represent the interests of the plan beneficiaries. 
A few studies also directly highlight the crucial importance of board effectiveness in pension funds. In 
particular, Besley and Prat (2003) and Hess and Impavido (2004) both demonstrate that, as beneficiaries 
are dispersed, there is a free-riding problem that reduces their vigilance and create the necessity for a 
strong, motivated, and well-functioning board of trustees. More specifically for public pension funds, 
Schneider and Damanpour (2002) provide evidence for the need of an effective board and explain it as a 
way to mitigate the impact of self-interested officials and public administrators. Despite these studies, 
rationale on the relevance of the board and its effectiveness remain limited. This contrasts with the 
abundant literature evaluating board effectiveness in corporations [see e.g., John and Senbet (1998); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); Lipton and Lorsch (1992)] or in 
other entities such as mutual funds [see e.g., Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2010)], banks [see e.g., De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008)], or life insurance companies [see e.g., Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997)]. 
                                                          
20 For the related literature on corporate governance, control mechanisms, and the importance of legal protection, 
see e.g., the surveys of Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2005); Denis and McConnell (2003); Denis 
(2001); Davis and Useem (2001); John and Senbet (1998); Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010); Gillan (2006); Netter, 
Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2009); Chau (2011). 
21 See e.g., the U.K. Pensions Regulator and the Ireland Pensions Board which have developed respectively the Trustee 
Knowledge and Understanding (TKU) (2009) and the Trustee Handbook (2012) to provide guidelines for the 
responsibilities, roles, and training of the board of trustees in pension funds. 
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2.2.2. The empirical findings 
Most of the literature on pension boards is of empirical nature. Several empirical studies investigate 
the relation between governance measures related with board effectiveness and investment performance, 
asset allocation, operating costs, or funding level. Overall, there are two main, conclusive, and consistent 
findings. Initially, there seems to be a small positive relation between pension board effectiveness and 
investment performance for different countries and various datasets. This is the case for U.S. public 
pension funds [see e.g., Useem and Mitchell (2000); Albrecht and Hingorani (2004); Albrecht, Shamsub, and 
Giannatasio (2007); Hess (2005); Mitchell and Hsin (1994); Yang and Mitchell (2005); Harper (2008a); 
Harper (2008b); Schneider and Damanpour (2002)], Swiss pension funds [see e.g., Ammann and Zingg 
(2010); Ammann and Ehmann (2017)], defined-contributions pension plans in Poland [see e.g., Kowalewski 
(2012); Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2012)], and for an international dataset of large pension schemes [see 
e.g., Koedijk, Slager, and Bauer (2010); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, 
and Scheibelhut (1998)]. However, as a result of the remaining literature, those studies lack to explain why 
an effective board should initially matter and why there should be any relation in the first place.  
Moreover, there are important measurement issues associated with investment performance which 
may invalidate this result. The general problem encountered is that the time-series of returns is usually not 
long enough (with annual data and a short number of observations) to compute Sharpe ratios or Jensen’s 
alphas. This usually leads to measures applied to pension funds which are short-term oriented and which 
do not adjust at all or properly for risk. Ambachtsheer (1994) is one of the first to provide a solution with 
the concept of net value added (NVA) by adjusting for costs and risk with a benchmark based on the 
pension fund asset allocation. Others have then computed abnormal returns in the same spirit [see e.g., 
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998); Albrecht and Hingorani (2004); Albrecht, Shamsub, and 
Giannatasio (2007); Bauer, Lum, Frehen, and Otten (2008); and also Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986); 
Brinson, Singer, and Beebower (1991)]. However, those studies focus on the assets side and still omit to 
account for developments from the liabilities side of pension funds. Specific measures have been 
developed to control for the pension liabilities [see e.g., Plantinga and Huijgen (2000); Plantinga (2005); 
Bolla, Wittig, and Kohler (2016)]22, but they have not been applied in previous work, probably due to data 
availability. 
Another essential finding adds that asset allocation seems to be the channel through which pension 
board effectiveness matters [see e.g., Useem and Mitchell (2000); Albrecht and Hingorani (2004); Dobra 
                                                          
22 In details, such measures of pension fund performance distinguish between surplus-driven and liability-driven assets 
[see e.g., Plantinga and Huijgen (2000)], nominal and real liabilities [see e.g., Plantinga (2005)], or account directly for 
beneficiaries’ parameters [see e.g., Bolla, Wittig, and Kohler (2016)]. 
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and Lubich (2013); Harper (2008a)]. The way trustees decide to invest and allocate pension assets seems to 
explain how an effective pension board may affect the pension fund performance. Nevertheless, these 
studies on asset allocation and the ones evaluating directly the relation with investment performance still 
lack robustness in their empirical setting and methodology. The samples remain small, with a short time-
series, few pension funds, often based on a single country, and there are no endogeneity tests or causality 
assessments. There is definitely more empirical work needed to validate these current findings. 
Additional studies are also needed to understand why and how board effectiveness should matter 
for pension funds. Operating costs may be an alternative channel although the results so far are not 
conclusive. Indeed, pension board effectiveness may have no direct impact on net performance as its 
influence might be on costs reduction through a better monitoring. For instance, favours to external 
experts or too high fees charged by asset managers might be avoided with more competent boards. This 
potential explanation should be of large interest as costs are an important component of pension fund 
sustainability due to the accumulation process resulting from the long-term nature of pension funds. 
Moreover, it is crucial in today’s challenging environment where expected returns are low and costs 
reduction is a primary source of value for pension funds. 
The hypothesis that lower operating costs are associated with more effective, small, and 
independent boards has been tested and confirmed for mutual funds [see e.g., Del Guercio, Dann, and 
Partch (2003); Tufano and Sevick (1997)]. The level of the total expense ratio is even considered as a direct 
measure of board effectiveness. Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) also provide evidence for the impact 
of board composition in monitoring the expenses of life insurance companies. However, the lack of 
conclusive results for pension funds may be explained by two reasons. First, sound governance standards 
might be too costly. This concern is confirmed by the study of Tan and Cam (2015) on Australian pension 
funds who show that best-practices governance structures such as independent trustees and board 
committees do not benefit pension funds through a reduction of costs, and even find a strong positive link. 
Second, it could be that the level of operating costs might be primarily determined by fund size and 
governance considerations might have no influence beyond the important economies of scale experienced 
by large pension funds [see e.g., Bikker and De Dreu (2009); Dyck and Pomorski (2011); Bikker, Steenbeek, 
and Torracchi (2012); Bikker (2017)].  
Finally, governance measures used for empirical studies are various. Some of them only focus on 
board composition and structure [see e.g., Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2012); Harper (2008a); Harper 
(2008b); Schneider and Damanpour (2002); Tan and Cam (2015)]. Others include additional variables 
related with, among others, investment rules and practices such as a prudent person approach or 
independent performance evaluations [see e.g., Useem and Mitchell (2000); Albrecht and Hingorani (2004); 
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Albrecht, Shamsub, and Giannatasio (2007); Dobra and Lubich (2013); Hess (2005); Mitchell and Hsin 
(1994); Yang and Mitchell (2005)]. More complete and integrated measures have also been developed 
including a large set of variables adding up turnover, expertise, codes, or fines [see Kowalewski (2012)], 
governance indices with a large spectrum of variables including investment design [see Ammann and Zingg 
(2010); Ammann and Ehmann (2017)], and a survey score based on CEO assessments on elements such as 
trustees compensation or mission clarity [see Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008); Ambachtsheer, 
Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998)]. This plethora of measures raises an important question. Which one is the 
best to capture the effectiveness of pension boards? What really matters? Board composition cannot be 
the only aspect. Some measures also lack rationale as there are linked to the variables available in datasets.  
In the end of this review of the empirical work related with pension board effectiveness, several 
questions remain unanswered. What makes a good and strong pension board? What are the desirable 
attributes of an effective pension board? To my knowledge, there is no clear identification of the agency 
problems in pension boards, an analysis of the potential solutions to mitigate them, or a study of their 
sources and determinants that may strengthen it. This is an important strand of the literature that is 
currently missing for pension funds and a path that needs to be particularly investigated in further 
research. It might also explain the diversity of the measures used to capture pension board effectiveness 
and could narrow down its definition. 
2.2.3. Potential agency problems 
Common agency problems of the board of trustees are neither clearly identified nor empirically 
investigated as such. Instead, previous empirical work on pension funds studies specific governance 
characteristics related with board effectiveness and, in some cases, mention related agency problems. The 
literature on corporate boards provide as well insights which may be applicable to pension funds. By 
combining both literature, the goal of this Sub-section is to review and list the key agency problems that 
may exist in pension boards around the world in order to build additional empirical work. I classify these 
potential agency problems in three distinct groups and label them “opportunism”, “shirking”, and 
“incompetence”. Each of them is described in details below23. 
2.2.3.1. Opportunism 
A first important agency problem may arise in situations where trustees favor their own interest over 
beneficiaries’ one. This is for example the case when trustees decide to promote friends or families when it 
comes to allocate investment mandates to external parties. In addition of conflicts of interests, trustees’ 
                                                          
23 Note that this conceptualization is part of a larger and joint project with Carolina Salva. 
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opportunism might develop under different forms [see e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. It could be through 
private benefits of control with pet projects or fancy offices, misallocation of funds till full expropriation, 
self-dealing by manipulating financial figures, or entrenchment of their positions. However, in comparison 
with the corporate governance literature, the so-called entrenchment or anti-takeover provisions might not 
be so important or even applicable for pension funds [see e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)]. Indeed, stock markets and takeover threats do 
not exist for pension funds and trustee’s positions are often primarily linked with their employment.  
Most work involving pension boards has been focusing on the agency problem of opportunism by 
looking at the board composition and the conflicting interests of its trustees. As discussed previously, 
empirical studies also include it, partially or exclusively, in their measurement of pension board 
effectiveness. Still, there are many other forms of opportunistic behaviors that are left unexplored. 
Moreover, most studies have focused the discussion on the independence of the board as a way to resolve 
the conflicts of interests. This approach is embedded with two serious concerns. First, the corporate 
literature questions board independence as an effective mechanism. Indeed, board independence, as proxy 
by the proportion of outsiders, as long and extensively been studied for corporations [see e.g., Bhagat and 
Black (1999); Bhagat and Black (2002); Harris and Raviv (2008); John and Senbet (1998); Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003); Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); Denis (2001); Denis and McConnell (2003)]. This 
literature offers mixed evidence and shows that outsiders may not necessarily act in shareholders’ interest. 
In particular, Bhagat and Black (1999) and Bhagat and Black (2002) provide large evidence of no relation 
with corporate performance. A model developed by Harris and Raviv (2008) even shows that an outsiders-
controlled board might not be the optimal choice in the first place and that an optimal board should be the 
result from the tradeoff between both agency problems of decision-making and information. 
Second, this approach and the lessons from the corporate literature do not really apply to pension 
funds. Indeed, the primary question is not to be independent from the manager (as the board of trustees is 
by definition the direct internal manager) but more to represent the interests of the plan beneficiaries. 
Moreover, the proportion of outsiders cannot be a good proxy as trustee’s positions are generally related 
with employment, not occupied by professionals, and plan outsiders might not even be allowed in some 
cases. Indeed, most trustees are by designation not external to plans and sit on pension boards either as a 
representative of the employer or employees. This is for example the case in militia systems such as in 
Switzerland where equal representation of the employees and employer is legally required in pension 
boards [see LPP art. 51-1]. In the end, it should be more a matter of representativeness for pension funds 
than of independence as for corporations. 
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2.2.3.2. Shirking 
Trustees in pension funds tend to have full-time jobs or enjoy other mandates in parallel. As stressed 
by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), a lack of time and the inefficient way of using the few available is one of the 
major constraints on the effectiveness of corporate boards. Trustees may receive different kinds of 
compensation for their pension board representation. These may include performance-linked financial 
compensation, indemnity for attending, or counting the representation time within the regular working 
hours. Nevertheless, poor remuneration policies that are prevalent [see e.g., Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and 
Lum (2008); Ambachtsheer and McLaughlin (2015)] may not incentivize the most professional behaviors. As 
such, trustees may neglect their fiduciary duty and responsibility and favor the “path of least resistance”, 
meaning that they may prefer passive and herding decisions regarding pension investments [see e.g., Choi, 
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002)]. Trustees may also prefer to enjoy a “quiet life” and avoid taking 
difficult decisions which might cause them additional time and effort [see e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003)]. Furthermore, trustees may be too “busy” with other tasks and behave as passive actors and less 
effective monitors [see e.g., Fich and Shivdasani (2006)]. Any of these passive behaviors could be classified 
under shirking and significantly impact the plan beneficiaries’ welfare in the long term. 
Motivation and commitment are soft factors that are hard to quantify and integrate in any 
governance measure. Still, there are empirical studies in the literature of pension boards identifying 
variables as mitigating the issue of shirking. For instance, the CEO survey score includes assessments based 
on time spending [see Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Scheibelhut 
(1998)]. Other authors use as a proxy for motivated trustees the fact that there are elected as plan 
beneficiaries [see Hess (2005)] or that the chairman can be seen as a motivated insider [see Jackowicz and 
Kowalewski (2012)]. Appropriate compensation is a key incentive aiming at motivating trustees which is 
often studied [see e.g., Ambachtsheer and McLaughlin (2015); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008); 
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998); Ammann and Zingg (2010); Kowalewski (2012)].  
Having small boards may also be a way to commit trustees to actively participate and take decisions, 
although this aspect of board structure is usually not explored for that reason. This last point is particularly 
worth further investigation as the literature on corporate board size supports the general positive impact of 
smaller boards on performance and the quality of decisions [see e.g., Yermack (1996); John and Senbet 
(1998); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); Denis (2001); Denis and 
McConnell (2003); Davis and Useem (2001)]. On the other hand, and of relevance for pension funds, small 
boards are challenged by the need of representation of all participants. 
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2.2.3.3. Incompetence 
Board competence is a crucial determinant of pension fund sustainability. However, since the Myners 
Report (2001) in the U.K., several authors highlight the general problem of a lack of competence of trustees 
in the investment decision-making process and strategic thinking [see e.g., Clark (2004); Clark, Caerlewy-
Smith, and Marshall (2006, 2007); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008)]. For instance, Clark, Caerlewy-
Smith, and Marshall (2006, 2007) show an important heterogeneity in trustee competence, an absence of 
common approach, and an issue of consistency in decision-making regarding investments. Outside the 
boardroom, recent studies also provide evidence of a generally low level of financial literacy [see e.g. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011); Lusardi and Mitchell (2014)]. In brief, these studies show that people 
systematically fail in incorporating basic principles of time, risk, and diversification in investment decisions. 
As the complexity of the finance world requires today high levels of expertise and sophistication in 
investments, this agency problem could severely impair beneficiaries’ retirement wealth. Moreover, Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) highlight the complexity and amount of information as an important constraint on the 
effectiveness of corporate boards. The competence of the board is thus key to process all this information. 
Despite being often mentioned in the pension fund literature, the issue of trustees’ competence still 
need empirical investigation. Some studies have focused their attention on the existence of a designed 
framework for trustees to take investment decisions through several aspects as, for instance, estimations 
for the investment strategy or rules for the investment process [see e.g., Ammann and Zingg (2010); 
Ammann and Ehmann (2017); Useem and Mitchell (2000)]. Others examine diverse forms of expertise 
through education or experience and include it in their governance measures but it remains incomplete as 
detailed personal information on trustees are often absent from datasets [see e.g., Kowalewski (2012); 
Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2012) for an exception in Poland]. On the other hand, the literature on 
corporate boards delivers evidence of the importance and positive impact of financial expertise for the 
quality of board decisions. For example, Defond, Hann, and Hu (2005) show that the market reacts 
positively to appointments of accountants in audit committees, as these experts are expected to enhance 
the quality of financial reporting. Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) show that bankers (with no other 
conflicting bank mandate) provide valuable financial expertise in corporate boards. Further, Gray and 
Nowland (2014) show that board diversity in professional expertise limited to accountants, bankers, 
lawyers, consultants, and other CEOs benefit shareholders24. For pension funds, board expertise in 
investments is expected to be even more relevant as the management of plan beneficiaries’ pension assets 
actually characterizes their core business. 
                                                          
24 Although not directly related with financial expertise, two other studies from the corporate boards literature also 
highlight the positive impact of specific expertise in boards: (1) Fich (2005) with other well-performing CEOs and (2) 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) with politically-related directors. 
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To conclude, a strong board needs not only to ensure the representation of the beneficiaries’ 
interests but also to have the necessary expertise to manage millions of pension assets. Depending on the 
kinds of pension funds, it may include different skills from risk-return assessments to managerial ones such 
as in a multi-employer form. However, most trustees (and in particular the ones elected among the 
employees) usually do not have such expertise as they are not elected for this specific reason, which is a 
serious concern for the effectiveness of pension boards. This tradeoff between “representation” and 
“expertise” in pension boards is frequently mentioned and examined in the related literature [see e.g., 
Besley and Prat (2003); Hess (2005); Jackowicz and Kowalewski (2012); Clark (2007)]25. It is especially 
developed in Clark (2007) with an application to the governance of U.K. pension funds. However, further 
research is needed to determine if one aspect generally outweighs the other, for different types of plan, or 
under which circumstances. 
2.3. The sponsoring employer 
Employers around the world choose and offer pension plans to their employees. Along with legal and 
accounting obligations, they are engaged in managing the most appropriate, well-performing, and 
sustainable plans for their current and past employees. They are also the most important money 
contributor to these plans although they cannot benefit from this money anymore. This leaves them with 
the most stringent incentives to help flourish the retirement assets of plan beneficiaries. However, the 
sponsoring employer (including governments and their politicians as well as companies and their managers) 
may have different goals. Overall, the employer may be more interested in minimizing its contributions to 
the plans and related operating costs than maximizing the plan performance and returns credited on the 
beneficiaries’ accounts. He may also engage in different kinds of misaligned behaviors that could threaten 
the wealth of pension plan beneficiaries. Each of them is described in details in the following Sub-sections. 
In some cases, the employer’s influence may be direct such as for U.S. corporate pension plans as their 
administration is usually run by the corporation itself. Ultimately for all pension funds around the world, 
the agency problems of the employer might concretize inside the boardroom through its seats and impact 
board decisions.  
2.3.1. Diversions of pension assets 
The employer may use pension assets for its own purposes and needs. As a result, beneficiaries’ 
savings might be invested into loans to the employer, employer’s buildings, or even employer’s stock for 
listed corporations. For instance, one recent study by Atanasova and Chemla (2014) shows that companies 
                                                          
25 A model for corporate boards by Wagner (2011) also focuses on a similar tradeoff between independence and 
competence. The author shows that a less competent board (in terms of information about projects quality) is related 
with inefficient loyalty to the CEO, harming shareholders’ interests. 
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which are intensive in R&D, land, and buildings tilt the asset allocation of their pension plans towards more 
alternative investments. Although this decision might be explained by a familiarity bias, it eventually harms 
plan beneficiaries as the authors show that these sponsor-related assets produce negative returns. In the 
end, an asset allocation determined by the employer (whether a government or a company) has been 
shown to be inefficient for plan beneficiaries [see e.g., Besley and Prat (2003); Hess and Impavido (2004)]. 
However, this assessment still lack a general empirical support, while two specific cases have received a 
particular attention in the U.S. literature. First, for public pension funds, governments and their politicians 
may influence asset allocation decisions [see e.g., Hess (2005); Hess and Impavido (2004); Bradley, 
Pantzalis, and Yuan (2016); Dobra and Lubich (2013); Mohan and Zhang (2014)]. Political interference may 
even partly explain their underfunding [see e.g., Elder and Wagner (2015); Eaton and Nofsinger (2004)]. For 
instance, politicians may induce pension investments that favor local economic and social projects, limit 
certain types of investments, or pursue their own short-term political agenda.  
Second, as extensively studied for corporate pension plans, listed companies might decide to invest a 
substantial part of their plan assets into their own stock. The specific case of sponsor allocation into “own 
company stock” came in the spotlights after dramatic stock price collapses and firm bankruptcies as the 
Enron case [see e.g., Poterba (2003); Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein 
(2007)], and is still up-to-date26. However, outside the U.S., little is known about the case of own company 
stock. A first reason could be that data unavailability makes it difficult to build empirical work [see e.g., Lee, 
Liu, and Zhu (2007) for an exception in Taiwan]. Second, it could be that this problem might not even exist 
in other countries due to specific legal prescriptions. For example, in Switzerland, OPP2 art. 57-2 requires a 
5% investment limit for all types of sponsor allocation, including own company stock. As a result of the 
substantial research, the findings from this U.S. literature are presented in the next Sub-section. 
2.3.2. The case of own company stock in the U.S. 
Diverse estimations highlight the size and potential impact of investing in the own stock of the 
company. Benartzi (2001) estimates that about one-third of large retirement 401(k) accounts are invested 
in the own company stock27. Poterba (2003) adds that about one-fourth of 401(k)s hold more than 20%. At 
the extreme, Mitchell and Utkus (2004) estimate that more than 5 million of Americans hold more than 
60% of their future retirement invested in the single company there are currently working for. Although not 
all companies are concerned, this problem is particularly important as it involves large companies with a 
                                                          
26 See e.g., a recent newspaper article building from the RadioShack case, The New York Times, 20.03.2015. “A scary 
movie: Filling your 401(k) with company stock”. 
27 Note that in typical 401(k)s, the employees have to choose an investment strategy for their pension plan following 
the menu and options offered by the employer. Thus, there are two different types of investment choices under 
401(k) pension plans. 
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large number of plan beneficiaries [see e.g., Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Poterba (2003); Even and 
Macpherson (2004)]. As evidenced by Even and Macpherson (2004), while only one-tenth of defined-
contributions pension plans have any investment in their related company stock, one-third of all workers in 
this type of plans are affected by the problem. 
Holding a significant portion of pension assets into own company stock contradicts modern portfolio 
theory and the core investment principle of diversification established since Markowitz (1952). With this 
investment, plan beneficiaries have to assume the additional volatility of holding a single stock that could 
be diversified in their retirement portfolio. This is called the idiosyncratic risk. There is also the risk for 
employees of having their current wages, present job, and human capital correlated with their future 
income and retirement assets. By being dependent of the company stock performance, an employee might 
lose both its job and wealth in the worst-case scenario. All studies on the topic agree that these are the 
main disadvantages and risks for corporate employees [see e.g., Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Benartzi, 
Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007); Even and Macpherson (2004); Poterba (2003); Benartzi (2001); Rauh 
(2006a)]. Some authors have even estimated the associated cost of this diversification issue [see e.g., 
Meulbroek (2005); Ramaswamy (2004); Poterba (2003); Poterba (2004); Even and Macpherson (2004); 
Even and Macpherson (2008)]. Even and Macpherson (2008) also particularly examine the consequences of 
this poor diversification. The authors give evidence that a high concentration of employer’s stock reduces 
the risk-adjusted return performance, while modest holdings have a negligible impact28.  
Explanations for employers choosing to hold their own stock in the pension plans they offer to their 
employees are advanced in the associated literature [see e.g., Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Benartzi, Thaler, 
Utkus, and Sunstein (2007); Even and Macpherson (2004); Rauh (2006a); Beatty (1994)]. Initially, this form 
of employee ownership was encouraged to strengthen the loyalty and motivation of workers. The main 
purpose was to increase employee’s productivity in order to maximize firm value29. This reason particularly 
explains the expansion of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and KSOPs (which are a combination of 
ESOP and 401(k)) in the U.S. landscape. However, empirical studies provide mixed evidence for the 
productivity hypothesis. Although employee’s motivation appears to be increased, results on corporate 
outcomes turn out to be inconclusive [see e.g., Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and 
Sunstein (2007); Even and Macpherson (2004)]. This might be explained by the free-riding problem of the 
impact of one worker’s effort on the overall performance of the company [see e.g., Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, 
and Sunstein (2007); Even and Macpherson (2004)]. 
                                                          
28 On the other hand, there are also associated benefits with this investment. These include monetary tax advantages, 
private information for discretionary contributions, and the feeling of being part of the team and owning a part of 
your own firm [see e.g., Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007); Mitchell and Utkus (2004)]. 
29 This contradicts the initial goal of pension funds as being the interest of plan beneficiaries and in particular their 
retirement safety. 
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Other explanations are also advanced in the literature but they have all received little or no empirical 
support. These include (1) tax advantages as the deductibility of dividends in KSOPs [see e.g., Benartzi, 
Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007); Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Beatty (1994); Even and Macpherson 
(2004)], (2) financing reasons as stocks cost less than cash contributions [see e.g., Mitchell and Utkus 
(2004); Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007); Even and Macpherson (2004)], (3) behavioural motives 
as if the employer also offers other safer plans and their stock is a blue chip [see e.g., Mitchell and Utkus 
(2004)], and (4) the specific U.S. legal and accounting environment [see e.g., Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and 
Sunstein (2007)]. 
A hypothesis has received a particular attention and empirical support: “ownership for control” [see 
e.g., Rauh (2006a); Beatty (1994); Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007); 
Even and Macpherson (2004)]. According to this idea, employer’s decision to invest in their own stock 
might be a defensive strategy from the company managers to protect themselves from a potential hostile 
takeover. Employee ownership might act as a substitute for managerial ownership if both employees and 
managers intentions are aligned together. In the case of a takeover threat, this is most likely to be true as 
both employees and managers should intend to focus on keeping their jobs. In the end, investing plan 
assets into the own company stock might be an alternative way to find managerial entrenchment without 
bearing the agency costs [see e.g., Rauh (2006a)]. The study of Beatty (1994) is the first to give some 
support for the anti-takeover hypothesis. It shows that ESOPs are more likely to be adopted by companies 
with a higher risk of a takeover. Using changes in state laws as a natural experiment, Rauh (2006a) also 
robustly shows that employee ownership is indeed effective in reducing takeover probabilities. Moreover, 
the author suggests that cross-sectional corporate governance might be an additional and promising 
hypothesis. Indeed, anti-takeover provisions put in place by corporate managers such as a staggered board 
is a way to entrench themselves from takeovers [see e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009); Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Faleye (2007)]. On the other hand, Comment and 
Schwert (1995) cast some doubts on the real deterrence effect of these anti-takeover provisions. There is 
definitely further research needed on this question. 
Finally, behavioural reasons can explain why employees may voluntary choose to invest in their own 
company stock, despite the associated costs [see e.g., Even and Macpherson (2004); Benartzi (2001); 
Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007), Mitchell and Utkus (2004); Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and 
Metrick (2003)]. These explanations are specific to U.S. 401(k)s and applicable to other countries and cases 
where employees can freely choose the investment strategy of their pension plan30. A first reason might 
simply be a “familiarity bias”. Indeed, it might feel and look like a good choice from the employee’s 
                                                          
30 In Switzerland, although they do not apply for the employer-based pension system (second pillar), they may exist in 
the voluntary third pillar in which individuals are left with their own investment choices. 
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perspective to invest in a company you know, are engaged to, and daily work for. Second, there might be 
an “endorsement effect” if employers offer in the first place their own stock in the investment menu (and 
with a high default options level) as well as match employees’ contributions with their own stock31. Third, 
employees’ myopia in the “risk assessment” of their own company stock and relatively to the stock market 
might be an additional explanation. For example, evidence by Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein (2007) 
shows that employees underestimate the risk of owning their company stock in comparison with a 
diversified portfolio. Finally, a fourth important reason may be a “representativeness bias”. As shown by 
Benartzi (2001) and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2003), employees excessively extrapolate past 
company stock returns as an indicator of future performance. This leads them to allocate their 
discretionary contributions to employer’s stock following high past returns. Indeed, as evidenced by 
Benartzi (2001), employees allocate 40% for best performers, while only 10% is allocated for worst 
performers. 
2.3.3. Misconducts in financial distress 
The employer may favor its own durability over its pension plans in particularly constrained or 
distressed situations. Specifically, for defined-benefits pension plans, the beneficiaries are protected and 
only the employer has to bear the extra payoffs due to deficits and the immediate consequences of 
underfunding [see e.g., McCarthy and Miles (2013); Besley and Prat (2003)]. The sponsoring employer is 
merely the residual claimant [see e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)]32. This payoffs asymmetry 
gives the employer the incentive to act in its own interest in order to prevent any additional contributions. 
And this problem is crucial for financially-distressed companies, i.e., for companies with a high debt 
leverage and/or low-funded pension plans. In cash-constrained situations and with mandatory pension 
contributions, companies’ investments and capital expenditures may suffer [see e.g., Rauh (2006b); 
Franzoni (2009)]. Companies may also prefer to pay shareholders’ dividends than refund their pension 
plans [see e.g., Webb (2007); Cocco and Volpin (2007)]33. Governments may as well have other budgetary 
problems and urgent spending [see e.g., Hess (2005)]. 
                                                          
31 The plan design and investment menu offered by the employer to its employees also induce a plethora of 
behavioural biases for individual retirement decisions. A large literature discusses these biases [see e.g., the surveys of 
Choi (2015); Mitchell and Utkus (2003)] and provide evidence for different kinds of consequences on employees’ 
retirement [see e.g., Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007); Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2010); Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian, and Metrick (2002); Madrian and Shea (2001); Sialm, Starks, and Zhang (2015); Benartzi and Thaler (2001); 
Huberman and Jiang (2006); Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2006); Bubb, Corrigan, and Warren (2015)]. 
32 For public pension funds, taxpayers are in fact the last-resort residual claimant [see e.g., Pennacchi and Rastad 
(2011); Dobra and Lubich (2013)]. 
33 Webb (2007) develops a model where a pension plan deficit is seen as a company debt, affects the company’s real 
investment and capital structure, and depends on the institutional environment. The employer’s incentive of choosing 
dividends over the funding of its pension plans is only one of the model implications. 
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In addition of reduced contributions, previous literature identifies two ways the employer may take 
costly decisions for the plan beneficiaries by transferring its financial risks to its pension plans. First, with 
funding issues, the employer could be suspected to manipulate its actuarial assumptions as the technical 
interest rate applied to value pension liabilities. This liability discount rate might be artificially set higher 
(and as such lower pension liabilities) in order to meet funding requirements, improve funding status, or 
simply reduce the due contributions. However, by setting a higher technical rate, pension funds need to 
assume a higher expected rate of returns on pension assets and thus increase investment risk. Several 
studies confirm that this “actuarial mechanism” is problematic for public pension funds [see e.g., Andonov, 
Bauer, and Cremers (2013); Mohan and Zhang (2014); Pennacchi and Rastad (2011); Eaton and Nofsinger 
(2004); Hess (2005)] as well as, to some extent, for corporate pension plans [see e.g., Bergstresser, Desai, 
and Rauh (2006); Kisser, Kiff, and Soto (2015); Cocco and Volpin (2007); Newell, Kreuze, and Hurtt (2002)]. 
Indeed, Newell, Kreuze, and Hurtt (2002) find a reverse causality between actuarial assumptions and 
funding status. Cocco and Volpin (2007) do not find support for this idea, probably due to specific U.K. 
regulation where this decision is rather in actuaries’ than employers’ hands.  
If a higher investment risk is taken only to justify actuarial assumptions and hide underfunding, it can 
have severe implications for plan beneficiaries. For example, as shown by Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers 
(2013) on an international dataset, the resulting increased investment risk-taking in U.S. public pension 
funds is associated with underperformance. However, this result is mainly due to distinct U.S. regulation for 
public pension funds that ties the technical rate with the expected rate of returns on pension assets, and 
might not apply in other countries [see e.g., Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013); Cocco and Volpin 
(2007)]. Yet, it could be very costly for any pension fund around the world if it further delays needed 
restructuring measures. 
Second, financial distress may directly influence the employer’s choice of the investment policy and 
risk-taking behavior of its pension plans. Two hypotheses compete in a large and still active literature. The 
“risk management hypothesis” advocates that companies experiencing high default risks and low funding 
ratios will take less risk (by allocating less into equity) in order to limit the costs of financial distress [see 
e.g., Rauh (2009); An, Huang, and Zhang (2013); Weller and Wenger (2009); Gerber and Weber (2007)]. For 
very poorly funded pension plans, McCarthy and Miles (2013) also show that sponsors have incentives to 
invest safely and Atanasova and Chemla (2014) provide evidence that they invest less in alternative 
investments. Related to corporate governance, Vafeas and Vlittis (2016) also show that a higher proportion 
of outside trustees in pension boards also supports the risk management hypothesis.  
On the other hand, the “risk shifting (or transfer) hypothesis” stresses that companies in such 
situations will increase the equity allocation in their pension plans as a way to gamble for resurrection and 
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catch up with pension underfunding. This is the consequence of the actuarial mechanism as described 
previously. Accordingly, the behavior of public pension funds facing funding issues usually supports this 
hypothesis [see e.g., Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013); Mohan and Zhang (2014); Pennacchi and Rastad 
(2011)]. However, a study by Park (2014) may also suggest that this increased risk-taking behavior is not 
constant over time and may change during difficult periods. Indeed, following the 2008 financial crisis, 
public sponsors facing mandatory pension contributions shifted their behavior by investing less into equity. 
Additionally, this hypothesis also appears to be supported for companies in extreme financial distress [see 
e.g., An, Huang, and Zhang (2013); Guan and Lui (2016)], when corporate managers have incentives to 
manipulate corporate earnings [see Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2006)], or when pension boards include 
a higher proportion of corporate directors [see Cocco and Volpin (2007)]. 
2.4. Conclusion 
Pension fund governance studies the participating agents and their diverging incentives which could 
harm plan beneficiaries’ best interests. This chapter reviews its literature by focusing on the internal agency 
problems induced by the board of trustees and the sponsoring employer in pension funds around the 
world. It also uses insights from the corporate governance literature as a way to improve our current 
understanding of the topic. Overall, previous research places board effectiveness at the centre of pension 
fund governance and emphasizes on the employer’s influence over pension fund asset allocation decisions. 
However, pension fund governance remains a new area of research. Little is known or investigated outside 
the U.S., only a few datasets are available in specific countries, additional explanatory work and more 
robustness in empirical studies are needed, and there is definitely the need to learn more about pension 
boards. 
This chapter is also a foundation to build more empirical work on the governance of pension funds 
and in particular on the effectiveness of their pension boards. Several avenues for further research have 
been highlighted along this review. The following and remaining chapters of this thesis focus on some of 
them. Specifically, Chapter 3 aims to analyse the sources and determinants of an effective pension board. 
For that purpose, it also designs a new measure of pension board effectiveness. Chapter 4 examines 
whether and to what extent it really matters and may impact pension fund asset allocation.  
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Chapter 3. 
 
What are the sources of an effective pension board? 
Evidence from Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
An effective pension board is supposed to act on the best interests of its plan beneficiaries. In 
particular, its integrity, commitment, and competence should ensure that pension assets are properly 
managed and the pensions are guaranteed. However, several sources may drive the board away from its 
main goal or on the contrary strengthen its effectiveness. Legal constraints may force pension boards to 
adopt attributes diverting them from their optimum. A public employer may be associated with more 
conflicts of interests and thus a less effective board. Pension funds offering defined-benefits plans may 
protect better their beneficiaries. Likewise, larger pension funds may have the necessarily means and 
resources from scale economies to invest in best-practices standards such as training or compensation, 
enhancing their board effectiveness. 
This chapter aims to analyse the determinants of the effectiveness of pension boards. Using the 
Swiss framework, it is the first study that focuses on this question for pension funds34. In contrast, the 
literature on the determinants of effective corporate boards is large. Previous surveys emphasize on the 
                                                          
34 Note that a PhD thesis by Njuguna (2010, 2011) looks at the determinants of pension fund efficiency through the 
governance question in pension funds in Kenya. However, this work is specific to a particular emerging economy very 
different from Switzerland and other countries with professionalized systems. 
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endogenous and optimal nature of strong boards [see e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Adams, 
Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); John and Senbet (1998)]. Empirical studies particularly examine the factors 
shaping the size and composition of corporate boards and give support to some of them such as the size of 
the firm or growth opportunities [see e.g., Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007); Lehn, Patro, and Zhao 
(2009)]. This study contributes to this strand of research in two ways. First, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
conclude that relatively little is known for other entities than corporations. Although optimality might be a 
common feature across boards, the relevant sources of board distortions for pension funds are expected to 
be different due to another agency setting and institutional environment. New rationale and empirical 
work are needed specifically for pension funds. Second, Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) show that 
a lot remains unexplained following established theories. Therefore, the results from this study may, to 
some extent, complement the unexplained variation in corporate boards and add further understanding to 
the shaping of boards in general. 
Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) also suggest that the unexplained variation in boards may lie 
in entity-specific factors affecting different board characteristics. For this reason, I focus the analysis of 
potentially relevant sources on pension fund variables such as fund size and structure characteristics 
including, among others, legal form and plan type. Due to the importance of the endogeneity of boards and 
the country’s system for pension funds, I also emphasize on the legal provisions and their potential effect 
on pension board effectiveness. I then empirically assess what drives and shapes strong pension boards by 
looking at various dimensions of board effectiveness including integrity, commitment, and competence. 
This represents a broader set of board characteristics than the usual concentration on aspects of board 
structure such as size and composition [see e.g., Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007); Lehn, Patro, and 
Zhao (2009)]. 
To conduct empirical tests, I use a unique hand-collected dataset of Swiss pension funds and develop 
a new measure describing the effectiveness of pension boards directly applicable to Swiss pension funds. 
To construct the measure, I gather a comprehensive list of 24 desirable attributes meeting best-practices 
criteria and classified in each of the dimensions of board effectiveness. I also identify seven out of the 24 
attributes as legally binding provisions for pension funds in Switzerland. I then aggregate the related 
attributes into an equally-weighted index of board effectiveness as well as sub-indices for each dimension, 
the provisions which are legally binding, and the ones which can be complied on a voluntary basis.  
Previous studies also investigate pension fund governance in Switzerland while they focus on its 
relation with investment performance using surveys [see Ammann and Zingg (2010); Ammann and Ehmann 
(2017)]. This chapter complements their work by analysing the determinants of an originally superior level 
of governance using a new dataset including the smallest Swiss pension funds. As constrained by my 
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dataset, I cannot directly replicate their measures. Instead, I build another measure that may bring 
additional governance insights in Switzerland. Mostly, it includes attributes representing a subset of their 
indices and adding relevant elements of board structure and representativeness.  
With data collected directly from Swiss pension fund annual reports and other important files 
covering the period 2010-2012, I describe the levels of board effectiveness and its dimensions of 210 
unique pension funds for a full sample of 614 fund-year observations. Compared to surveys, this data 
collection process from reported files has the advantages of remaining based on objective information and 
without positive selection bias. On the other hand, I can only focus on what is available and collectable in 
Swiss pension fund files. The information disclosed and its level of transparency will necessarily influence 
the measurement of pension board effectiveness as well as the interpretation of the results. 
Overall, I observe a high diversity in the Swiss pension fund landscape. In my sample, Swiss pension 
funds can manage less than CHF 100,000 in assets to almost CHF 8 billion, have up to 3,888 affiliated 
employers, offer 15 different pension plans, and have a number of beneficiaries varying from 1 to 76,687. 
Moreover, 5% are public entities and 15% offer defined-benefits plans which is representative of the Swiss 
pension market in that matter. There are also large differences in the desirable attributes and level of 
effectiveness of Swiss pension boards, where some of them seem to be less common. For instance, 
descriptive results show that only 22% of the pension funds offer a compensation to trustees, 56% mention 
a training of the trustees, and 66% have an internal manager for the daily operations of the administration 
and/or the investments. Moreover, most pension boards do not have the recommended organisation and 
still lack to clearly establish a detailed framework to take investment decisions. 
The results from the analysis show that fund size is the key explanatory variable of my measure of 
board effectiveness and that it matters beyond other potentially relevant sources. In particular, large 
pension funds managing their administration internally seem to be associated with more effective and 
committed boards. This is consistent with the hypothesis that pension funds with a sufficient scale have the 
economies to invest in best-practices attributes and to build an in-house administration team35. Although 
the plan type distinction (defined-benefits vs. defined-contributions) does not seem to be initially relevant 
in Switzerland, fund size matters beyond the legal form of the pension fund (private vs. public). This 
conclusion is also robust for all three dimensions of board effectiveness, whether fund size is proxy in terms 
of assets or beneficiaries, by excluding public pension funds or funds planning a liquidation procedure, and 
across the three years included in the sample.  
                                                          
35 In this study, I show that an in-house administration team is associated with my measure of board effectiveness. 
However, I do not claim any causality or that it is necessarily the best solution for all types of pension funds and in 
particular the smallest ones. 
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Following these results, fund size seems to be an important determinant. However, it could be 
endogenously determined. In particular, multi-employer pension funds may decide to invest in high 
standards of governance in order to attract more employers and grow in size. On the contrary, in 
Switzerland, single-employer pension funds have their size constrained by the size of the employer. Fund 
size is given as exogenous. On a sub-sample of this particular kind of pension funds, the results are 
qualitatively similar, which lowers to some extent the concern of reverse causality.  
Furthermore, the results hold when focusing on the provisions voluntary chosen by Swiss pension 
boards. However, this claim has to be taken with caution as Swiss pension funds do not seem to comply 
with the attributes identified as legally binding provisions. The major reason for this puzzling result is linked 
to the data collection process and transparency in Swiss pension fund files. From a practical perspective, 
non-documentation is different from non-implementation. This important limitation associated with the 
measurement of pension board effectiveness prevents me from concluding on whether legal constraints 
are a relevant source of pension board distortions in Switzerland. 
As a final point, I cannot exclude transparency as an alternative explanation to the findings. This is 
especially relevant as fund size is particularly a significant and important explanatory variable for a sub-
sample of the smallest pension funds, which are also usually the ones with less documentation and 
disclosed information. Therefore, governance considerations cannot be clearly dissociated from 
transparency aspects in this study. It remains that pension fund governance, its board effectiveness, and 
transparency seem to be mainly a question of fund size. As such, this study gives to some extent support 
for the consolidation of pension funds in Switzerland as well as other countries with a similar institutional 
environment and still small dispersed pension funds. Nevertheless, I do not show that consolidation is 
necessarily better for plan beneficiaries and pension fund sustainability, but rather leave that for further 
research. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Using previous literature, Section 3.2 develops the new rationale 
for the potential sources of effective boards in pension funds. Section 3.3 presents the unique hand-
collected dataset of Swiss pension funds and gives summary statistics on pension fund variables. The new 
measure of board effectiveness is developed and constructed in Section 3.4, including its three dimensions 
and the list of its desirable attributes for Swiss pension funds. This Section also gives descriptive results 
regarding the organisation and functioning of Swiss pension boards. Section 3.5 provides the results of the 
empirical analysis of the determinants using univariate tests and multivariate regressions. I also discuss the 
significance of the results for the consolidation of the Swiss pension fund industry. I conclude in Section 3.6. 
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3.2. The potential sources of an effective pension board 
3.2.1. Optimal solution and legal constraints 
What is an effective pension board? As commonly believed among authors on the topic [see e.g., 
Mitchell and Hsin (1994); Hess and Impavido (2004); Ammann and Zingg (2010)], there is no universal and 
one-size-fits-all solution for a strong board of trustees. In fact, there is an optimal board specifically for 
each pension fund. Its attributes of effectiveness are endogenously chosen by the board of trustees as the 
optimal solution with respect to the constraints the pension fund faces [see e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003); Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); John and Senbet (1998)]. In particular, it is the result of an 
internal optimal decisional problem that solves the tradeoff between pension-level benefits with the costs 
of monitoring [see e.g., Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009); Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007)] and the 
costs of implementation given the country’s institutional environment [see e.g., Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and 
Metzger (2011); Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007); Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011)]. 
From another perspective, Clark and Urwin (2008) point that governance considerations can first be 
considered as a strategic and long-term investment for pension funds. Therefore, best-practices attributes 
can also be seen as an investment where its return depends on the agency costs of its setting [see e.g., 
Adams, Mansi, and Nishikawa (2010)]. In pension funds, significant agency costs might exist for some 
attributes and explain why they may not be the optimal choice for all of them. For instance, an annual 
compliance with codes of a long list of best-practices for all trustees and managers might add an excessive 
administrative burden and divert trustees’ time from more important tasks. Also, having a full-time internal 
manager, offering specific training and appropriate compensation to trustees, or using a myriad of tools 
and experts to support investment decisions might actually be very costly. As summarized by Hess and 
Impavido (2004), a well-governed pension fund should choose the optimal attributes at the lowest cost. 
Therefore, what appear to be poor governance choices might still be the result from the constrained 
optimization problem [see e.g., Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)].  
Most of all, pension funds are dependent on the country where it evolves [see e.g., Mitchell and Hsin 
(1994)], and this in turn affects the governance and shaping of boards [see e.g., Boone, Field, Karpoff, and 
Raheja (2007); Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and Metzger (2011); Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007); Larcker, 
Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011)]. Indeed, as illustrated by these authors, country-specific characteristics such 
as the nature of the competitive environment, the legal protection for minorities, and the level of economic 
and financial development have an influence on board composition and size. Favourable systems actually 
create an environment where pension funds are willing to invest more in their own governance simply as 
they can directly benefit from their investment. With no legal protection, there is absolutely no guarantee 
that they would receive the due return from their investment [see e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)].  
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In this setting, legal provisions are given by the institutional environment as the key constraints and 
thus might deviate the board decisions from its optimum [see e.g., Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and Metzger (2011); Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor 
(2011)]. For example, Bhagat and Black (1999) show that the external pressure to comply with a sufficient 
proportion of outsiders to increase board independence might not be optimal for all entities. Overall, by 
limiting board managerial discretion, attributes which are legally binding might reduce monitoring by the 
board and its general effectiveness [see e.g., De Andres and Vallelado (2008); Connelly and Limpaphayom 
(2004)]. On the other hand, attributes which can be complied on a voluntary basis are decisions which 
should have been optimally chosen by the board of trustees. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) show indeed 
that governance provisions chosen above country norms have a positive impact on firm valuations. 
Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011) confirm that the valuation effect of governance increases when legal 
provisions are excluded from the analysis. In the end, the distinction “legally binding” and “voluntary 
compliance” among attributes is an important one when studying the effectiveness of pension boards. The 
effect of country-level provisions needs to be dissociated in order to capture what is actually related with 
the board decisions at the pension fund level. 
3.2.2. Fund size and economies of scale 
Large pension funds benefit from important economies of scale for their operating costs [see e.g., 
Bikker and De Dreu (2009); Dyck and Pomorski (2011); Bikker, Steenbeek, and Torracchi (2012); Bikker 
(2017)]. Especially for administrative costs, Bikker, Steenbeek, and Torracchi (2012) provide strong 
evidence that there are still worldwide unused economies of scale. This is even true for pension funds in 
countries as the U.S. and Netherlands with already large pension funds, a professionalized system, and 
optimized costs levels. Following these authors, consolidation should increase the cost-efficiency of 
worldwide pension funds and strengthen their long-term performance. Indeed, as shown by Dyck and 
Pomorski (2011), “bigger is better” for the investment returns of pension funds. 
Fund size may also directly impact the effectiveness of pension boards36. Foremost, as argued by 
Stewart and Yermo (2008), means and resources from scale economies could be dedicated to more 
investment in the internal governance of pension funds. This includes for instance a complete and detailed 
training for trustees in order to ensure that they have the sufficient expertise in investments to manage 
pension assets. Larger pension funds also usually have preferential access and bargaining power with 
external investment experts [see e.g., Harper (2008a)]. At some point, pension funds become large enough 
                                                          
36 For corporations, Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2009) and Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) provide evidence that 
firm size is an important determinant of board structure. They show that large firms have larger and more 
independent boards. However, the rationale is different and not directly applicable to pension funds. 
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to be internally managed by a full-time internal manager and an in-house team [see e.g., Ambachtsheer, 
Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998)] as well as to attract and employ the best talents and most competent staff 
[see e.g., Clark (2004)]37. Finally, with more affiliated employers and employees, they have a largest pool of 
potentially good candidates to sit on their board [see e.g., Stewart and Yermo (2008)]. Therefore, small 
pension funds that grow or consolidate to obtain a sufficient scale are expected to invest in the desirable 
attributes of board effectiveness. 
3.2.3. Pension fund structure characteristics 
Several structure characteristics originally shaping the organisation of pension funds may also drive 
the level of board effectiveness. First, public (vs. private) pension funds usually involve more agents in the 
decisions process and very often directly on board seats. However, politicians and officials are external to 
plans with no direct stake and may have shorter term goals with policy matters. This should translate in 
additional conflicts of interests and issues of representativeness towards plan beneficiaries’ best interests. 
Therefore, public pension funds are projected to have less effective boards38. Second, pension funds 
offering defined-benefits (vs. defined-contributions) plans are expected to be related with stronger 
governance as such arrangement guarantees benefits and appears to protect better plan beneficiaries [see 
e.g., McCarthy and Miles (2013); Besley and Prat (2003)]. However, this distinction is sensitive to the 
country under study. Particularly in Switzerland, it should be of less relevance as pure defined-contributions 
plans do not exist and are rather embedded with minimum guarantees established by the Law on 
Occupational Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Pension Plans (LPP) [see e.g., Bütler (2014); Bütler and 
Ruesch (2007); Gerber and Weber (2007); Queisser and Vittas (2000)]39. 
Third, single-employer (vs. multi-employer) pension funds are more dependent on the one and only 
sponsoring employer which might lower their board effectiveness. As the employer may have different 
incentives, sufficient weight to employees in pension boards is important in order to prevent conflicts of 
interest [see e.g., Hess and Impavido (2004); Harper (2008a); Harper (2008b)]. Fourth, pension funds using 
reinsurance products (vs. autonomous) have a part or the totality of their risks covered by an insurance 
company which create additional conflicts and costs. In addition, autonomous pension funds are expected 
to exercise sufficient vigilance and care as well as have the proper competence to manage and bear all 
                                                          
37 This point has implications for the costs and performance of pension funds. For example, Dyck and Pomorski (2011) 
show that large pension funds managed internally cost at least three times less than the ones externalizing their asset 
management and that internal management is the main identified determinant of the outperformance of the largest 
pension funds. 
38 Dyck and Pomorski (2011) also study the impact of better-governed pension funds on economies of scale. To 
measure strong governance, the authors simply proxy for private pension funds (by assuming that public ones are 
subject to weaker governance) and show that it is related with higher scale economies. 
39 For more discussion on this point and the structure characteristics of Swiss pension funds in general, please refer to 
Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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these risks. Finally, internal (vs. external) management of both administration and investments generally 
involves a more committed internal manager and team for the daily operations. It might also be associated 
with reduced conflicts and costs [see e.g., Dyck and Pomorski (2011)]. In opposition, support from external 
investment experts may add professionalism and expertise in pension boards. The net effect on board 
effectiveness is thus of empirical matter. 
3.3. The dataset of Swiss pension funds 
3.3.1. Data collection and final sample 
Worldwide empirical research on pension fund governance and board effectiveness is scarce due to a 
lack of data accessibility. Complete and objective information on pension funds is usually not publicly 
available. In Switzerland, the information contained in pension fund annual reports and other fillings are 
not necessarily available online. Instead, Swiss pension funds have to report to regional supervision 
authorities. Following an exclusive access, I collect pension fund data directly from the As-So, the 
supervision authority that covers the cantons of Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel, and Jura40. All data are manually 
gathered from the paper files that the pension funds under their supervision send them. Specifically, these 
include (1) the audited annual reports under Swiss GAAP RPC 26 (balance sheet, income statement, and 
notes to the accounts), (2) the foundation statutes (or laws for public pension funds), and (3) the internal 
rules regarding the organisation and investments. 
I start by collecting the list of all pension funds under the supervision of the As-So and a set of 
individual variables including board governance features for the period 2010-2012. Collecting information 
over a three-year period helps to minimize errors during the data collection process and as such increases 
data quality. Pension funds under liquidation within LPP art. 53c are excluded from the sample since the 
reported numbers can be misleading according to the exact procedure followed. Accordingly, a fund-year 
observation is not collected if the variable “total assets” or “total beneficiaries” is equal to zero. The full 
sample contains 210 unique pension funds that are registered to follow the minimum requirements settled 
in the Swiss law [see LPP art. 48-1 and OPP1 art. 3-2-a] and that were active from 2010 to 2012, i.e. with 
audited annual reports for at least one of these years. Including all the pension funds that were active 
during the period 2010-2012 guarantees that there is no survivorship bias as even the pension funds that 
have been liquidated during that time period are included at the beginning of the sample period, before 
the start of the liquidation procedure. In the end, the final sample represents a significant unbalanced 
                                                          
40 For the purpose of data collection and information sharing, a collaboration agreement with the As-So (Autorité de 
Surveillance LPP et des fondations de Suisse Occidentale) was settled in July 2013 in Lausanne. 
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panel dataset of 614 fund-year observations41. All data collected from the various files include the pension 
fund and governance variables used in this study, but also performance, costs, and asset allocation 
information for further research. The variables of this study are listed and defined in Appendix 3.1.42 
3.3.2. Descriptive statistics of Swiss pension funds 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the Swiss pension funds included in the sample. This shows 
how diverse the Swiss pension fund landscape is with pension funds managing less than CHF 100,000 in 
assets to almost CHF 8 billion and an equally-weighted mean of about CHF 300 million. On average, pension 
funds are fully funded with an assets-weighted mean coverage ratio of 103.46% for private pension funds, 
while some are still underfunded. These include mainly 11 public pension funds with an average of 68.80% 
due to the preferential funding treatment granted by the Swiss law [see LPP art. 72a ss]43. To value pension 
liabilities, the technical rate oscillates between 4.5% and 2% during the period under study. For 2012, the 
average technical rate disclosed by pension funds is of 3.44% (not reported), which is slightly below the 
national reference rate set for this year at 3.5% [see DTA 4 (2015) of the Swiss Chamber of Pension 
Actuaries (CSEP/SKPE)]. It is also important to note that the funding level and related total of the balance 
sheet are sensitive to the year under study, as in 2012 when pension funds significantly increased their 
assets under management during the year.  
[Table 3.1: Summary statistics of pension fund variables] 
Furthermore, I can observe from Table 3.1 that the Swiss pension funds under study are on average 
39 years old and thus the majority of them were founded before the enactment of the LPP in 1985. 
Specifically, for this sample, most pension funds (64%) and their assets (67%) are located in the canton of 
VD with relatively facilitated access to financial services. I can also give support to a consolidation 
phenomenon in Switzerland. Indeed, 7.65% of the included Swiss pension funds have a liquidation 
procedure in progress or have planned to liquidate in a foreseeable future. These include mainly very small 
pension funds as this number drops to 0.46% when weighting over total assets. Moreover, the number of 
affiliated employers, pension plans, and participating beneficiaries differs a lot across entities. Some 
pension funds have up to 3,888 different employers and offer 15 pension plans, while others are only 
                                                          
41 Two other points regarding the sample selection deserve to be mentioned. First, the sample does not include the 
pension funds that have been liquidated before the end of 2012. This means that some pension funds with reports in 
2010 and 2011 are not included in the sample. It is a minor concern as it represents less than 10 pension funds. 
Second, only the pension funds that have presented all their files in French are included in the sample. Four pension 
funds with a presentation in German have been eliminated accordingly. 
42 Note that this dataset of Swiss pension funds is part of a larger and joint project with Carolina Salva. 
43 As alleged in Table 3.1, information on whether public pension funds follow a total or partial funding regime is not 
available in the dataset and can thus not be described further here. 
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composed of active employees or passive pensioners. The number of beneficiaries can thus vary from 1 to 
76,687 with an equally-weighted mean of 2,455 beneficiaries. In relative terms, there are at the median 
about 4 employees for one pensioner to sustain a Swiss pension fund. I call this measure “beneficiaries 
ratio”. Additionally, Swiss pension funds hold at the median about 2 times more capital of employees than 
capital of pensioners at their immediate disposal for investments. 
With a sample of about 200 pension funds that jointly manage more than CHF 61 billion in 2012, this 
study covers about 10% of all Swiss pension funds and 9% of the pension fund assets under management in 
Switzerland [see OFS (2014)]. Therefore, a potential concern could be that the sample is biased towards 
specific location characteristics as culture and language. To lessen this concern, I show, in Table 3.2, that 
my sample is representative of the Swiss pension market in terms of structure characteristics and fund size. 
In the full sample, 95% are private entities (vs. public), 15% offer defined-benefits plans (vs. defined-
contributions), 20% have a multi-employer form (vs. single-employer), 14% are autonomous in hedging 
their risks (vs. reinsurance), and 21% and 25%, respectively, manage their administration and investments 
internally (vs. external). When comparing the sample in 2012 with the complete universe of Swiss pension 
funds surveyed by the OFS (2014), I see that proportions regarding the legal form, plan type, and hedging 
type are similar. Nonetheless, it appears that the sample is biased towards single-employer pension funds. 
More importantly, my sample is unbiased towards fund size, as measured by total assets. Indeed, in 2012, 
the average pension fund manages CHF 314 million which is almost identical to the CHF 325 million 
reported by the OFS (2014). 
[Table 3.2: Comparison of pension fund structure characteristics] 
To my knowledge, there are only two studies that evaluate the governance of pension funds 
particularly in Switzerland. Using surveys, Ammann and Zingg (2010) and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) 
investigate empirically the governance quality of Swiss pension funds and its relation with investment 
performance. In comparison, as shown in Table 3.2, my sample includes a larger number of pension funds 
(210 vs. 96 and 139) and is not titled towards large public defined-benefits pension funds. On the other 
hand, it covers less pension fund assets (about CHF 61 billion vs. 194 and 286) and is thus less 
representative of the whole Swiss universe in that matter. By specifically including the smallest Swiss 
pension funds, my dataset enables me to account for the wide dispersion across Swiss pension funds in 
terms of fund size. This spectrum of small pension funds is often not studied in previous studies but is 
important if we want to get the full picture and a better understanding of the governance and board 
effectiveness of pension funds in Switzerland.  
Finally, three limitations are embedded with this specific dataset of Swiss pension funds. First, the 
sample remains small and as such restricts the empirical design and tests to be implemented. In particular, 
53 
it remains limited in time-series by only including three years as well as by the number of pension funds 
given their variation in structure characteristics. Second, the sample period of 2010-2012 coincides with a 
structural reform in Switzerland affecting Swiss pension fund organisation, supervision, and transparency. 
This may influence the results of the analysis. Third, the information contained in my sample remains free 
of any subjectivity and positive selection bias as with targeted surveys. However, it is constrained by the 
amount and type of information disclosed in Swiss pension fund files, their transparency, and degree of 
details. This may also influence the results as well as the measurement of board effectiveness in Swiss 
pension funds. 
3.4. The measure of board effectiveness 
3.4.1. The approach 
For this study, I design a new measure of pension board effectiveness. I aim to proxy for aspects of 
the organisation and functioning of pension boards that are consistent with best-practices governance 
standards and the best interests of plan beneficiaries. As an optimal board cannot be defined specifically 
for each pension fund, I rather focus on a set of best-practices attributes that are generally accepted as 
good governance for different kinds of pension funds and for which each attribute belongs to one specific 
dimension of board effectiveness.  
I build governance indices capturing pension board effectiveness and its three key dimensions, 
namely integrity, commitment, and competence. The methodology applied to construct the indices follows 
the idea and spirit of the pioneer and widely-used corporate governance indices from Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) as well as Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). I construct indices despite the usual 
shortcomings advanced in the corporate governance literature [see e.g., Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano 
(2008)]. Although such indices are imperfect instruments, they have the advantages to provide a synthetic 
view of the multi-dimensional nature of governance considerations and to provide a simple measure to 
conduct empirical tests. With that measure, I can thus determine empirically what drives and shapes strong 
pension boards along its different dimensions. Moreover, this methodology is comparable to previous 
integrated measures of pension fund governance as developed by Ammann and Zingg (2010) and Ammann 
and Ehmann (2017) in Switzerland, although they differ in their content and classification. As such, my 
measure may also bring additional governance insights for Swiss pension funds. 
With a new dataset of Swiss pension funds, I cannot directly replicate measures from previous 
empirical studies and in particular the ones of Ammann and Zingg (2010) and Ammann and Ehmann (2017).  
Instead, I adopt the following approach. To identify desirable attributes, I start by listing the governance 
characteristics used and investigated in previous empirical work on pension funds that have received the 
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most attention in the literature. Then, I apply two filters to this list. First, as constrained by my dataset, I 
keep the variables applicable to Switzerland with respect to the pension funds’ institutional environment. 
For instance, the question of the proportion of employees’ representatives in pension boards studied in 
other countries is less relevant in Switzerland due to the legal requirement of equal representation 
between the employees and employer [see LPP art. 51-1]. This measure is thus developed specifically for 
Switzerland and directly applicable to Swiss pension funds.  
Second, I remove the variables not available in the reported files of Swiss pension funds or that 
cannot be collected in a consistent and reliable manner. Compared to surveys, focusing on what is available 
and collectable may facilitate replication for further research. However, this approach significantly reduces 
the number of variables and in particular their degree of details. As an example, while Ammann and Zingg 
(2010) and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) can ask if board financial compensation is linked to performance, I 
collect whether the board receives any indemnity for attending board meetings. In the end, I identify 24 
quantifiable desirable governance attributes classified in each of the three dimensions of board 
effectiveness. They are described in details in the next Sub-section. The list and classification are 
summarized in Figure 3.1 and the exact definitions are given in Appendix 3.1.  
[Figure 3.1: Board effectiveness and its desirable attributes] 
3.4.2. Dimensions and desirable attributes 
Pension board effectiveness embraces three key dimensions. First, integrity in boards should prevent 
any opportunistic behavior as well as conflicts of interests. Second, active commitment should ensure that 
trustees devote enough time and effort to their fiduciary duty and responsibility. Third, board competence 
in investments should guarantee a sufficient expertise and detailed framework to manage pension assets. 
For each dimension, specific solutions and desirable attributes may exist and be implemented by pension 
funds to strengthen their overall board effectiveness44. 
In order to ensure integrity, trustees firstly can and should comply with codes of best-practices. Such 
codes usually include aspects related with the proper conduct and ethical behavior but also disclosure 
practices of conflicts of interests. For that purpose, some countries have established legal and regulatory 
requirements and/or have elaborated their own code such as the ASIP charter and directive (2011) in 
Switzerland. Elements linked to the representativeness of trustees could also secure that the board acts 
towards plan beneficiaries’ best interests. With a direct financial interest, political independence, and by 
                                                          
44 For more details on each of these dimensions, please refer to the review of the main agency problems in pension 
boards in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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still being professionally active, employees-trustees are the best candidates to prevent any conflict of 
interest [see e.g., Hess and Impavido (2004); Harper (2008a); Harper (2008b)]. Therefore, sufficient weight 
in pension boards should be granted to employees with a fair election procedure and an effective 
representation power. For example, an equal representation of the employees and employer as legally 
required in Switzerland [see LPP art. 51-1] could ensure that beneficiaries have a seat and voice as well as a 
balance of the diverging interests. However, such a rule can sometimes be cosmetic and employees can 
feel the pressure or stress of losing their job when negotiating and taking decisions alongside with the 
employer. A chairman position might help to reduce that fear by giving more power to the employees 
rather than to the employer. Additionally, external trustees with no direct stake in pension plans such as 
the internal manager or politicians should be avoided. 
Furthermore, to promote the commitment and motivation of trustees, I could identify two solutions. 
First, appropriate compensation is one of the most obvious incentives but others may as well ultimately 
apply. For instance, an internal manager should take care of daily operations and avoid board micro-
management [see e.g., Ammann and Zingg (2010); Koedijk, Slager, and Bauer (2010); Harper (2008b); 
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008)]. Women representatives should sit on the board since women 
seem to allocate more effort to monitoring and contribute in making boards more effective [see e.g., 
Adams and Ferreira (2009); Choudhury (2014)]. A sufficiently long board tenure should be the promise of a 
minimum moral commitment and care as well as enough information accumulated over the years to take 
adequate decisions [see e.g., Bonini, Deng, Ferrari, and John (2017)]. Lastly, board meeting frequency 
should reflect the intensity of board activities and certify that trustees devote sufficient time to it [see e.g. 
Vafeas (1999)].  
Second, a specific organisation for decision-making can also force commitment. With a small board 
and committees, trustees have no choice but to actively participate in board decisions and might even feel 
the peer pressure if they fail to do so. Therefore, such organisation should increase the personal 
commitment of each individual trustee. It might also partly solve two important issues. First, problems 
related with coordination, consensus building, and inertia in decision-making should be reduced in small 
and specialized units [see e.g., Clark (2007); De Andres and Vallelado (2008)]. Second, delegation of the 
decisional controls to committees might help the board to focus on its strategic and monitoring tasks as 
well as reduce potential micro-management [see e.g., Koedijk, Slager, and Bauer (2010); Harper (2008b); 
Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008)]. In particular, a dedicated investment committee should help the 
board to coordinate all the parties involved with the investment process and take quicker investment 
decisions. 
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According to the last dimension of competence, all trustees should be elected from a procedure 
based on their expertise in addition of the representation criteria. In practice, a sufficient expertise in 
investments could also be guaranteed with a basic and continuous training for the trustees as well as the 
availability of external investment experts to support the board decisions. Moreover, a clear framework for 
the investment process is necessary for trustees to actually take decisions. In that matter, an investment 
policy stating the strategy and beliefs is cornerstone [see e.g., Carmichael and Palacios (2004); Koedijk, 
Slager, and Bauer (2010)]. Best-practices also consistently recommend detailed investment objectives for 
the asset allocation, specific and global benchmarks, a risk policy, and an asset-liability management (ALM) 
study for the strategy. In the end, both suitable expertise and framework should help to foster board 
competence regarding investments decisions. 
In comparison with previous empirical studies on pension fund governance in Switzerland, 18 out of 
these 24 attributes represent a subset of the index of governance quality developed since Ammann and 
Zingg (2010). Although focusing on Swiss pension fund files may decrease the level of accuracy of the 
collected attributes compared to designed surveys, it has the advantage of being applicable for different 
kinds of pension funds. For example, for some attributes as compensation, looking at any form of 
indemnity may be less restrictive than performance-linked financial compensation. This is especially 
important for small pension funds in Switzerland in which this question may not apply. However, despite 
being generally less restrictive on the definitions of the attributes, I cannot exclude that some of them 
might not completely fit the needs of the smallest pension funds. The remaining 6 attributes not included in 
the former Swiss studies add elements of board structure and representativeness due to their importance 
in the previous literature. As relevant for Swiss pension boards, I add, for instance, equal representation, 
women representatives, and board tenure. 
In terms of content, the indices of Ammann and Zingg (2010) and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) 
comprise many other attributes not studied here and included in my measure. These are mainly related 
with detailed target settings, management objectives, and monitoring. They also incorporate directly 
elements related with the transparency and disclosed information of Swiss pension funds. As a last point, 
the index of Ammann and Ehmann (2017) contains comprehensive aspects of the investment process and 
in particular risk management. While these authors dedicate an entire sub-index to this question, I only 
have one attribute assessing whether the pension board has developed any type of risk policy, regardless of 
the types of risks monitored. 
3.4.3. Construction of governance indices 
To build the governance indices related with board effectiveness and its different dimensions, I apply 
the following methodology. For a matter of aggregation, the collected board governance features are 
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translated into the 24 desirable attributes meeting best-practices criteria. As such, each attribute is equal 
to one if the pension fund complies with best-practices, and zero otherwise. When a board governance 
feature is not mentioned, meaning that the information is missing in the files, the attribute is translated as 
if the best-practices criteria was not met. For example, to evaluate whether a pension fund offers a training 
program to its trustees, I look for either an explicit mention of training in the fillings or whether there is a 
non-null line in the income statement accounting for training expenses. Therefore, I cannot guarantee that 
a non-disclosure means that there is no implemented training for the trustees in practice. As such, my 
measure also captures indirectly for the level of transparency and disclosed information in Swiss pension 
fund files. As shown by Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011), the valuation effect of governance indices 
should increase when missing values are treated as zero in the index construction. On the other hand, this 
construction implies that any uncover association with the governance indices may be due to governance 
considerations but also transparency aspects. These two elements cannot be clearly dissociated and this 
may influence the results from the analysis and their interpretation.  
Then, assuming that all attributes matter equally and complement each other, the 24 attributes are 
aggregated into an additive equally-weighted index and scaled to one. I call this general index 
“effectiveness”. Following this construction, a higher level of “effectiveness” thus proxies for a superior 
level of governance associated with a more effective pension board. To capture the different dimensions, 
similar governance indices are constructed for the three key dimensions (namely “integrity”, 
“commitment”, and “competence”) as well as the six potential solutions to strengthen them (namely 
“compliance”, “representativeness”, “incentives”, “organisation”, “expertise”, and “framework”). Each sub-
index includes the attributes classified in their respective dimension and solution.  
Further, to analyse separately the governance attributes which are legally binding from the ones 
which can be complied on a voluntary basis, I construct two additional indices named “legally binding” and 
“voluntary compliance”. I split the general index “effectiveness” in two parts and identify seven out of the 
24 attributes as legally binding provisions for pension funds in Switzerland. In details, LPP art. 51 on joint 
management explicitly states that “election procedure available” (3) and “equal representation” (4) are the 
basis of the Swiss militia system. Then, the tasks of the board given in LPP art. 51a list, among others, the 
attributes “compensation for attending” (9), “training of the trustees” (18), “investment policy available” 
(20), and “ALM study for the strategy” (24). Finally, “own code of best-practices” (1) is tied with the 
requirements given by LPP art. 51b, LPP art. 51c, and OPP2 art. 48f-l. Other attributes are as well 
mentioned or recommended in the Swiss law but are not considered as binding ones and thus not included. 
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An equal weighting scheme to construct indices may seem an arbitrary choice although it is common 
practice in the corporate governance literature45. To lessen this concern, some studies have taken an 
additional approach to the aggregation of a large number of variables called principal component analysis 
[see e.g., Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011); Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007); Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007)]. This alternative approach has also been performed to reduce the initial 
number of variables and understand better the dimensionality of the sample. Following this statistical 
procedure, the first principal component is a linear combination of the initial variables that may explain the 
largest possible variation in the dataset. The different loadings can then be used to construct an alternative 
index set to be equal to the first principal component [see e.g., Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011)]. 
I conduct a principal component analysis on all 24 attributes included in my dataset. The results can 
be visualized from the scree plot of Figure 3.2 which shows the associated eigenvalues to the principal 
components. Following either the scree plot or the Kaiser criterion46, 10 principal components should be 
selected. Moreover, the extracted 10 principal components can explain 65.83% of the variation, while the 
first one only explains 13.83%. Overall, these results restrict me from constructing an alternative index with 
this approach but they confirm that there is significant variation in the initial dataset of all the attributes to 
be aggregated into an index47. 
[Figure 3.2: Scree plot from the principal component analysis] 
3.4.4. Descriptive statistics of Swiss pension boards 
In the sample, the proportions of pension funds meeting each of the governance attributes are 
shown in Table 3.3. Primarily, Swiss pension funds appear to comply with codes of best-practices by either 
following the legal and regulatory requirements (73%) and/or the equivalent ASIP charter and directive 
(21%). These numbers increased from respectively 70% to 78% and 19% to 24% during the sample period of 
2010-2012, probably as a result of the structural reform of the Swiss occupational pension scheme. In 
terms of representativeness, some attributes do not seem to be met by a majority of the Swiss pension 
funds. These include an “election procedure available” (42%), “chairman employees representative” (17%), 
and “chairmanship alternation” (23%). On the other hand, the equal representation between the 
employees and employer as stated in the Swiss law is almost always respected (90%) and most boards do 
not provide a seat for the internal manager (76%) and external trustees (90%). Further, Swiss pension 
                                                          
45 Another concern may come from the assumption of complementarity when aggregating into indices. In unreported 
results, I compute the pairwise correlations between the sub-indices and see that there are all positively but not 
significantly related. There is one exception with a significant but still positive coefficient of correlation of 0.34 
between “integrity” and “competence” (and correspondingly of 0.37 between “compliance” and “framework”). 
46 According to the Kaiser criterion, all principal components with eigenvalues larger than one should be selected. 
47 Note that this measure of board effectiveness is part of a larger and joint project with Carolina Salva. 
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boards usually have women representatives (64%), as well as sufficient board tenure (94%) and board 
meetings (80%). 
[Table 3.3: Summary statistics of governance attributes] 
Remarkably, these statistics also show five interesting facts in Switzerland. First, 22% of the pension 
funds offer any kind of financial compensation to trustees for attending board meetings. Second, training of 
the trustees is only mentioned by 56% of the pension funds, and this despite the minor 1% having an 
election procedure based on expertise. Instead, most of them seem to have access to external investment 
experts (87%). Third, most pension boards do not have the recommended organisation. It appears that 64% 
have a small number of trustees, 43% have committees (19% in small pension funds), and 41% have in 
particular a separated investment committee (18% in small pension funds). The non-conformity to a small 
board size also seems to be more important for large pension funds (40%) than for small pension funds 
(89%), which can be explained by the need of representation of a larger number of participants. Fourth, 
66% of the pension funds have an internal manager for the administration and/or the investments. This 
means that in one-third of the cases, the board still has to run the daily administration and investments of 
the pension fund by itself. Fifth and last, the majority of pension boards seems to lack to clearly establish a 
framework to take investment decisions including investment benchmarks (41%), a risk policy (12%), and 
an ALM study for the strategy (24%). On the other hand, most of them have at least defined an investment 
policy (94%) as well as investment objectives (81%) for their asset allocation48. 
By looking at the distribution of the governance indices, it appears that the level of effectiveness of 
Swiss pension boards is also heterogeneous. As discussed by Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), as 
Swiss pension funds are various in their structure characteristics and fund size, then it is expected to have 
heterogeneity in the solutions chosen in terms of governance. In Table 3.4, summary statistics confirm large 
differences across Swiss pension funds, with the general index “effectiveness” ranging from 21% to 83%, 
with an average of 54%, and most sub-indices having values from 0% to 100%. More details about the 
distribution of the main indices are given in Appendix 3.2. Additionally, the governance indices seem to be 
related with fund size. Large pension funds are in general associated with higher levels of board 
effectiveness (59% vs. 49% for small pension funds) and this statement holds for its different dimensions. 
                                                          
48 In unreported results, the pairwise correlations between the 24 attributes show four other insights. First, by 
construction, the attributes “manager not a trustee” and “existence of a manager” are negatively correlated (-0.41). 
Second, when a structure of committees exists, it almost surely includes an investment committee (0.95). Third, board 
size (“small number of trustees”) is as expected negatively correlated with “existence of committees” and “existence 
of an investment committee” (-0.52 and -0.50). Fourth, the coefficient of correlation between the two governance 
codes is not significant (0.25), which illustrates that one of the two solutions is usually chosen by Swiss pension funds. 
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However, despite a slight improvement of the indices levels over the three-year period under study, the 
variation across time for a single pension fund remains low.  
[Table 3.4: Summary statistics of governance indices] 
From Table 3.4, I can also analyse the separated effect of “legally binding” and “voluntary 
compliance” attributes on the level of board effectiveness. Regarding the index “voluntary compliance”, 
pension funds seem to follow best-practices beyond provisions given in the Swiss law, with a mean of 53%. 
Therefore, their boards seem to be willing to invest in high standards of governance, despite their 
associated costs. However, the level of the index “legally binding” is not high. On average, the pension 
funds in the sample comply at 57% with the identified Swiss legally binding provisions. As such important 
law violations are unlikely to exist in practice, these results are puzzling. 
Two explanations for this apparent non-compliance to legal provisions by Swiss pension funds may 
be advanced. First, five out of the seven provisions that I identified as legally binding are in fact the 
consequences of the 2010-2012 structural reform in Switzerland which are not in application at the 
beginning of my similar sample period49. Although all of them should be effective for the exercise year of 
2012, implementation may take time in practice and explain why some Swiss pension funds do not comply 
with them. This timing issue due to the different speeds of adjustment to legal changes is an important 
limitation related to the sample period of my dataset. Second, as highlighted previously, these apparent 
law violations may simply be the result of the data collection process linked to the transparency in Swiss 
pension fund files. This explanation due to measurement is probably the one behind the attribute “election 
procedure available” already in application before the Swiss structural reform. Indeed, it is not because a 
Swiss pension fund does not document one that it does not implement it in practice. In the end, timing and 
transparency are most likely to explain these results and prevent me from assessing whether Swiss pension 
funds comply or not, and today, with Swiss legally binding provisions. Therefore, I cannot analyse here the 
effect of Swiss legal constraints as a relevant source of pension board distortions50. 
                                                          
49 In details, the provision (1) own code of best-practices is in application since 08.2011, while the other four 
provisions (9) compensation for attending, (18) training of the trustees, (20) investment policy available, and (24) ALM 
study for the strategy are in application since 01.2012. The remaining two provisions (3) election procedure available 
and (4) equal representation are both in application since 04.2004. 
50 Note also that the apparent compliance to legal provisions by Swiss pension funds improved during the sample 
period of 2010-2012. This can be explained either as it coincides with the implementation time following the Swiss 
structural reform or by the data collection process as for these specific attributes, when the information was found in 
any reported file, it was assumed to hold thereafter. There is the exception of the information to build the attribute 
“equal representation” which was found in the annual reports and can thus be assessed each year based on the 
turnover and vacancy of board seats. 
61 
As conclusion, these first results remind a central limitation associated with this measure of board 
effectiveness to be used to analyse its determinants. Transparency aspects cannot be clearly dissociated 
from governance considerations. Furthermore, as for previous Swiss studies, my measure remains 
applicable to Swiss pension funds and may not generalize to other countries. Finally, as for all previous 
empirical studies, I cannot exclude that what appears to be a poor level of board effectiveness might 
actually be the result of an optimal choice for some pension funds [see e.g., Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2010)]. 
3.5. Analysis of the determinants of board effectiveness 
In this Section, I empirically assess the potential sources of the effectiveness of pension boards in 
Switzerland. For that purpose, I analyse a set of pension fund variables including fund size and structure 
characteristics on the level and dimensions of my measure of board effectiveness. Other variables which 
may generally influence the governance framework of Swiss pension funds are also tested. My panel 
dataset of Swiss pension funds enables me to account for the wide dispersion across pension funds, both in 
terms of fund and governance aspects. However, due to the low time-variation of governance indices, I 
present univariate tests and multivariate regressions on the mean (or median for dummies) over the period 
2012-201051. By looking at the cross-sectional differences, it will also allow me to study directly what type 
of pension fund is generally associated with a more effective board and thus a superior level of governance. 
3.5.1. Univariate tests 
The first step of the analysis is to conduct individual and univariate tests on the levels of board 
effectiveness and its dimensions. To perform the tests, the variables under study are split in two groups 
based on the median (or directly used as such for the dummies). For each variable, the results of the 
statistical tests in the mean difference between the two groups are presented in Table 3.5 for 
“effectiveness” and in Table 3.6 for “integrity”, “commitment”, and “competence”. Qualitatively similar 
results are given for two-group mean-comparison tests (t-test) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (z-test) which 
account for potential non-normal distributions. For the t-test, the null hypothesis to be tested is that the 
means of the two groups are equal while the z-test relaxes the assumption of normality and test whether 
the distributions of the populations in the two groups are equal. 
[Table 3.5: Univariate tests on board effectiveness] 
[Table 3.6: Univariate tests on integrity, commitment, and competence] 
                                                          
51 As robustness test, I also perform the base regressions for each of the three years separately. See Table 3.9 for 
more details and the results. 
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Overall, the results highlight the importance of fund size for governance considerations. Swiss 
pension funds with a higher level of board effectiveness are generally autonomous (60% vs. 53%), manage 
their administration internally (60% vs. 52%), are large both in terms of assets and beneficiaries (59% vs. 
49%), have more active employees (59% vs. 49%), passive pensioners (58% vs. 50%), affiliated employers 
(58% vs. 50%), pension plans (57% vs. 53%), and did not plan a liquidation procedure (55% vs. 47%). Large 
pension funds, in terms of assets, beneficiaries, employees, or pensioners, have higher levels of board 
integrity, commitment, and competence. Pension funds with more affiliated employers are also in general 
associated with a stronger board across all three dimensions. Moreover, autonomous pension funds 
managing their administration internally are related with more committed and competent boards.  
On the other hand, other variables such as the employer administrative form, management of the 
investments, foundation age, canton urban location, and variables linked to the liabilities side of the 
pension fund (coverage ratio, beneficiaries ratio, capital ratio, and technical rate) do not seem to be 
relevant for my measure of effectiveness of Swiss pension boards. There is one exception. Swiss pension 
funds managing their investments externally, with a low coverage ratio, and a high technical rate seem to 
be related with more competent boards. Though, this result could be explained as Swiss pension funds in 
an underfunding situation might need to hire specific external investment experts and develop a 
restructuring investment framework, which would artificially increase the level of the index “competence”. 
Further, as expected, I do not observe significant differences between defined-benefits and defined-
contributions plans in Switzerland. This result is consistent with the fact that this distinction is of less 
relevance for Swiss plan beneficiaries due to the minimum guarantees established by the Swiss law. 
My findings also show that public pension funds seem to be associated with more effective (60% vs. 
54%, although not significant with the z-test) and in particular committed (69% vs. 59%) boards. This result 
is unexpected and counterintuitive [see e.g., Dyck and Pomorski (2011)]. With more agents involved and 
political connections at work, it should be that private pension funds act better towards the best interests 
of their plan beneficiaries. On the other hand, public pension funds are large enough to have the means 
and resources to invest in costly attributes behind the index “commitment” such as compensation or 
internal manager. Therefore, public pension funds may appear to have stronger governance simply because 
there are also usually larger52. This idea and the results from the other relevant sources highlighted in the 
univariate tests raise an important question. What if fund size was actually capturing the whole dispersion 
in the level of effectiveness of Swiss pension boards? 
                                                          
52 An alternative explanation for why public pension funds and pension funds with more affiliated employers may 
have stronger governance is related with marketing. These two types of pension funds particularly need to give a 
“good” image to respectively the taxpayers and the employers they want to attract. One way to do that is through 
“good” standards of governance. 
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As a preliminary answer, I compute and present in Table 3.7 the pairwise Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients between the pension fund variables under analysis. The correlation coefficients show that large 
pension funds are in general public, autonomous, internally managed for their administration, have more 
affiliated employers, and a lower coverage ratio. Except for the coverage ratio, these are the same variables 
that explain the differences in the levels of “effectiveness”, “integrity”, “commitment”, and “competence”. 
By looking at the other pairwise correlations with the coverage ratio, the only significant coefficient is with 
the legal form. As expected, a pension fund with a low coverage ratio is also most likely to be a public one 
(as it benefits from a preferential funding treatment in the Swiss law) and thus a larger one. Eventually, as 
the same variables that explain the levels of board effectiveness and its dimensions seem to also be driven 
by the size of the pension fund, there is the need to conduct multivariate tests. Fund size might in fact be 
the main and only determinant. 
[Table 3.7: Pairwise correlation coefficients between pension fund variables] 
The magnitude of the correlation coefficients between the pension fund variables also raises a 
multicollinearity issue. In particular, because of significantly high coefficients, I do not include all the 
variables under study in the model specification for the multivariate regressions. First, to measure fund 
size, I initially keep “total assets” and exclude “total beneficiaries” (0.688), “active employees” (0.580), and 
“passive pensioners” (0.929)53. Second, the information related with “affiliated employers” (0.483) and 
“pension plans” (0.456) are by definition redundant with “multi-employer” and thus not included in the 
base regressions. Moreover, with a mean VIF of 1.35, the sample seems to only suffer from low partial 
multicollinearity54. This appears to be a result of the model specification and is likely to be a common 
feature outside of this sample. 
3.5.2. Multivariate regressions 
The second step of the analysis is to perform multivariate regressions on my measure of board 
effectiveness in order to determine which variables can explain globally the dispersion. Specifically, it will 
help me to assess if fund size is the overall and single source or if other variables might still be relevant for 
the levels of board effectiveness and its dimensions. By using cross-sectional OLS regressions, I indeed show 
that the key explanatory variable is fund size. This suggests that fund size is an important determinant. 
Table 3.8 presents the estimated regressions with a constant and robust standard errors on the main 
                                                          
53 In the robustness tests, I also use total beneficiaries as proxy for fund size (instead of total assets) and distinguish 
between active employees and passive pensioners among beneficiaries. See Table 3.9 for more details and the results. 
54 The variance inflation factor (VIF) test is a post-estimation test for multicollinearity on multivariate regressions 
estimated with OLS. The result of the test on the base model yields a mean of 1.35 and a maximum of 1.93 for the 
legal form, which is considered below the critical threshold of 5 or 10. 
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governance indices55. Standard errors are robust as heteroskedasticity-consistent following Huber-White 
estimation and, for a matter of scale, “total assets” is transformed by taking the natural logarithm56.  
[Table 3.8: Multivariate regressions on governance indices] 
As expected, the distinctions private vs. public, multi-employer vs. single-employer, and autonomous 
vs. reinsurance do not seem to be relevant anymore. The previously found univariate relations are most 
likely to be captured by fund size. Indeed, the results show that large pension funds managing their 
administration internally are usually associated with a more effective board. Moreover, fund size is the only 
variable that can explain the whole dispersion across all three dimensions of board effectiveness. It is even 
the only significant variable for the estimated regression on the level of “integrity”. However, this last claim 
has to be taken with caution due to a low adjusted R-squared of 2.77%. Note also the large differences in 
adjusted R-squared along the three dimensions and the significance of the constant. These suggest that 
there is still a large part of the dispersion that remains unexplained. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that a sufficient scale provides the economies to 
invest in attributes increasing the level of board effectiveness as well as to build an in-house team to 
administrate the pension fund. Moreover, the internal management of the administration seems to be 
associated with a higher level of “commitment” and not a lower level of “competence”. This means that, in 
Switzerland, and for this dataset and measure, the benefits of administrating the pension fund internally 
with a committed team seem to outweigh the benefits of external expertise and professionalism. In 
addition from previous univariate tests, Swiss pension funds which have a lower capital ratio (so more 
capital of pensioners than capital of employees) seem to be related with more competent boards. This 
finding is in line with the same hypothesis as a lower capital ratio is usually associated with older and thus 
automatically larger pension funds.  
Finally, an alternative explanation for these results may be related with the construction of the 
measure of pension board effectiveness and in particular its data collection process. Transparency may as 
well explain the results. Indeed, I can expect that larger pension funds are also the ones with the resources 
and incentives to have a better documentation and more disclosed information in their reported files. 
                                                          
55 I also run similar multivariate regressions on the six solution indices. The results from the estimated regressions 
show that fund size remains a significant explanatory variable in three out of the six (“compliance”, “expertise”, and 
“framework”). However, the adjusted-R squared is in some cases very low and too few attributes are included in the 
indices to be reliable measures of pension board effectiveness. For the same reason, I do not run any regression on 
the 24 attributes directly. 
56 For the linear estimation, note that one observation containing only one pensioner among its beneficiaries and thus 
an excessively high “capital ratio” is omitted. This particular pension fund is facing a liquidation procedure and is 
liquidated by 2012. 
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Consistent with previous univariate results, public pension funds also tend to have a more detailed 
documentation as they are accountable to the taxpayers. Consequently, the alternative explanation of 
transparency aspects instead of governance considerations cannot be excluded here. 
In unreported results, I also estimate similar multivariate regressions on the additional indices 
“legally binding” and “voluntary compliance”. From a theoretical perspective, dissociating the effect of 
country legal provisions from the ones on which the board has a decisional power and might actually have 
an influence should strengthen the precision of the results. I would expect the index “voluntary 
compliance” to be a more reliable measure of pension board effectiveness beyond the legal provisions 
given by the country. The estimated regression on “voluntary compliance” shows that fund size is again a 
significant explanatory variable of the voluntary chosen attributes by Swiss pension boards. This result 
holds either with an estimation on the mean over the period 2012-2010 or in 2012 only, when all legal 
provisions are in application and effective for Swiss pension funds. However, as shown in my previous 
descriptive results, the identified Swiss legally binding provisions still suffer from a timing issue of 
implementation as well as the same transparency concern than the remaining governance attributes. 
Therefore, I cannot rely on this test to assess whether this distinction is relevant or not, for Switzerland, in 
practice, and today. 
To conclude, several concerns might question the robustness of the results and in particular the 
importance of fund size for governance considerations. In Table 3.9, using a similar methodology, I present 
robustness tests including alternative specifications and restricted samples. For each test, the significant 
explanatory variables of each multivariate regression on the main governance indices are presented with 
their respective sign57. The first row recalls the base result (1) and all the tests (2-11) are developed in 
details below. 
[Table 3.9: Robustness tests of the multivariate regressions] 
(2-3) Due to the relevance of fund size for the results, I also use alternative proxies. First, I use “total 
beneficiaries” instead of “total assets” in the regressions. The results are qualitatively similar. Second, I 
distinguish between active and passive beneficiaries by adding “active employees” and “passive 
pensioners” both in the same regression, instead of “total assets”. Despite a high correlation coefficient 
between these two variables, there are not significant, with the exception of passive pensioners for board 
competence. This may illustrate that what really matters is fund size in the aggregate and that it is not 
specifically related with the kind of beneficiaries. 
                                                          
57 For reasons explained previously, the estimated regressions on the six solution indices, 24 attributes, and additional 
indices “legally binding” and “voluntary compliance” are not presented in Table 3.9. 
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(4-5) Due to the high dispersion in size for Swiss pension funds, I split the sample in two groups based 
on the median of “total assets” and I run the regressions separately for each group. For large pension 
funds, fund size does not seem to be relevant anymore although the internal management of the 
administration still significantly explains higher levels of board effectiveness and commitment. On the 
contrary, fund size is particularly a significant and important explanatory variable for levels of board 
effectiveness and its dimensions for the smallest pension funds in Switzerland. 
(6) Public pension funds have a specific agency setting, benefit from a preferential funding treatment 
in the Swiss law, and are disproportionally large in comparison with private entities. In particular, the 
sample includes 11 public pension funds with an assets-weighted mean coverage ratio of 68.80% (vs. 
103.46% for private ones) and on average 10 times larger in assets (CHF 1,888 million vs. CHF 186 million 
for private ones). As this category of pension funds might influence the results, I re-estimate the 
regressions without the public pension funds. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
(7) Pension funds planning a liquidation procedure could have anticipated the procedure and as such 
have influenced the reported numbers of assets and/or beneficiaries. They might also have initially 
considered this procedure to consolidate due to their relatively small size. Consequently, the regressions 
are re-estimated without the funds in liquidation procedure. Despite the critical nature of this point, the 
results are qualitatively similar. 
(8) Fund size may endogenously determine the levels of board effectiveness and is dimensions. For 
instance, as illustrated previously, pension funds with more affiliated employers may invest in their own 
governance and good standards in order to attract more employers and grow in size. This reverse causality 
is most likely to exist in multi-employer pension funds as, in Switzerland, single-employer pension funds 
have their size given as exogenous by the size of the employer. Accordingly, for this test, I exclude multi-
employer pension funds in order to assess whether the results hold when focusing on pension funds where 
fund size seems to be an exogenous determinant. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
(9-11) As a last test, I also perform the base cross-sectional regressions for each of the three years in 
the sample separately (instead of an estimation on the mean over the period 2012-2010). For the years 
under consideration in this study, the main result is unaffected and thus seems to be robust. 
3.5.3. Discussion on consolidation 
Pension fund governance, its board effectiveness, and transparency seem to be mainly a question of 
fund size. This is an important finding as it may indicate that an efficient way of improving the organisation 
and functioning of pension boards in Switzerland and in countries with a similar institutional environment is 
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through the consolidation of the pension fund industry. In this study, I do not investigate directly this 
relation or claim that consolidation should be better for pension funds, their funding, and sustainability. I 
leave that for further research. Rather, by analysing the determinants of pension board effectiveness using 
the Swiss framework, I empirically show for the first time that it is related with fund size and that it matters 
beyond other potentially relevant sources. In this Sub-section, I discuss consolidation for Switzerland, as 
mentioned in previous literature [see e.g., Ammann and Zingg (2010); Ammann and Ehmann (2017); 
Stewart and Yermo (2008)]. 
The consolidation of the Swiss pension fund landscape is not something new and is a long-standing 
phenomenon. Because of the increasing administrative burden and the complexities of the law, regulation, 
and investments, this process has been started a long time ago. According to the survey of the OFS (2014), 
the number of Swiss pension funds decreased from 2,935 in 2004 to only 2,073 in 2012 (and even 1,866 in 
2014 for the most recent OFS (2016) survey). This means that more than 35% of the Swiss pension funds 
liquidated during the last decade. Moreover, in my sample, 7.65% of them report at the end of 2012 that 
they have planned to liquidate in a foreseeable future, including mainly very small pension funds (0.46% by 
weighting over total assets). Pension experts in Switzerland support that this ongoing consolidation of the 
landscape is likely to continue58. Prof. Ambachtsheer even argues that 20 Swiss pension funds should be 
enough59. Following his Canadian model of governance, large pension funds managed internally should 
have reduced conflicts of interests and managing costs, as well as ultimately better performance60. 
Based on the recent ORAb (2014)61 on pension fund activism in Switzerland, larger players should 
also strengthen the governance of Swiss listed companies. In particular, they should have more voice to 
actually have a say-on-pay of boards and executives of those corporations. However, previous studies on 
institutional activism are sceptic about the effectiveness of this control mechanism for U.S. corporations 
[see e.g., the review of Romano (2001)]. Von Arx and Schäfer (2007) develop a model to show that the 
dispersion of stock holdings by pension funds might explain the little or no effect of such activism. 
According to these authors, coalition building would be necessary for any action to actually work, 
explaining the low occurrence and probability of success in the past. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) also 
empirically confirm the negligible value added of U.K. pension funds on corporate governance and 
performance improvements. Overall, previous research emphasizes that it might be easier for pension 
funds to simply sell the stock and exit the market instead of actively force corporate changes. 
                                                          
58 See e.g., “Les experts prévoient une forte baisse du nombre de caisses de pension”, Le Temps, 17.11.2016. 
59 See e.g., “Selon le pape de la prévoyance, la Suisse doit réduire à 20 le nombre de caisses de pension”, Le Temps, 
21.09.2016. 
60 See e.g., “Les caisses de pension suisses sous-performent et sont mal dirigées”, Le Temps, 14.08.2017. 
61 See ORAb, 2014. Ordonnance contre les rémunérations abusives dans les sociétés anonymes cotées en bourse du 
20 novembre 2013. Etat le 1er janvier 2014. 
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Nevertheless, a strand of the literature shows that large pension funds with reduced conflicts of 
interests should have a positive impact on firm value [see e.g., Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); Woidtke 
(2002)]. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) show that large and active U.S. public pension funds can be 
successful through shareholder proposals. Although these authors find no evidence of agency problems 
inside public pension funds [see e.g., Romano (1993); Romano (1995)], Woidtke (2002) provide evidence of 
a negative effect of public pension funds (in comparison with a positive effect of private pension funds) due 
to conflicts of interests inherent with different objectives than increasing firm value. Therefore, large 
pension funds with strong governance seem to be better activists for the governance of corporations. 
Accordingly, I could expect that a consolidation of the Swiss pension fund industry including larger players 
with high standards of governance to be linked to the success of the ORAb (2014). 
As an end point, consolidation may not be beneficial for all plan beneficiaries and protect their best 
interests. Consolidation also has its drawbacks suggesting that there is not only an optimal board for each 
pension fund but also an optimal size and scale [see e.g., Bikker (2017)]. For instance, as argued by 
Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2012), larger pension funds tend to invest in more costly investment 
vehicles such as active mandates and illiquid assets, offsetting the associated benefits for the net 
investment performance. Large pension funds also usually have higher communication costs and important 
short-term liquidity needs. Although supervision efficiency is increased with consolidation [see e.g., 
Queisser and Vittas (2000)], they may face more supervisory pressure from the authorities or scrutiny by 
the media. Their organisation can become complex and the coordination difficult for the agents involved. 
Likewise, with too large pension funds, the representation of all participants’ interests become impossible. 
Pension arrangements cannot be tailor-made anymore and each plan beneficiary becomes inevitably 
anonymous. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Using a unique dataset of Swiss pension funds and a new measure of pension board effectiveness, I 
aim to analyse the determinants of effective boards in pension funds. I show that there is heterogeneity in 
the Swiss pension fund landscape and that fund size is the key explanatory variable of the wide dispersion 
in the levels of board effectiveness and its dimensions including integrity, commitment, and competence. 
Large pension funds managing their administration internally seem to be associated with more effective 
and committed boards by investing in the desirable best-practices attributes. Moreover, fund size matters 
beyond other potentially relevant sources such as the legal form or plan type and seems to hold on the 
provisions voluntary chosen by Swiss pension boards. Overall, the results give to some extent support for 
the consolidation of the pension fund industry in Switzerland and other countries with still small dispersed 
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pension funds. However, due to the data collection process and associated measurement, I cannot exclude 
transparency as an alternative explanation to the findings.  
The generalization of my results is limited as follows. First, additional empirical tests need to be 
implemented on extended samples. Such sample includes either more cross-sectional data collected from 
other regional supervision authorities or a longer time-series of data after the Swiss structural reform. 
Second, alternative approaches to measure pension board effectiveness, in which transparency reasons can 
be clearly dissociated, are necessary to validate the findings. Third and last, country matters for the 
governance and board effectiveness of pension funds. The applicability of my results to other countries 
thus depends on the specificities of their institutional environment and similarities with the Swiss pension 
system. Other empirical studies should be conducted and other measures should be developed outside 
Switzerland.  
Ultimately, following this study, further research should focus on whether and why consolidation 
should be better for pension funds and their plan beneficiaries. In particular, there is the need to determine 
the optimal pension fund size [see e.g., Bikker (2018)]. More empirical work is also needed to understand 
to what extent board effectiveness really matters for pension funds. In the following chapter, I aim to test 
whether it impacts pension fund asset allocation as well as what matters exactly among its different 
dimensions. 
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rm
 –
 P
R
IV
A
T
E
 
Le
g
a
l 
fo
rm
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 i
s 
P
R
IV
A
T
E
 (
co
o
p
e
ra
ti
v
e
 s
o
ci
e
ty
 o
r 
fo
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
) 
v
s.
 P
U
B
LI
C
 (
p
u
b
li
c 
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
) 
P
la
n
 t
y
p
e
 –
 D
E
F
IN
E
D
-B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
 
P
la
n
 t
y
p
e
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 p
la
n
s 
is
 D
E
F
IN
E
D
-B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
 v
s.
 D
E
F
IN
E
D
-C
O
N
T
R
IB
U
T
IO
N
S
 (
d
e
fi
n
e
d
-c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
o
r 
h
y
b
ri
d
) 
 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
 f
o
rm
 –
 M
U
LT
I-
E
M
P
LO
Y
E
R
 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e
 f
o
rm
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 i
s 
M
U
LT
I-
E
M
P
LO
Y
E
R
 (
co
ll
e
ct
iv
e
 o
r 
co
m
m
o
n
) 
v
s.
 S
IN
G
LE
-E
M
P
LO
Y
E
R
 
H
e
d
g
in
g
 t
y
p
e
 –
 A
U
T
O
N
O
M
O
U
S
 
H
e
d
g
in
g
 t
y
p
e
 o
f 
th
e
 r
is
k
s 
is
 A
U
T
O
N
O
M
O
U
S
 v
s.
 R
E
IN
S
U
R
A
N
C
E
 (
p
a
rt
ia
l 
o
r 
to
ta
l)
 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 –
 I
N
T
E
R
N
A
L 
A
D
M
IN
. 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 p
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 i
s 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L 
A
D
M
IN
. 
v
s.
 E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L 
A
D
M
IN
. 
a
s 
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
 i
n
 f
il
li
n
g
s 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
ts
 –
 I
N
T
E
R
N
A
L 
IN
V
E
S
T
. 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 i
n
v
e
st
m
e
n
ts
 p
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 i
s 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L 
IN
V
E
S
T
. 
v
s.
 E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L 
IN
V
E
S
T
. 
a
s 
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
 i
n
 f
il
li
n
g
s 
 
 
O
th
e
r 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
D
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s:
 
T
o
ta
l 
a
ss
e
ts
 (
in
 m
io
 C
H
F
) 
T
o
ta
l 
a
ss
e
ts
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
, 
w
it
h
 t
h
e
 a
ss
e
ts
/l
ia
b
il
it
ie
s 
fr
o
m
 c
o
ll
e
ct
iv
e
 i
n
su
ra
n
ce
 c
o
n
tr
a
ct
s 
(i
n
 m
il
li
o
n
 C
H
F
) 
T
o
ta
l 
b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s,
 c
o
m
p
u
te
d
 a
s 
a
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
p
lu
s 
p
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
  
A
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
P
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 (
re
ti
re
d
, 
d
is
a
b
le
d
, 
a
n
d
 s
u
rv
iv
o
rs
) 
F
o
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
 a
g
e
 
A
g
e
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
, 
co
m
p
u
te
d
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e
 f
o
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
 y
e
a
r 
A
ff
il
ia
te
d
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
rs
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
a
ff
il
ia
te
d
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
rs
 o
r 
sp
o
n
so
ri
n
g
 c
o
m
p
a
n
ie
s 
to
 t
h
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 
P
e
n
si
o
n
 p
la
n
s 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 p
la
n
s 
o
ff
e
re
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 a
s 
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
 i
n
 f
il
li
n
g
s 
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
a
ti
o
 (
in
 %
) 
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
a
ti
o
 o
r 
te
ch
n
ic
a
l 
fu
n
d
in
g
 r
a
ti
o
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
, 
d
e
fi
n
e
d
 a
s 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 a
ss
e
ts
 a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 o
v
e
r 
th
e
 c
o
m
m
it
te
d
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s 
(O
P
P
2
 a
rt
. 
4
4
 a
n
d
 a
n
n
e
x)
 (
in
 %
) 
B
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s 
ra
ti
o
 
R
a
ti
o
 o
f 
a
ct
iv
e
 o
v
e
r 
p
a
ss
iv
e
 b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s,
 c
o
m
p
u
te
d
 a
s 
a
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
o
v
e
r 
p
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 (
a
n
d
 i
s 
e
q
u
a
l 
to
 a
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
if
 p
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 i
s 
ze
ro
) 
C
a
p
it
a
l 
ra
ti
o
 
R
a
ti
o
 o
f 
a
ct
iv
e
 o
v
e
r 
p
a
ss
iv
e
 c
a
p
it
a
l,
 c
o
m
p
u
te
d
 a
s 
ca
p
it
a
l 
o
f 
e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
(i
n
 m
il
li
o
n
 C
H
F
) 
o
v
e
r 
ca
p
it
a
l 
o
f 
p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 (
in
 m
il
li
o
n
 C
H
F
) 
(a
n
d
 i
s 
e
q
u
a
l 
to
 c
a
p
it
a
l 
o
f 
e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
if
 c
a
p
it
a
l 
o
f 
p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 i
s 
ze
ro
) 
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
ra
te
 (
in
 %
) 
A
p
p
li
e
d
 t
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
in
te
re
st
 r
a
te
 f
o
r 
v
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 l
ia
b
il
it
ie
s 
(i
n
 %
) 
C
a
n
to
n
 u
rb
a
n
 (
d
u
m
m
y
) 
C
a
n
to
n
 o
f 
lo
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 i
s 
V
D
 w
it
h
 f
a
ci
li
ta
te
d
 a
cc
e
ss
 t
o
 f
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
se
rv
ic
e
s 
v
s.
 N
E
/V
S
/J
U
 
Li
q
u
id
a
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
 (
d
u
m
m
y
) 
Li
q
u
id
a
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 i
s 
in
 p
ro
g
re
ss
 o
r 
e
xp
e
ct
e
d
 i
n
 a
 f
o
re
se
e
a
b
le
 f
u
tu
re
 
 
 
P
a
n
e
l 
B
: 
P
e
n
si
o
n
 g
o
ve
rn
a
n
ce
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
 
G
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 i
n
d
ic
e
s 
C
o
m
p
u
te
d
 a
s 
su
m
 o
f 
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
sc
a
le
d
 t
o
 1
: 
E
F
F
E
C
T
IV
E
N
E
S
S
 
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
in
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 t
h
e
 2
4
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(1
-2
4
) 
IN
T
E
G
R
IT
Y
 
D
im
e
n
si
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 8
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(1
-8
) 
C
O
M
M
IT
M
E
N
T
 
D
im
e
n
si
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 8
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(9
-1
6
) 
C
O
M
P
E
T
E
N
C
E
 
D
im
e
n
si
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 8
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(1
7
-2
4
) 
7
1
 
C
o
m
p
li
a
n
ce
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 2
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(1
-2
) 
R
e
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 6
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(3
-8
) 
In
ce
n
ti
v
e
s 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 5
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(9
-1
3
) 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 3
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(1
4
-1
6
) 
E
xp
e
rt
is
e
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 3
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(1
7
-1
9
) 
F
ra
m
e
w
o
rk
 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 i
n
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 5
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
(2
0
-2
4
) 
Le
g
a
ll
y
 b
in
d
in
g
 
A
d
d
it
io
n
a
l 
in
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 a
ll
 t
h
e
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
w
h
ic
h
 a
re
 l
e
g
a
ll
y
 b
in
d
in
g
 (
1
-3
-4
-9
-1
8
-2
0
-2
4
) 
V
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 c
o
m
p
li
a
n
ce
 
A
d
d
it
io
n
a
l 
in
d
e
x,
 i
n
cl
u
d
in
g
 a
ll
 t
h
e
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
w
h
ic
h
 a
re
 n
o
t 
le
g
a
ll
y
 b
in
d
in
g
 
 
 
G
o
v
e
rn
a
n
ce
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
E
q
u
a
l 
to
 1
 i
f 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
a
p
p
ly
: 
(1
) 
o
w
n
 c
o
d
e
 o
f 
b
e
st
-p
ra
ct
ic
e
s 
T
h
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 h
a
s 
it
s 
o
w
n
 c
o
d
e
 o
f 
co
n
d
u
ct
, 
e
th
ic
, 
a
n
d
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 p
ra
ct
ic
e
s 
b
u
il
t 
o
n
 t
h
e
 l
e
g
a
l 
a
n
d
 r
e
g
u
la
to
ry
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 o
f 
LP
P
 
a
rt
. 
5
1
b
, 
LP
P
 a
rt
. 
5
1
c,
 O
P
P
2
 a
rt
. 
4
8
f-
l 
(2
) 
A
S
IP
 c
h
a
rt
e
r 
a
n
d
 d
ir
e
ct
iv
e
 
T
h
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 f
o
ll
o
w
s 
th
e
 p
re
v
a
le
n
t 
A
S
IP
 c
h
a
rt
e
r 
a
n
d
 d
ir
e
ct
iv
e
 (
b
a
se
d
 o
n
 d
u
ti
e
s,
 m
a
te
ri
a
l 
b
e
n
e
fi
ts
, 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
fl
ic
ts
 o
f 
in
te
re
st
s)
 
(3
) 
e
le
ct
io
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
 a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 
T
h
e
 b
o
a
rd
 i
s 
co
n
st
it
u
te
d
 a
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 a
n
 e
le
ct
io
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
 f
o
r 
th
e
 s
e
le
ct
io
n
 a
n
d
 n
o
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
it
s 
tr
u
st
e
e
s 
(L
P
P
 a
rt
. 
5
1
) 
(4
) 
e
q
u
a
l 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
T
h
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
tr
u
st
e
e
s 
re
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
r 
e
q
u
a
ls
 t
h
e
 o
n
e
s 
o
f 
th
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
(a
n
d
/o
r 
p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
) 
(L
P
P
 a
rt
. 
5
1
-1
) 
(5
) 
ch
a
ir
m
a
n
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
 
T
h
e
 c
h
a
ir
m
a
n
 i
s 
a
 r
e
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
 o
f 
th
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
(6
) 
ch
a
ir
m
a
n
sh
ip
 a
lt
e
rn
a
ti
o
n
 
T
h
e
 c
h
a
ir
m
a
n
sh
ip
 i
s 
le
a
d
 a
lt
e
rn
a
te
ly
 b
y
 a
 r
e
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
 o
f 
th
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
r 
(a
s 
re
co
m
m
e
n
d
e
d
 i
n
 L
P
P
 a
rt
. 
5
1
-3
) 
(7
) 
m
a
n
a
g
e
r 
n
o
t 
a
 t
ru
st
e
e
 
T
h
e
 i
n
te
rn
a
l 
m
a
n
a
g
e
r 
is
 n
o
t 
a
 t
ru
st
e
e
 (
o
r 
th
e
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
 i
s 
e
q
u
a
l 
to
 o
n
e
 i
f 
e
xi
st
e
n
ce
 o
f 
a
 m
a
n
a
g
e
r 
is
 e
q
u
a
l 
to
 z
e
ro
) 
(8
) 
n
o
 e
xt
e
rn
a
l 
tr
u
st
e
e
s 
T
h
e
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
tr
u
st
e
e
s 
in
 t
h
e
 b
o
a
rd
 r
e
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
a
ls
, 
th
e
 s
ta
te
 f
o
r 
p
u
b
li
c 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
s,
 o
r 
th
e
 f
o
u
n
d
in
g
 
sp
o
n
so
ri
n
g
 c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 f
o
r 
m
u
lt
i-
e
m
p
lo
y
e
r 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
s 
is
 z
e
ro
 (
a
s 
d
is
cu
ss
e
d
 i
n
 O
P
P
2
 a
rt
. 
4
8
h
) 
(9
) 
co
m
p
e
n
sa
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
a
tt
e
n
d
in
g
 
T
h
e
 t
ru
st
e
e
s 
a
re
 c
o
m
p
e
n
sa
te
d
 w
it
h
 a
t 
le
a
st
 a
n
 i
n
d
e
m
n
it
y
 f
o
r 
a
tt
e
n
d
in
g
 b
o
a
rd
 m
e
e
ti
n
g
s 
a
s 
m
e
n
ti
o
n
e
d
 i
n
 f
il
li
n
g
s 
(L
P
P
 a
rt
. 
5
1
a
-4
) 
(1
0
) 
e
xi
st
e
n
ce
 o
f 
a
 m
a
n
a
g
e
r 
A
n
 i
n
te
rn
a
l 
m
a
n
a
g
e
r 
is
 a
v
a
il
a
b
le
 f
o
r 
th
e
 a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
/o
r 
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
ts
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 
(1
1
) 
w
o
m
e
n
 r
e
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
s 
T
h
e
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
w
o
m
e
n
 i
n
 t
h
e
 b
o
a
rd
 i
s 
g
re
a
te
r 
th
a
n
 z
e
ro
 
(1
2
) 
b
o
a
rd
 t
e
n
u
re
 a
t 
le
a
st
 t
h
re
e
 y
e
a
rs
 
T
h
e
 m
in
im
u
m
 b
o
a
rd
 t
e
n
u
re
 i
s 
th
re
e
 y
e
a
rs
 
(1
3
) 
b
o
a
rd
 m
e
e
ts
 a
t 
le
a
st
 o
n
ce
 p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
T
h
e
 m
in
im
u
m
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
o
a
rd
 m
e
e
ti
n
g
s 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
is
 o
n
e
 (
to
 v
a
li
d
a
te
 t
h
e
 a
n
n
u
a
l 
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l 
st
a
te
m
e
n
ts
) 
(1
4
) 
sm
a
ll
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
tr
u
st
e
e
s 
T
h
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
tr
u
st
e
e
s 
is
 b
e
lo
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Appendix 3.2: Distribution of the main governance indices 
These figures present the histograms of the general index “effectiveness” and the dimension indices “integrity”, “commitment”, 
and “competence” on the full sample (2012-2010). 
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Figure 3.1. 
Board effectiveness and its desirable attributes. 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
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Figure 3.2. 
Scree plot from the principal component analysis. 
This figure presents the scree plot of the eigenvalues from the principal component analysis on the 24 governance attributes 
included in the general index “effectiveness” on the full sample (2012-2010). As a matter of interpretation, the number of principal 
components associated to the eigenvalues must be retained above the scree, i.e. before the slope becomes flat. Alternatively, with 
the Kaiser criterion, all principal components with eigenvalues larger than one should be selected. 
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Table 3.1. 
Summary statistics of pension fund variables. 
This table presents summary statistics of pension fund variables for the full sample (2012-2010) and each year for total assets. 
Means are also computed by weighting over total assets. Summary statistics for the coverage ratio are given separately for private 
pension funds and for public ones due to different legal funding treatment. Information on whether public pension funds follow a 
total or partial funding regime is not available. The variables are detailed in Appendix 3.1. 
 
  Full sample (2012-2010) 
 
Obs. Sd Min Median Mean 
Mean 
(assets-
weighted) 
Max 
      
 
 
Total assets (in mio CHF) 614 802.0612 0.09 43.27 281.52 2562.89 7846.39 
In 2012 195 861.4167 0.09 48.60 313.83 2666.15 7846.39 
In 2011 210 767.0151 0.17 39.57 266.03 2466.93 7349.93 
In 2010 209 781.8035 0.37 42.00 266.94 2545.71 7422.74 
        
Total beneficiaries 614 7394.4505 1 287 2455 16887 76687 
Active employees 614 6338.4264 0 222 1973 12409 73033 
Passive pensioners 614 1514.0235 0 53 481 4478 15070 
      
 
 
Foundation age 614 20.8564 0 38 39 53 114 
Affiliated employers 609 501.1620 0 3 124 452 3888 
Pension plans 609 1.9083 1 1 2 2 15 
      
 
 
Coverage ratio (in %) 
     
 
 
Private 570 18.6643 67.70 103.55 106.00 103.46 278.44 
Public 32 17.3135 55.20 66.47 74.93 68.80 102.58 
        
Beneficiaries ratio 614 14.4496 0.00 4.38 8.93 4.90 196.00 
Capital ratio 614 245.3639 0.00 1.90 25.17 12.58 5428.49 
Technical rate (in %) 543 0.3811 2.00 3.50 3.60 3.66 4.50 
 
     
 
 
Canton urban (dummy) 614 0.4818 
  
63.52% 66.85% 
 
Liquidation procedure (dummy) 614 0.2661     7.65% 0.46%   
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Table 3.3. 
Summary statistics of governance attributes. 
This table presents the mean or proportions of the governance attributes for the full sample (2012-2010), large vs. small pension 
funds, and each year (2012, 2011, and 2010). Large and small pension funds are split in two groups based on the median of total 
assets. The variables are detailed in Appendix 3.1. Note that by construction all the variables have a number of observations of 614. 
 
  Full sample (2012-2010)         
 
Mean   
Mean 
(large) 
Mean 
(small)  
Mean 
(2012) 
Mean 
(2011) 
Mean 
(2010) 
         
INTEGRITY 
        
Compliance   
  
 
   
(1) own code of best-practices 73%  74% 72%  78% 72% 70% 
(2) ASIP charter and directive 21%  30% 13%  24% 20% 19% 
Representativeness 
 
 
  
 
   
(3) election procedure available 42%  48% 36%  45% 40% 40% 
(4) equal representation 90%  89% 90%  91% 90% 88% 
(5) chairman employees representative 17%  22% 13%  18% 17% 17% 
(6) chairmanship alternation 23%  26% 21%  24% 23% 23% 
(7) manager not a trustee 76%  85% 67%  76% 75% 76% 
(8) no external trustees 90%  91% 89%  91% 90% 90% 
         
COMMITMENT 
        
Incentives 
 
 
  
 
   
(9) compensation for attending 22%  30% 14%  24% 21% 21% 
(10) existence of a manager 66%  78% 54%  68% 65% 65% 
(11) women representatives 64%  65% 64%  62% 65% 66% 
(12) board tenure at least three years 94%  93% 95%  94% 94% 94% 
(13) board meets at least once per year 80%  77% 83%  81% 80% 80% 
Organisation 
 
 
  
 
   
(14) small number of trustees 64%  40% 89%  64% 66% 64% 
(15) existence of committees 43%  68% 19%  45% 42% 42% 
(16) existence of an investment committee 41%  64% 18%  43% 40% 40% 
         
COMPETENCE 
        
Expertise 
 
 
  
 
   
(17) election procedure based on expertise 1%  1% 1%  1% 1% 1% 
(18) training of the trustees 56%  61% 50%  61% 54% 53% 
(19) investment experts available 87%  93% 82%  89% 87% 87% 
Framework 
 
 
  
 
   
(20) investment policy available 94%  99% 90%  95% 94% 94% 
(21) investment objectives defined 81%  86% 76%  83% 80% 80% 
(22) investment benchmarks defined 41%  52% 30%  43% 41% 40% 
(23) risk policy available 12%  17% 7%  13% 12% 11% 
(24) ALM study for the strategy 24%   32% 15%   25% 24% 22% 
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Table 3.5. 
Univariate tests on board effectiveness. 
This table presents univariate tests on the general index “effectiveness” on the mean over the period 2012-2010 based on different 
group splits. To perform the tests, “total assets”, “total beneficiaries”, “active employees”, “passive pensioners”, “foundation age”, 
“affiliated employers”, “pension plans”, “coverage ratio”, “beneficiaries ratio”, “capital ratio”, and “technical rate” are split in two 
groups based on the median. The first column [Mean (1)] gives the mean level of the index for pension funds in the group (1). The 
second column [Mean (0)] gives the mean level of the index for pension funds in the group (0). The third column [t-test] gives the 
results of the two-group mean-comparison tests performed to assess the statistical significance in the mean difference between 
the two groups. The null hypothesis to be tested is that the means of the two groups are equal. The fourth column [z-test] gives the 
results of the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests which account for potential non-normal distributions. The null hypothesis to be tested is 
that the distributions of the populations in the two groups are equal. 
 
  EFFECTIVENESS 
   
Diff (0-1) 
 Mean (1) Mean (0) t-test z-test 
     
PRIVATE (1) vs. PUBLIC (0) 54% 60% 1.67 1.37 
DEFINED-BENEFITS (1) vs. DEFINED-CONTRIBUTIONS (0) 53% 55% 0.52 0.52 
MULTI-EMPLOYER (1) vs. SINGLE-EMPLOYER (0) 56% 54% -1.12 -0.80 
AUTONOMOUS (1) vs. REINSURANCE (0) 60% 53% -2.72 -2.64 
INTERNAL ADMIN. (1) vs. EXTERNAL ADMIN. (0) 60% 52% -3.86 -4.00 
INTERNAL INVEST. (1) vs. EXTERNAL INVEST. (0) 53% 55% 0.97 0.56 
 
Total assets: large (1) vs. small (0) 59% 49% -6.44 -5.61 
Total beneficiaries: large (1) vs. small (0) 59% 49% -6.51 -5.76 
Active employees: large (1) vs. small (0) 59% 49% -6.21 -5.39 
Passive pensioners: large (1) vs. small (0) 58% 50% -5.66 -5.21 
Foundation age: old (1) vs. young (0) 55% 53% -1.38 -1.40 
Affiliated employers: lot (1) vs. few (0) 58% 50% -4.78 -4.40 
Pension plans: lot (1) vs. few (0) 57% 53% -2.23 -1.90 
 
Coverage ratio: high (1) vs. low (0) 55% 55% 0.05 -0.34 
Beneficiaries ratio: high (1) vs. low (0) 53% 55% 0.82 0.75 
Capital ratio: high (1) vs. low (0) 55% 54% -0.55 -0.35 
Technical rate: high (1) vs. low (0) 56% 54% -1.04 -0.90 
Canton urban: yes (1) vs. no (0) 54% 55% 0.73 0.98 
Liquidation procedure: yes (1) vs. no (0) 47% 55% 2.91 2.51 
 
8
0
 
T
a
b
le
 3
.6
. 
U
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 t
e
st
s 
o
n
 i
n
te
g
ri
ty
, 
co
m
m
it
m
e
n
t,
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
p
e
te
n
ce
. 
T
h
is
 t
a
b
le
 p
re
se
n
ts
 u
n
iv
a
ri
a
te
 t
e
st
s 
o
n
 t
h
e
 d
im
e
n
si
o
n
 i
n
d
ic
e
s 
“i
n
te
g
ri
ty
”,
 “
co
m
m
it
m
e
n
t”
, 
a
n
d
 “
co
m
p
e
te
n
ce
” 
o
n
 t
h
e
 m
e
a
n
 o
v
e
r 
th
e
 p
e
ri
o
d
 2
0
1
2
-2
0
1
0
 b
a
se
d
 o
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
g
ro
u
p
 s
p
li
ts
. 
T
o
 p
e
rf
o
rm
 t
h
e
 
te
st
s,
 “
to
ta
l 
a
ss
e
ts
”,
 “
to
ta
l 
b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s”
, 
“a
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s”
, 
“p
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
”,
 “
fo
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
 a
g
e
”,
 “
a
ff
il
ia
te
d
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
rs
”,
 “
p
e
n
si
o
n
 p
la
n
s”
, 
“c
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
a
ti
o
”,
 “
b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s 
ra
ti
o
”,
 “
ca
p
it
a
l 
ra
ti
o
”,
 
a
n
d
 “
te
ch
n
ic
a
l 
ra
te
” 
a
re
 s
p
li
t 
in
 t
w
o
 g
ro
u
p
s 
b
a
se
d
 o
n
 t
h
e
 m
e
d
ia
n
. 
T
h
e
 f
ir
st
 c
o
lu
m
n
 [
M
e
a
n
 (
1
)]
 g
iv
e
s 
th
e
 m
e
a
n
 l
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
th
e
 i
n
d
e
x 
fo
r 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
s 
in
 t
h
e
 g
ro
u
p
 (
1
).
 T
h
e
 s
e
co
n
d
 c
o
lu
m
n
 [
M
e
a
n
 (
0
)]
 g
iv
e
s 
th
e
 m
e
a
n
 l
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
th
e
 i
n
d
e
x 
fo
r 
p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
s 
in
 t
h
e
 g
ro
u
p
 (
0
).
 T
h
e
 t
h
ir
d
 c
o
lu
m
n
 [
t-
te
st
] 
g
iv
e
s 
th
e
 r
e
su
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e
 t
w
o
-g
ro
u
p
 m
e
a
n
-c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
 t
e
st
s 
p
e
rf
o
rm
e
d
 t
o
 a
ss
e
ss
 t
h
e
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
m
e
a
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 t
w
o
 g
ro
u
p
s.
 T
h
e
 n
u
ll
 h
y
p
o
th
e
si
s 
to
 b
e
 t
e
st
e
d
 i
s 
th
a
t 
th
e
 m
e
a
n
s 
o
f 
th
e
 t
w
o
 g
ro
u
p
s 
a
re
 e
q
u
a
l.
 T
h
e
 f
o
u
rt
h
 c
o
lu
m
n
 [
z-
te
st
] 
g
iv
e
s 
th
e
 r
e
su
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e
 W
il
co
xo
n
 r
a
n
k
-s
u
m
 t
e
st
s 
w
h
ic
h
 a
cc
o
u
n
t 
fo
r 
p
o
te
n
ti
a
l 
n
o
n
-n
o
rm
a
l 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s.
 T
h
e
 n
u
ll
 h
y
p
o
th
e
si
s 
to
 b
e
 t
e
st
e
d
 i
s 
th
a
t 
th
e
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
th
e
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
s 
in
 t
h
e
 t
w
o
 g
ro
u
p
s 
a
re
 e
q
u
a
l.
 
 
  
IN
T
E
G
R
IT
Y
 
  
C
O
M
M
IT
M
E
N
T
 
  
C
O
M
P
E
T
E
N
C
E
 
 
 
 
D
if
f 
(0
-1
) 
 
 
 
D
if
f 
(0
-1
) 
 
 
D
if
f 
(0
-1
) 
 
M
e
a
n
 (
1
) 
M
e
a
n
 (
0
) 
t-
te
st
 
z-
te
st
 
 
M
e
a
n
 (
1
) 
M
e
a
n
 (
0
) 
t-
te
st
 
z-
te
st
 
 
M
e
a
n
 (
1
) 
M
e
a
n
 (
0
) 
t-
te
st
 
z-
te
st
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
R
IV
A
T
E
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 P
U
B
LI
C
 (
0
) 
5
4
%
 
5
6
%
 
0
.6
0
 
0
.6
8
 
5
9
%
 
6
9
%
 
2
.0
0
 
1
.9
1
 
4
9
%
 
5
5
%
 
1
.0
1
 
1
.0
8
 
D
E
F
IN
E
D
-B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 D
E
F
IN
E
D
-C
O
N
T
R
IB
U
T
IO
N
S
 (
0
) 
5
3
%
 
5
4
%
 
0
.4
1
 
0
.3
3
 
5
7
%
 
6
0
%
 
0
.8
0
 
1
.0
6
 
5
0
%
 
5
0
%
 
-0
.0
6
 
-0
.1
9
 
M
U
LT
I-
E
M
P
LO
Y
E
R
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 S
IN
G
LE
-E
M
P
LO
Y
E
R
 (
0
) 
5
4
%
 
5
4
%
 
-0
.0
9
 
-0
.0
9
 
6
2
%
 
5
8
%
 
-1
.4
0
 
-1
.7
4
 
5
1
%
 
4
9
%
 
-0
.8
8
 
-1
.1
3
 
A
U
T
O
N
O
M
O
U
S
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 R
E
IN
S
U
R
A
N
C
E
 (
0
) 
5
7
%
 
5
3
%
 
-1
.1
9
 
-1
.2
1
 
6
6
%
 
5
8
%
 
-2
.5
3
 
-2
.3
3
 
5
6
%
 
4
8
%
 
-2
.0
8
 
-2
.0
3
 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L 
A
D
M
IN
. 
(1
) 
v
s.
 E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L 
A
D
M
IN
. 
(0
) 
5
6
%
 
5
3
%
 
-0
.9
3
 
-0
.9
0
 
7
0
%
 
5
6
%
 
-5
.2
1
 
-4
.9
6
 
5
4
%
 
4
8
%
 
-2
.2
1
 
-2
.4
9
 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L 
IN
V
E
S
T
. 
(1
) 
v
s.
 E
X
T
E
R
N
A
L 
IN
V
E
S
T
. 
(0
) 
5
3
%
 
5
4
%
 
0
.4
1
 
-0
.0
7
 
6
1
%
 
5
8
%
 
-1
.0
9
 
-1
.0
5
 
4
4
%
 
5
1
%
 
2
.6
3
 
1
.9
4
 
 
T
o
ta
l 
a
ss
e
ts
: 
la
rg
e
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 s
m
a
ll
 (
0
) 
5
8
%
 
5
0
%
 
-3
.7
4
 
-3
.5
4
 
6
4
%
 
5
4
%
 
-4
.6
0
 
-4
.3
9
 
5
5
%
 
4
4
%
 
-4
.9
5
 
-4
.4
9
 
T
o
ta
l 
b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s:
 l
a
rg
e
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 s
m
a
ll
 (
0
) 
5
7
%
 
5
1
%
 
-2
.9
2
 
-2
.7
0
 
6
4
%
 
5
4
%
 
-4
.7
2
 
-4
.5
6
 
5
6
%
 
4
3
%
 
-5
.7
4
 
-5
.5
8
 
A
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s:
 l
a
rg
e
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 s
m
a
ll
 (
0
) 
5
7
%
 
5
1
%
 
-3
.1
6
 
-2
.9
7
 
6
4
%
 
5
4
%
 
-4
.7
6
 
-4
.5
6
 
5
5
%
 
4
4
%
 
-4
.9
1
 
-4
.7
1
 
P
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
: 
la
rg
e
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 s
m
a
ll
 (
0
) 
5
7
%
 
5
0
%
 
-3
.4
1
 
-3
.1
3
 
6
3
%
 
5
5
%
 
-4
.0
4
 
-4
.1
7
 
5
4
%
 
4
4
%
 
-4
.3
4
 
-4
.3
3
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
 a
g
e
: 
o
ld
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 y
o
u
n
g
 (
0
) 
5
5
%
 
5
3
%
 
-1
.1
7
 
-1
.1
9
 
6
0
%
 
5
8
%
 
-0
.7
7
 
-0
.9
2
 
5
1
%
 
4
8
%
 
-1
.0
6
 
-0
.7
5
 
A
ff
il
ia
te
d
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
rs
: 
lo
t 
(1
) 
v
s.
 f
e
w
 (
0
) 
5
8
%
 
5
0
%
 
-4
.2
0
 
-3
.7
9
 
6
3
%
 
5
5
%
 
-3
.4
2
 
-3
.5
0
 
5
3
%
 
4
6
%
 
-2
.6
4
 
-2
.8
0
 
P
e
n
si
o
n
 p
la
n
s:
 l
o
t 
(1
) 
v
s.
 f
e
w
 (
0
) 
5
5
%
 
5
3
%
 
-0
.9
1
 
-1
.0
0
 
6
3
%
 
5
7
%
 
-2
.4
6
 
-2
.2
6
 
5
2
%
 
4
8
%
 
-1
.4
2
 
-1
.3
0
 
 
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
a
ti
o
: 
h
ig
h
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 l
o
w
 (
0
) 
5
5
%
 
5
3
%
 
-1
.1
2
 
-1
.4
5
 
6
0
%
 
5
9
%
 
-0
.5
9
 
-0
.6
6
 
4
8
%
 
5
2
%
 
1
.6
7
 
1
.5
4
 
B
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s 
ra
ti
o
: 
h
ig
h
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 l
o
w
 (
0
) 
5
3
%
 
5
4
%
 
0
.5
3
 
0
.5
4
 
5
9
%
 
5
9
%
 
0
.3
3
 
0
.4
5
 
4
8
%
 
5
0
%
 
0
.9
0
 
0
.9
8
 
C
a
p
it
a
l 
ra
ti
o
: 
h
ig
h
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 l
o
w
 (
0
) 
5
4
%
 
5
3
%
 
-0
.3
8
 
-0
.3
5
 
5
8
%
 
6
0
%
 
0
.6
8
 
0
.6
5
 
5
1
%
 
4
8
%
 
-1
.4
3
 
-0
.9
9
 
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
ra
te
: 
h
ig
h
 (
1
) 
v
s.
 l
o
w
 (
0
) 
5
6
%
 
5
4
%
 
-0
.6
7
 
-0
.8
3
 
5
9
%
 
5
9
%
 
0
.1
0
 
0
.0
9
 
5
3
%
 
4
9
%
 
-1
.7
1
 
-1
.6
6
 
C
a
n
to
n
 u
rb
a
n
: 
y
e
s 
(1
) 
v
s.
 n
o
 (
0
) 
5
3
%
 
5
5
%
 
0
.7
2
 
1
.3
8
 
5
9
%
 
6
0
%
 
0
.5
3
 
0
.2
7
 
4
9
%
 
5
0
%
 
0
.3
7
 
0
.8
0
 
Li
q
u
id
a
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
: 
y
e
s 
(1
) 
v
s.
 n
o
 (
0
) 
4
5
%
 
5
5
%
 
2
.8
2
 
3
.2
4
 
  
5
5
%
 
6
0
%
 
1
.2
5
 
1
.4
0
 
  
4
1
%
 
5
0
%
 
2
.2
4
 
1
.3
7
 
 
8
1
 
T
a
b
le
 3
.7
. 
P
a
ir
w
is
e
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
 
T
h
is
 t
a
b
le
 p
re
se
n
ts
 t
h
e
 p
a
ir
w
is
e
 P
e
a
rs
o
n
’s
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
p
o
te
n
ti
a
ll
y
 u
se
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 m
u
lt
iv
a
ri
a
te
 r
e
g
re
ss
io
n
s 
o
n
 t
h
e
 m
e
a
n
 o
v
e
r 
th
e
 p
e
ri
o
d
 2
0
1
2
-2
0
1
0
. 
T
h
e
 
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
 a
t 
1
%
 o
f 
th
e
 c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 c
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
 i
s 
h
ig
h
li
g
h
te
d
 w
it
h
 (
*
).
 
 
  
-1
- 
-2
- 
-3
- 
-4
- 
-5
- 
-6
- 
-7
- 
-8
- 
-9
- 
-1
0
- 
-1
1
- 
-1
2
- 
-1
3
- 
-1
4
- 
-1
5
- 
-1
6
- 
-1
7
- 
-1
8
- 
-1
9
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
- 
P
R
IV
A
T
E
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2
- 
D
E
F
IN
E
D
-B
E
N
E
F
IT
S
 
-0
.3
1
6
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3
- 
M
U
LT
I-
E
M
P
LO
Y
E
R
 
-0
.2
5
7
*
 
-0
.0
8
3
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4
- 
A
U
T
O
N
O
M
O
U
S
 
-0
.3
4
0
*
 
0
.2
1
2
*
 
0
.1
1
0
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5
- 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L 
A
D
M
IN
. 
-0
.2
4
2
*
 
0
.0
7
2
 
0
.2
0
3
*
 
0
.1
6
1
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-6
- 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
L 
IN
V
E
S
T
. 
0
.0
3
8
 
0
.0
6
8
 
0
.1
3
1
 
-0
.1
0
5
 
0
.1
6
2
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7
- 
T
o
ta
l 
a
ss
e
ts
 
-0
.4
8
0
*
 
0
.1
4
6
 
0
.1
6
2
 
0
.4
7
0
*
 
0
.2
9
0
*
 
0
.0
1
1
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-8
- 
T
o
ta
l 
b
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s 
-0
.3
4
8
*
 
0
.0
6
5
 
0
.3
2
4
*
 
0
.3
0
3
*
 
0
.2
8
5
*
 
0
.1
1
2
 
0
.6
8
8
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-9
- 
A
ct
iv
e
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
e
s 
-0
.2
7
6
*
 
0
.0
3
3
 
0
.3
3
1
*
 
0
.2
3
2
*
 
0
.2
7
3
*
 
0
.1
2
7
 
0
.5
8
0
*
 
0
.9
8
8
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
0
- 
P
a
ss
iv
e
 p
e
n
si
o
n
e
rs
 
-0
.5
4
2
*
 
0
.1
8
2
*
 
0
.1
9
5
*
 
0
.5
0
6
*
 
0
.2
4
9
*
 
0
.0
1
6
 
0
.9
2
9
*
 
0
.7
5
1
*
 
0
.6
3
7
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
1
- 
F
o
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
 a
g
e
 
-0
.3
4
2
*
 
0
.1
9
7
*
 
-0
.0
4
6
 
0
.2
1
5
*
 
0
.1
8
2
*
 
0
.0
2
6
 
0
.2
4
8
*
 
0
.1
6
6
 
0
.1
3
7
 
0
.2
3
8
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
2
- 
A
ff
il
ia
te
d
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
rs
 
-0
.0
9
8
 
-0
.0
9
6
 
0
.4
8
3
*
 
0
.0
9
7
 
0
.2
3
1
*
 
0
.1
7
0
 
0
.2
2
6
*
 
0
.5
7
2
*
 
0
.6
0
4
*
 
0
.2
6
2
*
 
0
.0
6
4
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
3
- 
P
e
n
si
o
n
 p
la
n
s 
-0
.0
7
0
 
-0
.1
1
5
 
0
.4
5
6
*
 
0
.0
1
6
 
-0
.0
1
2
 
-0
.0
0
1
 
0
.1
0
9
 
0
.2
1
9
*
 
0
.2
2
8
*
 
0
.1
1
4
 
-0
.0
9
7
 
0
.3
6
3
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
4
- 
C
o
v
e
ra
g
e
 r
a
ti
o
 
0
.3
4
6
*
 
-0
.1
4
1
 
-0
.1
4
1
 
-0
.0
9
9
 
-0
.1
0
5
 
0
.0
8
5
 
-0
.2
4
3
*
 
-0
.2
0
1
*
 
-0
.1
6
7
 
-0
.2
8
2
*
 
0
.0
2
7
 
-0
.0
3
9
 
-0
.1
2
1
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
5
- 
B
e
n
e
fi
ci
a
ri
e
s 
ra
ti
o
 
0
.1
0
2
 
-0
.2
1
5
*
 
0
.1
7
6
 
-0
.1
5
9
 
0
.0
4
1
 
0
.0
0
4
 
-0
.1
0
3
 
0
.0
0
4
 
0
.0
3
1
 
-0
.1
1
2
 
-0
.3
9
7
*
 
0
.0
9
2
 
0
.1
8
2
*
 
-0
.0
4
6
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
-1
6
- 
C
a
p
it
a
l 
ra
ti
o
 
0
.0
3
0
 
-0
.0
5
5
 
0
.1
9
8
*
 
-0
.0
5
0
 
0
.0
0
7
 
-0
.0
1
7
 
-0
.0
2
3
 
-0
.0
0
9
 
-0
.0
0
4
 
-0
.0
3
2
 
-0
.1
4
6
 
0
.0
4
2
 
0
.1
5
5
 
-0
.0
5
0
 
0
.3
9
7
*
 
1
 
 
 
 
-1
7
- 
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
ra
te
 
-0
.1
9
3
*
 
0
.1
9
6
*
 
-0
.0
8
4
 
-0
.0
0
4
 
-0
.1
1
7
 
-0
.0
1
0
 
0
.0
7
8
 
0
.1
0
5
 
0
.0
9
0
 
0
.1
3
8
 
0
.0
0
8
 
-0
.0
4
7
 
-0
.0
3
6
 
-0
.3
1
4
*
 
-0
.0
6
4
 
-0
.0
6
6
 
1
 
 
 
-1
8
- 
C
a
n
to
n
 u
rb
a
n
 
0
.1
3
4
 
-0
.0
7
1
 
-0
.0
2
0
 
0
.0
4
3
 
-0
.0
4
1
 
-0
.1
0
9
 
0
.0
2
2
 
0
.0
2
6
 
0
.0
2
6
 
0
.0
1
8
 
0
.0
1
7
 
0
.0
4
8
 
0
.0
9
9
 
0
.0
8
6
 
-0
.1
0
2
 
0
.0
1
0
 
-0
.1
2
9
 
1
 
 
-1
9
- 
Li
q
u
id
a
ti
o
n
 p
ro
ce
d
u
re
 
0
.0
7
8
 
-0
.0
9
9
 
-0
.0
4
8
 
-0
.0
8
7
 
-0
.0
1
9
 
-0
.0
1
0
 
-0
.1
1
0
 
-0
.0
9
9
 
-0
.0
9
3
 
-0
.0
9
5
 
-0
.1
1
5
 
-0
.0
6
9
 
-0
.0
4
5
 
0
.0
4
5
 
0
.0
9
3
 
0
.1
8
4
*
 
0
.0
3
6
 
0
.1
1
9
 
1
 
 
82 
Table 3.8. 
Multivariate regressions on governance indices. 
This table presents the multivariate regressions on the governance indices “effectiveness”, “integrity”, “commitment”, and 
“competence” on the mean over the period 2012-2010. For a matter of scale, “total assets” is transformed by taking the natural 
logarithm. Each regression is estimated with cross-sectional OLS, a constant, and robust standard errors. Standard errors are robust 
as heteroskedasticity-consistent following Huber-White estimation. For the linear estimation, note that one observation containing 
only one pensioner among its beneficiaries and thus an excessively high “capital ratio” is omitted. For each explanatory variable 
and the constant, the first row gives the coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional OLS regressions and the second row gives 
the robust standard errors of the coefficient estimates. Additionally, the number of observations, the statistical value from the F-
test, and the adjusted R-squared are given for each regression. For the F-test, the null hypothesis to be tested is that all coefficient 
estimates are equal to zero. 
Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  EFFECTIVENESS INTEGRITY COMMITMENT COMPETENCE 
     
PRIVATE 0.0268 0.0055 -0.0201 0.0952 
 
0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 
DEFINED-BENEFITS -0.0354 -0.0298 -0.0659 -0.0105 
 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
MULTI-EMPLOYER -0.0291 -0.0305 -0.0342 -0.0228 
 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
AUTONOMOUS -0.0017 -0.0129 0.0191 -0.0113 
 
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
INTERNAL ADMIN. 0.0601** 0.001 0.1335*** 0.0458 
 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
INTERNAL INVEST. -0.0067 0.0147 0.0119 -0.0468 
 
0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Total assets (ln) 0.0271*** 0.0204* 0.0222* 0.0386*** 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Foundation age -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coverage ratio -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Beneficiaries ratio -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0011 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Capital ratio -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003**  
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Technical rate -0.0163 -0.0061 -0.0658 0.023 
 
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Canton urban -0.0264 -0.0175 -0.0281 -0.0337 
 
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Liquidation procedure -0.0075 -0.0569 0.0092 0.025 
 
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
     
constant 0.5592*** 0.5799** 0.8028*** 0.295 
 
0.11 0.18 0.19 0.17 
     
# Obs. 184 184 184 184 
F-test 6.97 1.55 6.25 4.25 
Adj. R-squared 22.51% 2.77% 19.36% 14.25% 
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Table 3.9. 
Robustness tests of the multivariate regressions. 
This table presents the robustness tests of the multivariate regressions on the governance indices “effectiveness”, “integrity”, 
“commitment”, and “competence” on the mean over the period 2012-2010. For a matter of scale, “total assets”, “total 
beneficiaries”, “active employees”, and “passive pensioners” are transformed by taking the natural logarithm. Each regression is 
estimated with cross-sectional OLS, a constant, and robust standard errors. Standard errors are robust as heteroskedasticity-
consistent following Huber-White estimation. For the linear estimation, note that one observation containing only one pensioner 
among its beneficiaries and thus an excessively high “capital ratio” is omitted. For each test, the significant explanatory variables of 
each multivariate regression on the governance indices are presented with their respective sign (+ or -) as well as the number of 
observations. The first row recalls the base result (1) and all the tests (2-11) are developed in details in the body of the chapter. In 
terms of methodology, the rows (9-11) present the estimated regressions for each of the three years in the sample separately 
(instead of an estimation on the mean over the period 2012-2010). 
Statistical significance: (+)(-) p<0.05, (++)(--) p<0.01, (+++)(---) p<0.001 
 
  # Obs. EFFECTIVENESS INTEGRITY COMMITMENT COMPETENCE 
 
(1) Base result 184 (++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+) Total assets (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+++) Total assets  
 
(+++) Total assets 
 
(+) Total assets (--) Capital ratio  
 
(2) Total beneficiaries as 
proxy for fund size 
(instead of total assets) 184 (++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+) Total beneficiaries (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+++) Total beneficiaries 
 
(+++) Total beneficiaries (-) Beneficiaries ratio (+) Total beneficiaries (-) Capital ratio 
 
(3) Distinction between 
active and passive 
beneficiaries 179 (+) INTERNAL ADMIN. nothing (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+) Passive pensioners 
 
  
(-) Technical rate  (-) Capital ratio 
 
  (4) Large pension funds 
(total assets) 102 (++) INTERNAL ADMIN.  (-) Foundation age (+) AUTONOMOUS nothing 
  (+) Liquid. procedure  (+) Coverage ratio (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN.   
   (---) Liquid. procedure (-) Canton urban   
    (+++) Liquid. procedure  
      
(5) Small pension funds 
(total assets) 82 (++) Total assets  (--) INTERNAL ADMIN. (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (++) Total assets 
   (-) Coverage ratio (--) AUTONOMOUS   
   (+) Capital ratio (++) INTERNAL ADMIN.  
    (+) Total assets  
    (-) Beneficiaries ratio  
    (-) Technical rate  
      
(6) Without public 
pension funds 173 (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+++) Total assets 
 
(+++) Total assets  (++) Total assets  (++) Total assets (--) Capital ratio 
 
  
  
(7) Without funds in 
liquidation procedure 168 (++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (++) Total assets (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+++) Total assets 
 
(+++) Total assets (-) Beneficiaries ratio (+) Total assets (-) Capital ratio 
 
(-) Canton urban  
 
  
 
   
 
(8) Without multi-
employer pension funds 147 (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (++) Total assets 
  (+) INTERNAL ADMIN. (++) Total assets (+++) Total assets (-) Capital ratio 
  (+++) Total assets (+) Capital ratio   
      
(9) Estimation 2010 181 (+) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+) Total assets (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+++) Total assets 
 
(+++) Total assets (--) Liquid. procedure (+) Total assets (+) Liquid. procedure  
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(10) Estimation 2011 180 (++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+) Total assets (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+++) Total assets 
 
(+++) Total assets 
 
(+) Total assets (-) Coverage ratio 
 
(-) Coverage ratio 
  
(--) Capital ratio 
 
(-) Capital ratio 
  
 
 
(11) Estimation 2012 171 (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (++) Total assets (-) DEFINED-BENEFITS (+++) Total assets 
 
(+) INTERNAL ADMIN. (-) Liquid. procedure  (+++) INTERNAL ADMIN. (+) Beneficiaries ratio 
 
(+++) Total assets 
 
(+) Total assets (--) Capital ratio 
 
(-) Canton urban  
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Chapter 4. 
 
What really matters in board effectiveness for pension fund asset 
allocation? 
Evidence from Switzerland62 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In pension funds, various governance considerations may impair the best interests of its plan 
beneficiaries. For example, the persons responsible may lack integrity and favor their own interest. They 
could also do not actively commit to their fiduciary duty and have the necessary competence in 
investments to manage the pension assets. In this chapter, we investigate whether and to what extent 
pension fund governance matters. To this end, we aim to examine the impact of board effectiveness and its 
different dimensions on pension fund asset allocation. 
We focus on this association for four reasons. First, pension fund governance is at the top of the 
agenda of regulators. Challenging global economic conditions, financial markets, and ageing populations 
threaten the funding and sustainability of pension funds worldwide. Together with cases of fraud and 
excessive costs make governance a critical element to secure and maximize the wealth of plan 
beneficiaries. Recognizing that governance is key for the future of pension systems, best-practices 
recommendations and regulatory reforms have been put in place recently. Still, we do not understand well 
                                                          
62 This chapter is part of a project in collaboration with Carolina Salva. Note that the writing, interpretation, and errors 
are my own. 
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what governance attributes are relevant and if the law and policymakers have focused on the ones that 
really matter. This study aims to bring some additional light. 
Second, asset allocation is the main driver of pension fund performance and, therefore, critical for 
their sustainability [see e.g., Pennacchi and Rastad (2011); Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986); Brinson, 
Singer, and Beebower (1991); Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann (1999); Hood (2005); Ibbotson and Kaplan 
(2000); Ambachtsheer (1994)]. According to Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986), over 90% of investment 
returns are explained by a fund asset allocation policy over time. Another strand of the literature suggests 
that asset allocation is also the channel through which governance matters for pension funds [see e.g., 
Useem and Mitchell (2000); Albrecht and Hingorani (2004); Dobra and Lubich (2013); Harper (2008a)]. 
Following these authors, governance considerations may impact performance indirectly through the way 
pension assets are invested and in particular allocated towards equity and abroad. As evidenced by Useem 
and Mitchell (2000), this effect might enhance the fund financial performance up to 2 percentage points, 
despite the additional risk taken63. A recent study by Andonov, Hochberg, and Rauh (2016) also gives 
specific evidence for that channel. They show that the proportion of politicians in boards of public pension 
funds impact investments in private equity, ultimately explaining part of pension fund underperformance. 
Therefore, evaluating whether pension fund governance shapes asset allocation decisions can help us 
understanding the likely effect on the performance and sustainability of pension funds. 
Third, there is limited evidence on how governance considerations can explain pension fund asset 
allocation beyond the studies mentioned above and to what extent it really matters. Research on pension 
fund governance is still in its infancy mostly due to the lack of easily accessible data. Moreover, most of 
existing studies evaluate directly the relation between governance and performance. Although the 
literature concentrates on different countries and plan characteristics, the majority of the studies shows 
consistently a small positive relation between characteristics of board effectiveness and the investment 
performance of pension funds64. However, some conclusions have to be taken with caution due to 
measurement issues associated with investment performance such as the absence to account for the 
liabilities side of pension funds. Most of the studies also lack to explain how it matters and remain 
inconclusive regarding what is critical and relevant. 
                                                          
63 On the contrary, McCarthy and Miles (2013) demonstrate that inefficient excess risk-taking in investments might 
exist when payoffs asymmetries in sharing surplus and deficits between the sponsoring employer and beneficiaries 
are important. In that case, the beneficiaries (through their board positions) might be willing to take too much risk as 
they do not directly support the downward risk. Sound pension fund governance which reduces such asymmetries is 
thus crucial, and particularly in Switzerland where all pension funds offer minimum legal guarantees. 
64 See e.g., Useem and Mitchell (2000); Albrecht and Hingorani (2004); Albrecht, Shamsub, and Giannatasio (2007); 
Hess (2005); Mitchell and Hsin (1994); Yang and Mitchell (2005); Harper (2008a); Harper (2008b); Schneider and 
Damanpour (2002); Ammann and Zingg (2010); Ammann and Ehmann (2017); Kowalewski (2012); Jackowicz and 
Kowalewski (2012); Koedijk, Slager, and Bauer (2010); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008); Ambachtsheer, 
Capelle, and Scheibelhut (1998). 
87 
Fourth, we focus on the board of trustees and its effectiveness as the board is actually the direct 
manager in most pension funds and at the centre of governance and investment policies. In most 
institutional environments around the world, the board is the fiduciary and responsible of the management 
of the pension fund and its assets. It also normally takes all asset allocation decisions and should make sure 
that the investment policy remains focused on serving the beneficiaries’ interests. In particular, the 
benchmark portfolio should be one that better immunizes the risks of the liabilities while adhering to the 
basic principles of diversification and reasonable risks. Still, there are situations where the pension board 
may deviate from this goal and lack integrity, commitment, or competence. We conceptualize and identify 
ways the absence of any of these three key dimensions of pension board effectiveness may impact asset 
allocation decisions and, in general, the investment risk-taking behavior of pension funds. 
We use the Swiss framework to empirically investigate the relevance and importance of these three 
different dimensions of board effectiveness. Switzerland is an ideal setup to study that question as pension 
boards are the persons responsible for the investment strategy65 and have the wide discretion to do so66. 
We measure board effectiveness and capture its different dimensions with a general index and additional 
sub-indices. These governance indices are constructed with 24 desirable best-practices governance 
attributes for Swiss pension funds and built as additive equally-weighted indices. Largely, this measure 
helps us to distinguish what matters exactly in pension board effectiveness. However, due to the data 
collection process and associated measurement, governance and transparency matters cannot be clearly 
dissociated with this measure. As such, the disclosure of information and level of transparency could as 
well be an alternative explanation to governance considerations. 
Furthermore, to empirically evaluate how board effectiveness and its different dimensions relate to 
pension fund asset allocation, we measure the proportions invested in (1) equity as proxy for investment 
risk-taking, (2) sponsor-related assets, and (3) cash as proxy for liquidity. We then estimate a model of 
three regressions while controlling for several other factors including known determinants of pension fund 
asset allocation. For the estimation, we use OLS and a fractional response model [see Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996, 2008); Gallani, Krishnan, and Wooldridge (2016)], giving qualitatively similar results. By 
alternatively using fractional logit regressions, we can account for values of our asset allocation measures 
which are bounded in the unit interval [0;1] as well as close to and including zero67. To perform our tests, 
                                                          
65 In Switzerland, the board of trustees is the supreme body with the fiduciary duty and responsibility for the 
investment strategy and its related decisions [see LPP art. 51b-2; LPP art. 52; OPP2 art. 49a; OPP2 art. 50]. 
66 This point is balanced with the fact that pension boards in Switzerland have to deal with specific investment 
restrictions [see OPP2 art. 53ss]. However, as Swiss pension boards can deviate from these legal limits by extending 
their investment possibilities [see OPP2 art. 50-4], they still have a wide scope to implement investment decisions. 
67 Our measures of asset allocation are close to zero mainly as the result from the variables construction (especially for 
cash) and investment restrictions given by the Swiss law (especially for sponsor). Please refer to the body of this 
chapter for more details. 
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we use a unique hand-collected dataset of Swiss pension funds counting many variables. Our sample 
includes 210 pension funds over the period 2010-2012 for a total of 614 fund-year observations. 
We find that governance considerations do matter for the asset allocation of pension funds in 
Switzerland. In particular, board competence in investments with a clear and detailed framework to take 
investment decisions seems to be what matters. Such pension boards are generally related with more 
equity and less cash, translating in a higher risk-taking behavior. Overall, this associated higher investment 
risk-taking should benefit the plan beneficiaries and the long-term performance and sustainability of 
pension funds. However, in this study, we do investigate why more risk should necessarily be better as well 
as claim or assess this causality, but rather leave that for further research.  
By using other data, these results contribute and are similar to the ones of Ammann and Zingg (2010) 
and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) who examine the governance and investment performance of Swiss 
pension funds. Indeed, these authors highlight elements as target setting, investment strategy, and risk 
management to be associated with investment performance. We particularly complement the study of 
Ammann and Ehmann (2017) which could not find any significant relation with asset allocation in a second 
part of their study, by bringing additional light on how it might be of importance. Lastly, to our knowledge, 
we are the first to highlight the seemingly high levels of cash in Swiss pension funds and empirically show 
that they seem to be associated with weak governance through the lack of an investment framework. 
Our results hold through several robustness tests. For example, they hold by excluding either public 
pension funds or funds planning a liquidation procedure, as these have very particular settings which may 
influence the investment process and decisions. Moreover, it could be that these are higher risk-taking 
pension funds that put in place and develop an investment framework allowing them to better manage 
risks. To mitigate to some extent concerns of reverse causality, we additionally estimate the model by 
lagging the independent variables and find virtually the same results. On the other hand, some robustness 
tests highlight limitations to our findings. For instance, the results do not seem to hold when including in 
the model the technical rate to value pension liabilities.  
Finally, despite a large set of control variables, there are omitted variables we cannot control in our 
model and that could as well explain our findings. These include other determinants of asset allocation such 
as the age structure of plan beneficiaries or cash-flow variables as the promised benefits to be paid. In 
particular, we cannot exclude liquidity needs as an alternative explanation to pension fund cash levels in 
Switzerland. Large unexpected liquidity needs related to the Swiss regulatory setting such as lump sum 
payments at retirement and free pass transfers of vested benefits may as well explain high levels of cash. 
The sample period of 2010-2012 under study is also characterized by specific financial markets conditions 
such as low yields on bonds. This could also explain the uncovered associations. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 develops potential impacts of the three different 
dimensions of board effectiveness on pension fund asset allocation. The dataset and measurement of the 
variables needed to conduct the empirical tests are presented in Section 4.3. This Section also provides 
summary statistics. Section 4.4 presents our model, its estimation, and the included control variables. The 
main results and additional robustness tests are given in Section 4.5. We also discuss further the findings on 
cash levels in Swiss pension funds in this Section. And Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. Why and how may board effectiveness impact asset allocation 
Pension board effectiveness includes three key dimensions that we particularly investigate in this 
study. First, more integrity in boards should mean reduced conflicts of interests and representativeness 
towards the beneficiaries’ interests. Second, appropriate incentives and organisation should ensure the 
active commitment of trustees to their fiduciary duty and responsibility. Third, board competence in 
investments should be related with sufficient expertise and a clear framework to manage pension assets. In 
the absence of any of these features, it may lead to situations where the board may not function well, 
entailing poor governance and decision-making. It may particularly impact the pension fund asset allocation 
and the risk-taking behavior with the investments of beneficiaries’ wealth. Potential impacts on asset 
allocation decisions from a lack of board integrity, commitment, and competence are described below68. 
4.2.1. Integrity 
A lack of board integrity may exist when pension boards are controlled by the employer or under the 
influence of politicians. In the first case, board positions dominated by the employer may bend towards 
investing more in sponsor-related assets such as loans to the employer or employer’s shares. An asset 
allocation determined by the employer may not be efficient [see e.g., Besley and Prat (2003); Hess and 
Impavido (2004)]. For instance, sponsor allocation subjects beneficiaries to an excessive exposure to their 
employer and prevents them from sufficient diversification. Also, deviations from a desirable asset 
allocation policy such as extreme conservatism or risk-taking can hurt beneficiaries’ wealth in the long 
term. 
In the second case, mostly in public pension funds, politicians may as well affect asset allocation 
decisions. For instance, this could be through their own short-term policy goals, translating into more risk-
taking and thus more equity [see e.g., Hess (2005); Hess and Impavido (2004); Bradley, Pantzalis, and Yuan 
(2016); Dobra and Lubich (2013); Mohan and Zhang (2014)]. Politicians may also favor local economic and 
                                                          
68 For more details on each of these dimensions and their respective solutions, please refer to both Chapters 2 and 3 
of this thesis. 
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social projects and thus allocate excessive funds to real estate or domestic assets, resulting in poor 
diversification. Moreover, Andonov, Hochberg, and Rauh (2016) show that personal and political conflicts 
of interests from politicians in pension boards lead to poor decisions in private equity leading partly to 
public pension fund underperformance69. 
4.2.2. Commitment 
Less committed boards may devote few time and low effort in making decisions to manage the 
pension investments. For example, as shown by Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002), trustees may 
follow the “path of least resistance”, meaning that they may prefer passive and herding investment 
decisions. Trustees may also prefer to enjoy a “quiet life” and avoid taking difficult and risky decisions 
which might involve additional dedication [see e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)]. Moreover, without 
proper incentives and organisation, such as, for instance, a separated investment committee, trustees may 
be too slow with the investment process. Overall, trustees may be less dynamic and less reactive, which 
could have significant implications in the allocation of the pension assets such as holding excessive liquid 
assets and cash, and thus low equity and insufficient diversification. 
4.2.3. Competence 
Pension boards may lack the financial competence to guide the investment process and actually take 
asset allocation decisions. It could be for instance through the absence of a detailed framework including 
an investment policy, objectives, and benchmarks. The issue of competence in investments has been 
highlighted specifically for trustees several times in the literature [see e.g., Myners Report (2001); Clark 
(2004); Clark, Caerlewy-Smith, and Marshall (2006, 2007); Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum (2008)]. As 
such, trustees may miss potential returns from complex asset classes, allocate to inappropriate mandates 
or investments, or accept too high fees charged by external investment experts. In the end, this may 
translate into insufficiently diversified portfolios and excessive investments in low-risk and high-liquid 
assets, leading to low equity and high cash. For example, Useem and Mitchell (2000) and Dobra and Lubich 
(2013) show that pension boards having independent performance evaluations to assess their competence 
is crucial and that such boards decide to invest more in equity. 
 
                                                          
69 Predictions on the risk-taking behavior of pension boards with a high representation of beneficiaries, including 
mostly employees, are not clear. Harper (2008a) suggests that such boards are subject to lower potential conflicts of 
interests, take less risk, and invest less in equity. Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) find that instead they choose more 
equity and Useem and Mitchell (2000) show that board composition is an irrelevant question for the pension fund 
asset allocation. 
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4.3. Data and variables 
4.3.1. The dataset of Swiss pension funds 
In this study, we use the same dataset as in Chapter 3. Our dataset comprises a unique sample of 210 
Swiss pension funds, out of the 2,073 registered in Switzerland at the end of 2012 [see OFS (2014)]. We 
manually gather data for all active pension funds registered in the cantons of Vaud, Valais, Neuchatel, and 
Jura, that report to the As-So (Autorité de Surveillance LPP et des fondations de Suisse Occidentale), a 
regional supervision authority. For the period 2010-2012, we collect individual variables directly from the 
paper files that these pension funds are obliged to send regularly to the authority. These include the 
audited annual reports under Swiss GAAP RPC 26, the foundation statutes (or laws for public pension 
funds), and the internal rules of organisation and investments. Our final sample contains a large panel 
dataset of 614 fund-year observations for many variables including pension fund, asset allocation, and 
pension governance information. All the variables used in this study are listed and defined in Appendix 4.1. 
The advantages of our hand-collected dataset are threefold. First, common accounting standards 
ensure comparability across the various and different Swiss pension funds. Second, verification by a 
supervision authority and two independent specialists, namely an auditor and an expert in occupational 
pensions, confirm the reliability of the reported numbers. Third, the information is free of any subjectivity 
and positive selection bias compared to surveys data [see e.g., in Switzerland, Ammann and Zingg (2010); 
Ammann and Ehmann (2017)]. On the other hand, the collected information is constrained by the 
disclosure and transparency in Swiss pension fund files. This will necessarily influence the constructions of 
the measures and the interpretation of the results. In addition, the sample remains limited in time-series by 
only including three years as well as in cross-section by the number of pension funds. This will restrict 
further the empirical design and tests to be implemented. 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the pension fund variables and shows significant differences 
across the Swiss pension funds included in our sample. For example, their fund size varies from less than 
CHF 100,000 in assets (1 beneficiary) to almost CHF 8 billion (76,687 beneficiaries). Moreover, most pension 
funds are private entities (95%, vs. public) and offer defined-contributions plans (85%, vs. defined-benefits). 
Private pension funds are on average fully funded with an assets-weighted mean coverage ratio of 
103.46%, while 11 public pension funds exhibit an average of 68.80% with respect to a different legal 
funding treatment. In addition, only few pension funds manage their administration and investments 
internally (21% and 25%, vs. external). The largest pension funds are also most likely to be public, multi-
employer, autonomous, and manage their administration internally. Compared to the complete universe of 
pension funds in Switzerland [see OFS (2014)], our sample covers about 10% of all Swiss pension funds and 
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9% of their assets. It is also representative in terms of fund size, with an average pension fund managing 
CHF 314 million at the end of 2012 (vs. CHF 325 million, OFS (2014))70.  
[Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of Swiss pension funds] 
4.3.2. Measuring board effectiveness 
In this study, we use the same measure of pension board effectiveness as in Chapter 3. In general, we 
aim to measure whether more effective pension boards influence the investment process and in particular, 
the extent to which their integrity, commitment, and competence can impact asset allocation decisions. For 
that purpose, we construct a general index of board effectiveness and additional sub-indices capturing its 
different dimensions.  
We focus on desirable attributes that are considered best-practices and have received the most 
attention in the literature. The list of attributes is necessarily dependent on the Swiss institutional 
environment and has been restricted according to data availability and collectability in Swiss pension fund 
files. Therefore, this measure is directly applicable to Swiss pension funds and associated with the level of 
transparency and disclosed information in their reported files. In the end, we identify 24 quantifiable 
desirable governance attributes classified in each of the dimensions of board effectiveness71. For each 
attribute, we examine if the pension fund meets a threshold level of implementation. Then, we assign a 
value of one if the pension fund meets the threshold and complies with best-practices, and zero otherwise. 
When the information is missing in the files, we assign a value of zero, as if the best-practices criteria was 
not met. This procedure implies that governance and transparency matters cannot be clearly dissociated 
with this measure. 
To aggregate the attributes, we follow a similar methodology as the widely-used corporate 
governance indices [see e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)] and 
previous integrated measures of pension fund governance [see e.g., in Switzerland, Ammann and Zingg 
(2010); Ammann and Ehmann (2017)]. As such, we aggregate all attributes into an additive equally-
weighted index and scaled to one. For example, if a pension fund meets 18 attributes out of the 24, the 
index will have a value of 75% (that is 18/24). We label this general index “effectiveness”. A higher level is 
associated with a more effective pension board. To capture the different dimensions, we similarly build 
three indices representing the three key dimensions (namely “integrity”, “commitment”, and 
“competence”) as well as six indices of the potential solutions to strengthen them (namely “compliance”, 
                                                          
70 For more detailed information about the dataset of Swiss pension funds, please refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
71 Appendix 4.1 provides a detailed list of the attributes, their corresponding definitions, and classification. 
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“representativeness”, “incentives”, “organisation”, “expertise”, and “framework”). Each of the sub-indices 
includes the attributes classified in their respective dimension and solution. 
We note that the approach of aggregating scores assigned to a number of attributes into an index is 
subject to several limitations that could lead to a misleading representation of pension board effectiveness. 
For instance, we are building additive indices assuming that all attributes matter equally and complement 
each other72. Unfortunately, there exists little guidance of how different attributes relate to each other. 
Although the indices we construct are imperfect instruments, they are easy to understand and provide a 
synthetic view of the multi-dimensional nature of governance considerations. In particular, they allow us to 
investigate empirically what matters exactly among the different dimensions of board effectiveness. 
Table 4.2 describes in details the 24 governance attributes applicable to Swiss pension funds with 
their classification. It also gives the proportions of pension funds meeting each attribute and summary 
statistics of the governance indices. Overall, in our sample, we observe a wide dispersion in the governance 
and level of effectiveness of Swiss pension boards73. First, most pension funds comply with codes of best-
practices preventing conflicts of interests through the Swiss legal and regulatory requirements (73%) or the 
ASIP charter and directive (21%). Second, representativeness of beneficiaries’ interests is ensured with 
equal representation between the employees and employer (90%) and the fact that boards mostly do not 
include the internal manager (76%) and external trustees such as politicians (90%). However, an election 
procedure is only available in 42% of the cases and the chairman is rarely a representative of employees 
(17%) or infrequently alternate between the types of representatives (23%). Third, incentives for 
commitment may exist such as sufficient board tenure (94%) and board meeting frequency (80%) as well as 
women representatives on board (64%). However, most pension funds do not offer any kind of financial 
compensation (22%) or hire an internal manager to run the pension fund (66%). Fourth, a recommended 
organisation for making decisions with a small board (64%) and specialized committees (43%), with at least 
an investment committee (41%), is not the norm yet. Fifth, expertise in investments is mostly guaranteed 
by external investment experts (87%) as pension boards do not have an election procedure based on 
expertise (1%) or mention systematic training programs (56%). Sixth and last, most boards have in place a 
basic framework to take investment decisions, including an investment policy (94%) and investment 
                                                          
72 We also adopt an alternative approach to the construction of equally-weighted indices by applying a principal 
component analysis [see e.g., Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2011); Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007); Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007)]. However, we do not pursue this approach for the measure of board effectiveness as, 
despite different loadings, it would not significantly reduce the number of initial variables (10 principal components 
out of 24 attributes) while explaining most part of the variation in the dataset (65.83%). 
73 Although there is wide dispersion of the attributes across the Swiss pension funds, the time-variation remains low. 
Looking at indices will help to partly solve this issue inherent with the studies on governance questions, though the 
variation across time of the indices levels remains low as well. 
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objectives (81%) for their asset allocation. In contrast, they still seem to lack to define and use investment 
benchmarks (41%), an ALM study for the strategy (24%), and a risk policy (12%)74. 
[Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of pension governance variables] 
4.3.3. Measuring asset allocation 
Based on our predictions, the existing literature, and the information in Swiss pension fund files, we 
focus on the following measures of asset allocation to conduct the empirical tests. After collecting and 
computing the different asset classes, we use the proportion allocated in “equity”, “sponsor”, and “cash”75. 
Asset allocation in “equity” represents a simple proxy for the risk-taking behavior of pension funds. 
“Equity” usually refers to investments in stocks but may also include real estate and alternatives as these 
investments can as well be defined as risky assets [see e.g., Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013); Useem 
and Mitchell (2000)]. Given that real estate investments can also be considered as a safe asset [see e.g., 
Ammann and Ehmann (2017); Gerber and Weber (2007); Craft (2005)] through a stable and time-invariant 
income to the pension fund and more diversification to the portfolio, we decide not to include it. Thus, in 
this study, “equity” includes all stocks (both Swiss and foreign) and alternatives (including private equity, 
hedge funds, and commodities). As pension funds have generally a long-term horizon and that equity pays 
a positive expected risk premium in the long run, it seems appropriate to invest sufficiently in equities. This 
should have a positive impact on their long-term performance and sustainability, although we do not claim 
or assess directly this relation in this study.  
Furthermore, we investigate the variable “sponsor”, which mainly includes loans to the employer 
and employer’s shares76. Given that employees already have exposure to the employer through their 
present revenues, a high ratio of sponsor allocation may be an indicative of an excessive risk concentration 
and lack of diversification. Finally, we take the proportion of “cash”, including equivalents such as term 
deposits, to measure pension fund liquidity. Liquidity is necessary to meet short-term expected obligations 
such as pensioners’ annuities as well as unexpected lump sum payments at retirement or vested benefits 
upon termination of employment. However, excessive cash holdings may translate into foregone 
                                                          
74 For more detailed information about the measure of board effectiveness, please refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
75 Note that the asset allocation of the different classes is computed in % over sum of asset classes instead of in % over 
total assets. In this way, the category “others” is ignored and spread proportionally to the other asset classes [see e.g., 
Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) for a similar computation]. Moreover, it ensures that the sum of each pension fund asset 
allocation is equal to one and that the other possible assets (example: receivables) as disclosed by pension funds have 
no influence. In this way, the analysis can focus on the investment strategy only, namely the different allocation to the 
asset classes, which is the interest of this study. 
76 The exact definition and computation of sponsor allocation is given in Appendix 4.1 and is dependent on the 
reporting system of the As-So, the supervision authority who shared their data with us. 
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investment returns and can be a symptom of poor governance as existing studies show in the context of 
corporations [see e.g., Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006); Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007); Harford, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2008); Frésard and Salva (2010)]. Although the reasons for holding liquidity in pension 
funds are different from those in corporations, high levels of cash may also be an indication of weak 
governance77.  
Table 4.3 describes all the asset allocation variables of the Swiss pension funds in our sample. On 
average, pension assets are invested as follows: 22% in Swiss bonds, 14% in foreign bonds, 15% in Swiss 
stocks, 14% in foreign stocks, 18% in real estate, and 5% in alternatives. Moreover, the allocation towards 
equity represents on average 34%. Surprisingly, about 13% of the investable assets are held under the form 
of cash (11% in 2010, 15% in 2011, and 13% in 2012). We also observe a high dispersion regarding pension 
fund asset allocation, although variables as alternatives and sponsor appear to be skewed to the left hand-
side of the distribution by counting many zeros. Some pension funds have undiversified portfolios and a 
high exposure to particular asset classes. For example, one pension fund holds 80.21% in foreign bonds and 
another 99.87% in real estate. Regarding sponsor allocation, Swiss pension funds comply with the 
investment limit of 5% given by the Swiss law [see OPP2 art. 57-2] and, on average, invest only 1.41% in 
employer-related assets. 
[Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of asset allocation variables] 
By construction, we compute proportions and the sum of each pension fund asset allocation is equal 
to one. Therefore, the different asset classes and measures of asset allocation under study are bounded in 
the unit interval [0;1] and have many values at the lower bound, zero included. Appendix 4.2 gives more 
details about the distribution of the three asset allocation measures. The histograms confirm fat tails near 
zero and in particular for sponsor and cash allocations. On top of their construction, some variables may 
also be constrained further towards zero by the legal investment limits set in Switzerland. This is for 
instance the case for sponsor allocation as highlighted previously [5%, see OPP2 art. 57-2]. Table 4.4 lists all 
the investment restrictions given by the Swiss law and in application to our asset allocation classification78. 
For equity allocation in particular, it also highlights a legal limit of 65% [50% for all stocks and 15% for 
alternatives, see OPP2 art. 55], while cash is legally unconstrained79. By looking at the statistics, it may 
                                                          
77 The asset class “cash” is often omitted in the literature, although crucial for the operations and governance of 
pension funds. To our knowledge, only Dobra and Lubich (2013) and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) investigate the 
allocation in cash but they do not focus their analysis on that variable and their results are not conclusive. 
78 We only show the limits by asset classes (OPP2 art. 55 and OPP2 art. 57-2) and do not consider the following 
elements in the discussion: the compliance with authorized investments within the asset classes (OPP2 art. 53), the 
limits by a specific individual asset (OPP2 art. 54), and whether pension funds use OPP2 art. 50-4 to deviate from these 
limits by extending their investment possibilities.  
79 For equity allocation, note that the legal limit of 65% is much higher than the average of 34% in our sample. 
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appear that some Swiss pension funds included in the sample do not comply with the legal limits set for 
investments in Switzerland. In practice, a plausible explanation, and an element we cannot assess here, is 
the use of OPP2 art. 50-4 allowing pension funds to deviate from these limits by extending their investment 
possibilities. In the end, both the construction of the variables and investment restrictions induce non-
linearity to be addressed in the empirical design.  
[Table 4.4: Investment restrictions for asset allocation variables] 
Finally, as shown in Table 4.5, the asset allocation variables are correlated. This can be explained by 
their construction and in particular as any decrease in the level of cash is necessarily translated in an 
increase in any other asset class. Particularly relevant for our study is the significant Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient between cash and equity. This means that any uncover association with cash is related with 
equity and vice-versa. As sponsor allocation is constructed independently by looking at the proportion of 
employer’s investments in all potential assets, it is not significantly correlated with cash or equity and is of 
less concern to interpret the results. 
[Table 4.5: Pairwise correlation coefficients between asset allocation variables] 
4.4. Empirical design 
4.4.1. Model and estimation 
In this Sub-section, we present the methodology to empirically test in a multivariate setting the 
relation between board effectiveness and its different dimensions with pension fund asset allocation, while 
controlling for several other factors. To do so, we estimate the following model of three regressions: 
it t it it it
AA a T b GI c C         
With i referring to the pension fund; t to the fiscal year of the financial accounts; T to a time fixed-
effect; AA to one of the three asset allocation measures (“equity”, “sponsor”, and “cash”); GI to one of the 
governance indices (general index, three dimension indices, and six solution indices); and C to a set of 
control variables.  
Following our hypotheses, we expect betas to be positive for “equity” and negative for “sponsor” 
and “cash”. In this panel setup, a time fixed-effect is added to the model to control for specific events over 
the sample period of 2010-2012 that could have affected the pension fund governance and financial 
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performance. Such events include in particular the structural reform of the Swiss occupational pension 
scheme and different economic and financial markets conditions across those three years80. Control 
variables correct for the heterogeneity across Swiss pension funds and include proxies for known 
determinants of pension fund asset allocation. There are described in details in the next Sub-section. 
We proceed with the empirical analysis in three steps. First, we use the general index “effectiveness” 
to evaluate if governance matters for the allocations in equity, sponsor, and cash. Second, to further 
explore what matters exactly in board effectiveness, we disaggregate the general index into the three 
dimension indices and the six solution indices. Following the methodology of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009)81, all the governance indices from the same group are integrated into the same regression in order 
to control for the other governance attributes. In unreported results, we also regress each governance 
index alone into a single regression and find similar results in significance. Third, we present robustness 
tests including alternative specifications and restricted samples in order to understand better the 
limitations of our findings. 
To estimate the model, we use two methods. First, as a base model, we estimate linear regressions 
with OLS, a constant, and cluster-robust standard errors by pension fund. Using cluster-robust standard 
errors helps us to mitigate serial correlation in a panel setup. This is especially relevant in our case because 
of a low time-variation of governance indices for a single pension fund. Moreover, we want to estimate 
simultaneous regressions with correlated error terms. Indeed, we have seen previously that the allocations 
in equity and cash are correlated. The seemingly unrelated regressions estimation (SURE) method using the 
two-steps procedure of feasible GLS can account for correlated error terms. And it is equivalent to 
estimating the regressions on equity and cash separately with OLS in our specification, i.e. with the same 
set of explanatory variables [see e.g., Kruskal (1968)]. 
Second, given that our endogenous variables are confined in the unit interval [0;1] and count many 
values at the lower bound, zero included, OLS estimation may miss some non-linearity in the data and raise 
inference issues. As shown previously, this is mainly the result from the variables construction (especially 
for cash) and investment restrictions given by the Swiss law (especially for sponsor). To overcome this 
econometric challenge and fit the model, we follow the fractional response model of Papke and 
                                                          
80 We do not include a pension fund fixed-effect in the model specification because of a low time-variation of 
governance indices and a short time-series. Moreover, in this study, we are interested in the differences across 
pension funds and do not want to control for that but rather include a set of control variables. 
81 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) provide a cornerstone study on what matters for corporate governance among 
the entrenchment provisions studied by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). We follow this idea here for pension fund 
governance but differ in the methodology applied to select what is relevant. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
highlight 6 provisions (among the 24) with significant shareholder opposition and support from interviews with M&A 
experts. They then confirm that these are the provisions that matter with extensive empirical tests. For this study, we 
adopt a purely empirical approach to highlight the most relevant dimensions and related governance attributes. 
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Wooldridge (1996, 2008) and Gallani, Krishnan, and Wooldridge (2016). This model provides a robust 
approach and allows for a more flexible functional form by estimating fractional logit regressions using 
quasi-maximum likelihood. Particularly for our case, it is designed to account for values of our measures of 
asset allocation close to and including zero. We alternatively employ this model with the same specification 
and standard errors’ estimation as the base. For the presentation of the results, we report only average 
marginal effects to ease the interpretation of the coefficients estimates and the comparison with OLS.   
4.4.2. Control variables 
The set of pension fund controls included in the model is as follows. We include “total assets (ln)”82 
as a proxy for fund size and “foundation age” as a proxy for experience and learning. Large pension funds 
seem to take more risk and thus hold more equity [see e.g., Weller and Wenger (2009); Ammann and 
Ehmann (2017)]. Large pension funds might benefit from lower transaction costs and fees as well as have a 
stronger sponsoring employer who can afford additional contributions if needed [see Weller and Wenger 
(2009)]. They may also have more investment opportunities and advanced risk management structures [see 
Ammann and Ehmann (2017)]. A dummy “private” (vs. public) controls for the different agency and 
regulatory settings based on the legal form. Public pension funds tend to hold more real estate, sponsor, 
and domestic assets [see e.g., Ammann and Ehmann (2017)]. On the other hand, the legal form does not 
seem to be relevant for the equity allocation [see e.g., Gerber and Weber (2007)], although Weller and 
Wenger (2009) argue that public pension funds might actually take less risk due to more scrutinize by the 
authorities as well as different financial and investment constraints [see e.g., Mitchell and Hsin (1994)]. 
Further, a dummy “liquidation procedure”, specific to the Swiss setting, controls for the adjustments on the 
asset allocation resulting from a foreseeable liquidation, such as artificially high levels of cash from the 
sales of assets. 
To control for the capacity to take investment risk, we include two variables: “coverage ratio” and 
“beneficiaries ratio”. First, the “coverage ratio” proxy for the financial health of pension funds with a high 
level being associated with a good funding in Switzerland [see OPP2 art. 44 and annex]. A good funding, 
with more reserves available to take risks, should lead to more risks taken, and thus more equity in the 
asset allocation [see e.g., Gerber and Weber (2007)]. At the opposite, pension funds with a low funding 
should lower their investment risk in order to limit the costs of financial distress [see for the risk 
management hypothesis e.g., Rauh (2009); An, Huang, and Zhang (2013); Weller and Wenger (2009); 
                                                          
82 For a matter of scale, “total assets” is transformed by taking the natural logarithm. 
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Gerber and Weber (2007)]83. Another strand of the literature though gives evidence that some types of 
pension funds, and particularly public ones, will increase their equity allocation as a way to gamble for 
resurrection and hide underfunding through an artificially higher technical rate to value pension liabilities 
[see for the risk shifting (or transfer) hypothesis e.g., Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013); Mohan and 
Zhang (2014); Pennacchi and Rastad (2011)].  
Following these studies, the technical rate may as well be a determinant of pension fund asset 
allocation. By setting a higher technical rate, pension funds automatically increase their expected rate of 
returns on pension assets and thus their investment risk. Though, this effect has been shown to be specific 
to the regulation for U.S. public pension funds [see e.g., Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013); Cocco and 
Volpin (2007)] and we do not expect that it applies in Switzerland for two reasons. First, as for the U.K. 
setting [see Cocco and Volpin (2007)], the decision of the technical rate is in independent actuaries’ hands 
rather than the employer or trustees. Second, Swiss pension funds have more discretion to set their 
technical rate as long as it does not exceed the national reference rate set by the Swiss Chamber of Pension 
Actuaries (CSEP/SKPE) in DTA 4 (2015). Further, for Swiss pension funds, we might rather expect a reverse 
causality: the technical rate might be set based on the current asset allocation of the pension fund. Indeed, 
following the DTA (2015), the CSEP/SKPE recommends that the technical rate should be chosen at a 
sensible margin below the expected rate of returns on pension assets. In the end, we decide not to include 
“technical rate” in the controls of the model but rather conduct an additional robustness test. 
As a second way to control for the investment risk-taking capacity, we include the “beneficiaries 
ratio”, computed as the number of employees over pensioners, to proxy for the liabilities side of pension 
funds. Pension funds with an older age structure and more benefits to be paid are expected to hold less 
equity [see e.g., Gerber and Weber (2007); Weller and Wenger (2009)]. They should take less risk when 
there are more mature, i.e. with more pensioners compared to still active and contributing employees (and 
thus a low “beneficiaries ratio”). They may also be constrained by urgent liquidity needs for their 
beneficiaries and as such hold more cash. Previous empirical studies support the structure of plan 
beneficiaries as an important determinant. Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2013) show that, except for U.S. 
public pension funds, a higher percentage of pensioners is related with less risk. Rauh (2009) show that 
there is a positive correlation between the risk-taking behavior of corporate pension plans and the share of 
employees. Despite less conclusive results, Mohan and Zhang (2014) also recognize a demographic effect 
and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) acknowledge that their opposite finding is counterintuitive. 
                                                          
83 Additionally, Craft (2005) show with an asset-liability model that it is more optimal for underfunded (overfunded) 
pension funds to invest less (more) in real estate. According to the author, more real estate reduces portfolio risk. This 
might be explained by the diversification benefits because of a low correlation with the other asset classes. 
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Additionally, Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) and Mohan and Zhang (2014) give evidence that past 
investment returns relative to peers matter for the asset allocation of pension funds. Mainly, worst-
performing pension funds will tend to take more risk in order to catch up. Limited by our dataset, we argue 
that “coverage ratio” could also control to some extent for past performance. Although not the ideal proxy, 
it is a key decisional indicator in Switzerland when it comes to take investment decisions based on previous 
results and peers. Finally, to control for the employer risk, or more precisely for when the employer has to 
bear the investment risk itself, we include the dummies “defined-benefits” (vs. defined-contributions), 
“multi-employer” (vs. single-employer), and “autonomous” (vs. reinsurance). In those situations, that 
particularly characterize the structure of Swiss pension funds and with minimum legal guarantees for Swiss 
plan beneficiaries, the diverging incentives of the employer may as well affect pension fund asset 
allocation. 
We recognize that board decisions and its effectiveness are endogenous [as documented by e.g., 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012); Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); 
John and Senbet (1998)]. In particular, best-performing pension funds could have better levels of 
governance simply as they can afford costly governance attributes seen as best-practices. Also, it might be 
possible that this is poor performance that is triggering best-practices governance in the first place. By 
especially including a proxy for past performance (with the “coverage ratio”) in our model, we can, slightly, 
mitigate this general endogeneity issue with boards [see e.g., Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012)].  
4.4.3. Omitted variables 
Despite this rich set of control variables included in the model, we cannot exclude that any relation 
we uncover could be correlated with other variables omitted in our model. As constrained by the collected 
information in our dataset, these include for instance employer-related variables as their default risk, 
better measures of past investment performance, and other variables influencing board’s behavior as 
trustees’ personality or personal risk aversion.  
Furthermore, we can only partially control for the following two elements. First, for the liabilities side 
of pension funds and the structure of plan beneficiaries, we only include “beneficiaries ratio”. However, it 
has been shown to be an important determinant of pension fund asset allocation in the literature. In 
particular, demographic parameters such as the age structure are as equally important for the risk-taking 
behavior of pension funds. Also, we cannot include any cash-flow variables, and in particular the different 
types of benefits to be paid to beneficiaries, while liquidity needs may as well explain asset allocation 
decisions and specially cash holdings. Second, to control for the legal investment limits set in Switzerland, 
we are only accounting for their consequences as a constraint on our asset allocation measures through the 
fractional response model. Especially for equity, we do not account for the possibility that Swiss pension 
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funds might decide to set their equity allocation close to the legal limit as a reference point. Finally, we 
cannot exclude that any other specificities related with the Swiss pension system may as well explain our 
results. 
4.5. The results and additional tests 
4.5.1. Main results 
The estimated regressions of the general index “effectiveness” on the three asset allocation 
measures are shown in Table 4.6. According to the results, a high level of board effectiveness seems to be 
associated with less cash, while no direct relation with equity and sponsor allocations can be assessed84. 
Moreover, by disaggregating board effectiveness into its different dimensions, the results from Table 4.7 
show that “competence” and “framework” are what seem to matter for cash allocation. These governance 
indices are also significantly related with more equity, and thus a higher risk-taking behavior, as well as 
beyond controls for known determinants of pension fund asset allocation. Accordingly, Swiss pension funds 
seem to hold less cash and take more risks when their board has the financial competence to base their 
decisions on an investment framework. As cash and equity allocations are correlated, this is actually the 
result of a single mechanism: such pension boards tend to decrease their level of cash in order to increase 
equity, translating in a higher risk-taking behavior. In unreported results, similar estimated regressions 
including all 24 governance attributes separately indicate that investment objectives for the strategic and 
tactical asset allocation is what seems to be the most relevant85. 
[Table 4.6: Does it matter?] 
[Table 4.7: What matters exactly?] 
Remarkably, the other dimensions of board effectiveness do not seem to be as relevant for the asset 
allocation of Swiss pension funds. Only “representativeness” and “incentives” are slightly significantly 
related with, respectively, sponsor and cash allocations. For board integrity, it could be that our measure 
may not be able to capture the influence of politicians, with only one attribute (“no external trustees”) 
accounting partially for this point. With respect to its importance in the literature, the issue of boards 
lacking integrity could also be more sensitive in public pension funds which only represent a small part of 
our sample. 
                                                          
84 Note that our general index of board effectiveness becomes significantly related with more equity in two other 
model specifications though: (1) when standard errors are not clustered by pension fund but only adjusted following 
the Huber-White estimation and (2) when the model is estimated with GLS and pension fund random effects. 
85 The results from this test have to be taken with caution as the estimation suffers from a multicollinearity issue when 
estimating with each governance attribute separately rather than in the aggregate through the governance indices. 
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Furthermore, two reasons can explain why we do not find any relation with sponsor allocation and 
obtain a low adjusted R-squared of 6.06%. First, by only including employer’s loans and shares, the 
measurement of the variable “sponsor” cannot really capture the overall and more complex employer’s 
influence. Second, the specific investment restriction of 5% given by the Swiss law [see OPP2 art. 57-2] may 
actually limit the scope of discretion of pension boards. By looking at the regressions estimated with 
fractional logit, we observe that “framework” becomes statistically significant and negatively related, 
supporting further our hypotheses. Except for that point, the results given by this alternative estimation 
method are virtually the same that with OLS estimation. 
Our findings show that a clear and detailed framework to take investment decisions seems to be 
crucial for pension board effectiveness in order to allocate and manage the pension assets towards plan 
beneficiaries’ best interests. In particular, a guide stating the investment policy and providing the tools to 
actually take and implement judicious asset allocation decisions is key [see also e.g., Carmichael and 
Palacios (2004); Koedijk, Slager, and Bauer (2010)]. However, we need to acknowledge three limitations to 
this interpretation of the results. First, the uncover associations could still be related with omitted variables 
such as the ones expressed previously. The significance of the constant given by OLS for the three 
estimated regressions particularly suggests that a lot remains unexplained with our model. As an example, 
that could be sensitive to our results, liquidity needs may as well explain cash levels. Second, our measure 
of pension board effectiveness cannot clearly dissociate governance and transparency matters. Therefore, 
we cannot exclude that this is the transparency of having set clearly and disclosed in details an investment 
framework that explains the results and not the board decision of having in fact established it to guide the 
investment process. Third and last, we empirically show that more competent pension boards with an 
investment framework are associated with a higher risk-taking behavior. However, we do not evaluate why 
more risk should be better for plan beneficiaries by looking at, for instance, its impact on pension fund 
performance, funding, and sustainability. This investigation goes beyond the scope of this study. 
The relevance of an investment framework is an important finding for the Swiss pension fund 
industry. In a militia system based primarily on the representation of all participants, this suggests that the 
professionalization of the trustees responsible for the investment of pension assets is as equally important. 
In the end, both representation and competence should be key ingredients of a strong board [see e.g., 
Clark (2007); Besley and Prat (2003)]. This suggestion of financial professionalism for pension boards is in 
line with previous studies [see e.g., the Myners Report (2001); Ammann and Zingg (2010); Ammann and 
Ehmann (2017); Mitchell and Hsin (1994); Harper (2008b)] 86. In particular for Switzerland, Ammann and 
                                                          
86 This conclusion also reaches one of Andonov, Hochberg, and Rauh (2016) who show that elected beneficiaries in 
public pension boards are associated with a lower level of financial experience and that their “confusion” might lead 
to poor choices affecting pension fund performance. 
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Zingg (2010) and Ammann and Ehmann (2017) also highlight the relevant importance of a designed 
framework including elements of target setting, investment strategy, and risk management for the 
governance of Swiss pension funds and their investment performance. 
4.5.2. Robustness tests 
In this Sub-section, we conduct additional robustness tests on equity and cash allocations in order to 
validate our findings. Most of them support the relevance of board competence with an investment 
framework for the risk-taking behavior of Swiss pension funds, while some highlight specific cases when it 
does not seem to hold. Using a similar methodology, the results of these tests are presented in Tables 4.8 
and 4.9 for, respectively, equity and cash. We do not report the results on the allocation in sponsor as the 
coefficient estimates of the governance indices generally lack significance. For each group (general index, 
three dimension indices, or six solution indices), we report only the results related with the governance 
indices. The regressions are solely estimated with OLS as we have seen previously that applying a fractional 
response model provides similar results in significance. After recalling the base result (1), each robustness 
test (2-14) is developed in details below. 
[Table 4.8: Robustness tests on equity allocation] 
[Table 4.9: Robustness tests on cash allocation] 
(2-3) Alternative proxies to control for determinants of pension fund asset allocation are used in the 
model. For the fund size, we use “total beneficiaries (ln)”87 instead of “total assets (ln)”. The results remain 
unchanged. For the liabilities side of pension funds, we use “capital ratio”, computed as capital of 
employees over capital of pensioners, instead of “beneficiaries ratio”88. This variable expresses the same 
ratio of plan beneficiaries but in monetary terms. The results are also similar except that the direct relation 
between the general index “effectiveness” and cash allocation disappears. This feature will appear in other 
tests, suggesting further that these are “competence” and “framework” that really matter and not the level 
of board effectiveness in the aggregate.  
(4) Due to our sample specificities, we include an additional control in the model to account for 
possible location differences across the cantons in Switzerland. We add “canton urban” (or equivalently a 
dummy for the canton of VD vs. NE, VS, and JU) to control for those potential location differences as well as 
                                                          
87 For a matter of scale, “total beneficiaries” is transformed by taking the natural logarithm. 
88 For the linear estimation, note that one pension fund containing only one pensioner among its beneficiaries and 
thus an excessively high “capital ratio” is omitted. 
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a relatively facilitated access to financial services, as this could have an influence on the investment process 
and decisions. The results are the same. 
(5) Following previous literature, we also add in the model the variable “technical rate” as an 
additional control and determinant of investment risk. Although we did not expect this point to be crucial in 
Switzerland (see Sub-section 4.4.2), it appears to be an empirically sensitive one. Indeed, the technical rate 
seems to as well be significantly related with the variations in the asset allocation of Swiss pension funds 
and captures the significance of all governance indices. Therefore, our findings do not hold in this specific 
case. As one explanation, it could be the result of the recommendation of the DTA (2015) by the CSEP/SKPE 
to set the technical rate based on the expected rate of return.  
(6-7) To estimate our model, we also restrict our sample from Swiss pension funds with particular 
settings which may influence their asset allocation. For reasons developed previously in the study, we 
exclude either public pension funds or funds planning a liquidation procedure. In both cases, the results 
remain unchanged. 
(8-9) Fund size seems to be an important determinant of the governance of pension funds (see 
Chapter 3 of this thesis). For that reason, and a high dispersion in size for Swiss pension funds, we re-
estimate the model separately for two sub-samples split by the median of “total assets”. The results do not 
hold when estimating on a sub-sample of the largest pension funds. For small pension funds, there are of 
less significance for equity and of larger magnitude for cash. However, the conclusions from these tests 
have to be taken with caution due to the small size of the sub-samples. 
(10) As comparison, we alternatively compute the measures of asset allocation in % over total assets 
instead of in % over sum of asset classes and we re-estimate the model. Although the results are virtually 
the same for equity allocation, this alternative computation appears to be a sensitive point for measuring 
the proportion of cash in Swiss pension funds. It seems to be another limitation to our findings. 
(11-12) Methodologically, we also estimate the model with a 1-year (2-year) lag between the 
governance indices (as well as the set of pension fund controls) and the asset allocation variables in order 
to mitigate concerns of reverse causality. Indeed, it could be that this is a poor allocation of the assets that 
is triggering investments in best-practices governance attributes such as the development of an investment 
framework, strengthening board competence. Further, it might be possible that higher risk-taking pension 
funds are the ones that put in place the governance structures allowing them to better manage risks. This 
1-year (2-year) lag could also control for the time needed for pension boards to actually implement asset 
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allocation decisions in practice. Our results are qualitatively similar in both cases89. This lessens to some 
extent the concern of reverse causality although we do not claim any causality for our results in this study. 
(13-14) The organisation of the management of the investments and administration, whether 
internal or external, could as well influence the asset allocation by Swiss pension boards. For that reason, 
we include either “internal invest” or “internal admin” as additional structural controls. In both cases, the 
results are the same. 
4.5.3. Discussion on cash levels 
Our results related specifically with cash allocation deserve more discussion. Generally, Swiss 
pension funds seem to have high levels of cash. At the end of 2012, CHF 52 billion are kept in cash by all 
pension funds in Switzerland [see OFS (2014)]. On average, this represents about 8% of their assets under 
management90. In international comparison, pension funds in the U.S., U.K., Canada, and Japan usually 
have no more than 3% allocated to cash [see e.g., Towers Watson (2014)]. One of the most professionalized 
system, the Netherlands, even hold 0%91.  
As for the management of any portfolio, as soon as the investment performance is benchmarked 
with an index, the level of cash should be zero. Any cash flow received in excess of liquidity needs should be 
reinvested automatically according to the investment benchmark. Thus, high cash holdings do not make 
sense from a theoretical perspective and especially that, on average, Swiss pension funds appear to receive 
more cash than what they have to pay. Indeed, over the years, the assets under management have kept 
growing and the received contributions exceeded the benefits to be paid [see OFS (2016)]. And this pattern 
is projected to continue in the future [see e.g., the reports of the SwissBanking (2017) or the Federal 
Council (2013)]. Furthermore, the average level of cash remained high and constant over time as well as 
different economic cycles and financial markets conditions [see OFS (2016)]. High levels of cash in 
Switzerland seem to be a persistent phenomenon across different periods. 
                                                          
89 Lagging the independent variables does not affect our findings although by doing so we lose about one third (two 
third) of our sample. This can also be explained by the low time-variation of governance indices. 
90 The 8% contrasts with the 13% as disclosed in Table 4.3 for our sample and can be explained by measurement 
differences. When applying a similar computation, i.e. over total assets instead of over sum of asset classes, we find 
the same equally-weighted mean of about 8%. 
91 Compared to the Swiss occupational pension system, the regulatory setting of the Netherlands generally does not 
allow withdrawals that can generate large unexpected liquidity needs such as lump sum payments at retirement or 
free pass transfers of vested benefits. This could explain in part the 0% held in cash by Dutch pension funds. 
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In comparison with modern corporations, there is also no particular motive for Swiss pension funds 
to hold a lot of cash92. First, it could be for specific investment opportunities such as large infrastructure 
projects. However, pension funds might as well sell other liquid assets in due time and such investments 
are rare in Switzerland. Second, it could be a strategic decision to survive in the case of high competition 
[see e.g., Frésard (2010)]. Yet, this hypothesis does not really apply to Swiss pension funds as they are 
linked to the employer and as such do not face any competition. Employees cannot choose their pension 
fund in Switzerland. 
So, what can explain these high levels of cash particularly in Switzerland? Why Swiss pension funds 
seem to allocate so much in cash? In this study, we empirically show that cash holdings are related to the 
governance of pension funds, beyond other determinants. In particular, high levels of cash seem to be 
associated with weak governance through the lack of an investment framework. Accordingly, such pension 
funds might not know how to manage their cash, where to invest the cash they regularly receive, invest it 
too slowly, and accumulate it. This is especially critical if they do not have preliminary established an 
investment benchmark or lack the investment tools to compute their optimal level of cash93. 
We need to acknowledge that two other reasons may as well explain this finding. First, the sample 
period of 2010-2012 under study is characterized by a specific environment of low yields on bonds and thus 
can also explain high cash levels in Switzerland. Therefore, there is the need to conduct similar empirical 
tests on another period and a longer time-series in order to generalize our finding. Second, as expressed 
along this study, liquidity needs may be an alternative explanation that we cannot control in our model94. 
Swiss pension funds may simply hold a lot of cash because they actually need it. Although liquidity needs 
can be anticipated and planned in advance such as the benefits to be paid under the form of annuities to 
pensioners, some can be large and unexpected. In the Swiss regulatory setting, two important ones include 
(1) the lump sum payments at retirement cashing out the entire (or partial) pension savings of employees 
and (2) the free pass transfers of vested benefits upon termination of employment. In these two cases, 
despite some anticipation, Swiss pension funds face an important liquidity risk. Hence, more empirical work 
is needed to dissociate governance and liquidity matters behind the relations we uncovered. And although 
providing a deeper analysis on the drivers of pension fund liquidity is beyond the scope of this study, 
                                                          
92 We look at the corporate cash literature for explanations as the literature on pension fund cash management is very 
scarce. To our knowledge, there are only a few studies investigating the cash allocation of pension funds [see Dobra 
and Lubich (2013); Ammann and Ehmann (2017)]. 
93 This last idea is reinforced by the fact that the Swiss GAAP RPC 26 to present the financial statements of Swiss 
pension funds do not require any cash-flow statement. 
94 The most important cash-flow variables faced by Swiss pension funds and not included in our model are as follows: 
contributions (+), benefits (-), investment incomes (+), operating costs (-), as well as free pass transfers (+/-) resulting 
from the LFLP (Law on Free Pass in Occupational Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Pension Plans). 
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further research is also needed to understand the cash management of Swiss pension funds, their liquidity 
needs, and optimal level of cash.  
As an end point, and beyond its limitations, we highlight through this study for the first time the high 
levels of cash of Swiss pension funds. Eventually, holding too much cash translates into foregone returns 
from any investment of the pension assets. It is particularly costly in today’s Swiss environment where cash 
is rewarded with negative interest rates, affecting ultimately the sustainability of Swiss pension funds. 
Contrary to the general aging of the population, this is not an exogenous issue. The boards of Swiss pension 
funds can actually take action and influence cash levels. Some major Swiss pension funds have already 
taken measures against the negative interest rates in Switzerland [see the annual survey of Swisscanto 
(2016)]. Although 30% admitted to have done nothing, 46% separated their cash in several banks and/or 
39% reduced their cash exposure in their strategic and tactical asset allocation. 
4.6. Conclusion 
Various governance considerations may impact the asset allocation of pension funds, and ultimately 
the welfare of plan beneficiaries. In this chapter, we use a unique dataset of Swiss pension funds to 
empirically evaluate the relation between pension board effectiveness and its different dimensions with 
measures of asset allocation. We show that competent pension boards with a clear and detailed framework 
to take investment decisions seems to be what matters. In particular, such pension boards appear to be 
associated with more equity and less cash, translating in a higher investment risk-taking behavior. We also 
highlight the seemingly high levels of cash in Swiss pension funds and relate it with the lack of an 
investment framework. These results hold beyond known determinants of pension fund asset allocation 
while we cannot control and exclude liquidity needs reasons for our findings. 
Following this study, four avenues are particularly open for further research. First, additional 
empirical work should investigate and evaluate whether more risk is better for plan beneficiaries by, for 
instance, enhancing pension fund performance, funding, and sustainability. Second, endogeneity tests 
should be conducted to mitigate further the concerns of reverse causality. An exogenous shock such as the 
introduction of negative interest rates by the Swiss National Bank in January 2015 may provide a good 
experiment to validate the results and claim causality. Indeed, after this unexpected event, we would 
expect that better-governed Swiss pension funds to be the ones who have decided to reduce their cash 
exposure. Third, more empirical tests are also needed to assess to what extent our results are related with 
liquidity matters. For that purpose, there is the necessity to understand better how Swiss pension funds 
manage their cash and how they determine their liquidity needs and optimal level of cash. Fourth and last, 
other datasets should be used in order to generalize our findings and expand them in another time period 
and outside Switzerland. 
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Appendix 4.2: Distribution of the main asset allocation variables 
These figures present the histograms of the measures of asset allocation under study on the full sample (2012-2010). 
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Table 4.1. 
Descriptive statistics of Swiss pension funds. 
This table presents summary statistics of the fund variables and structure characteristics for the full sample (2012-2010). The 
proportions of the structure characteristics are computed over non-missing values and over the number of pension funds. Means 
are also computed by weighting over total assets. Summary statistics for the coverage ratio are given separately for private pension 
funds and for public ones due to different legal funding treatment. Information on whether public pension funds follow a total or 
partial funding regime is not available. The variables are detailed in Appendix 4.1. 
 
  Full sample (2012-2010) 
 
Obs. Sd Min Median Mean 
Mean 
(assets-
weighted) 
Max 
      
 
 
Total assets (in mio CHF) 614 802.0612 0.09 43.27 281.52 2562.89 7846.39 
Total beneficiaries 614 7394.4505 1 287 2455 16887 76687 
Foundation age 614 20.8564 0 38 39 53 114 
Coverage ratio (in %) 
     
 
 
Private 570 18.6643 67.70 103.55 106.00 103.46 278.44 
Public 32 17.3135 55.20 66.47 74.93 68.80 102.58 
Beneficiaries ratio 614 14.4496 0.00 4.38 8.93 4.90 196.00 
Capital ratio 614 245.3639 0.00 1.90 25.17 12.58 5428.49 
Technical rate (in %) 543 0.3811 2.00 3.50 3.60 3.66 4.50 
      
 
 
Canton urban (dummy) 614 0.4818 
  
63.52% 66.85% 
 
Liquidation procedure (dummy) 614 0.2661 
  
7.65% 0.46% 
 
      
 
 
Legal form – PRIVATE 614 0.2224 
  
94.79% 63.97% 
 
Plan type – DEFINED-BENEFITS 605 0.3594 
  
15.21% 28.68% 
 
Administrative form – MULTI-EMPLOYER 614 0.4018 
  
20.20% 38.64% 
 
Hedging type – AUTONOMOUS 614 0.3456 
  
13.84% 59.31% 
 
Management administration – INTERNAL ADMIN. 614 0.4111 
  
21.50% 55.72% 
 
Management investments – INTERNAL INVEST. 605 0.4341     25.12% 26.47%   
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Table 4.2. 
Descriptive statistics of pension governance variables. 
This table presents summary statistics of the governance indices and attributes for the full sample (2012-2010). Note that by 
construction all the variables have a number of observations of 614. For the governance attributes, means are equivalent to 
proportions when computed over non-missing observations. The variables are detailed in Appendix 4.1. 
 
  Full sample (2012-2010) 
 
Sd Mean 
   
EFFECTIVENESS 0.1197 54% 
   
INTEGRITY 0.1569 54% 
Compliance 0.2906 47% 
(1) own code of best-practices 0.4437 73% 
(2) ASIP charter and directive 0.4089 21% 
Representativeness 0.1753 56% 
(3) election procedure available 0.4932 42% 
(4) equal representation 0.3058 90% 
(5) chairman employees representative 0.3796 17% 
(6) chairmanship alternation 0.4220 23% 
(7) manager not a trustee 0.4290 76% 
(8) no external trustees 0.2972 90% 
   
COMMITMENT 0.1656 59% 
Incentives 0.1891 65% 
(9) compensation for attending 0.4145 22% 
(10) existence of a manager 0.4753 66% 
(11) women representatives 0.4799 64% 
(12) board tenure at least three years 0.2382 94% 
(13) board meets at least once per year 0.3993 80% 
Organisation 0.2790 49% 
(14) small number of trustees 0.4794 64% 
(15) existence of committees 0.4957 43% 
(16) existence of an investment committee 0.4917 41% 
   
COMPETENCE 0.1767 50% 
Expertise 0.2101 48% 
(17) election procedure based on expertise 0.0984 1% 
(18) training of the trustees 0.4970 56% 
(19) investment experts available 0.3315 87% 
Framework 0.2284 50% 
(20) investment policy available 0.2320 94% 
(21) investment objectives defined 0.3918 81% 
(22) investment benchmarks defined 0.4923 41% 
(23) risk policy available 0.3258 12% 
(24) ALM study for the strategy 0.4251 24% 
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Table 4.3. 
Descriptive statistics of asset allocation variables. 
This table presents summary statistics of the asset classes and allocation for the full sample (2012-2010) and the mean each year. 
The allocations are computed in % over sum of asset classes, except for sponsor allocation which is computed in % over total 
assets. The variables are detailed in Appendix 4.1. 
 
  Full sample (2012-2010)         
 
Obs. Sd Min Median Mean Max 
 
Mean (2012) Mean (2011) Mean (2010) 
           
(1) Cash 578 0.1927 0.00% 7.21% 12.86% 100.00% 
 
12.90% 14.97% 10.70% 
(2) Swiss bonds 578 0.1339 0.00% 20.94% 21.66% 89.49% 
 
20.17% 21.75% 22.96% 
(3) Foreign bonds 578 0.0920 0.00% 12.75% 13.92% 80.21% 
 
13.90% 13.83% 14.01% 
(4) Swiss stocks 578 0.0756 0.00% 14.81% 14.89% 52.46% 
 
15.22% 13.90% 15.60% 
(5) Foreign stocks 578 0.0733 0.00% 14.81% 14.41% 47.45% 
 
14.77% 13.45% 15.05% 
(6) Real estate 578 0.1401 0.00% 14.65% 17.53% 99.87% 
 
18.11% 17.52% 17.01% 
(7) Alternatives 578 0.0588 0.00% 3.08% 4.73% 37.11% 
 
4.93% 4.58% 4.68% 
           
Equity allocation (4+5+7) 578 0.1304 0.00% 36.00% 34.03% 94.61%   34.92% 31.93% 35.32% 
Sponsor allocation 614 0.0366 0.00% 0.11% 1.41% 40.78% 
 
1.55% 1.35% 1.35% 
 
115 
Table 4.4. 
Investment restrictions for asset allocation variables. 
This table lists the asset allocation variables and their corresponding legal limits in Switzerland. Only the limits by asset classes 
(OPP2 art. 55 and OPP2 art. 57-2), when applicable to our classification, are shown in this table. Note that OPP2 art. 57-2 includes 
only employer’s investments without guarantee as defined in our variable of sponsor allocation. The following elements are not 
under consideration: the compliance with authorized investments within the asset classes (OPP2 art. 53), the limits by a specific 
individual asset (OPP2 art. 54), and whether pension funds use OPP2 art. 50-4 to deviate from these limits by extending their 
investment possibilities. The time entry of application as reported is 2009 for OPP2 art. 55 and 2004 for OPP2 art. 57-2. This table 
also recalls the mean and max of the asset allocation variables for the full sample (2012-2010). 
 
    Full sample (2012-2010) 
 
Legal limits 
Corresponding 
requirements 
 Mean Max 
 
   
  
(1) Cash    12.86% 100.00% 
(2) Swiss bonds    21.66% 89.49% 
(3) Foreign bonds    13.92% 80.21% 
(4) Swiss stocks 
} 50% } OPP2 art. 55-b 
 14.89% 52.46% 
(5) Foreign stocks  14.41% 47.45% 
(6) Real estate 30% OPP2 art. 55-c  17.53% 99.87% 
(7) Alternatives 15% OPP2 art. 55-d  4.73% 37.11% 
      
Equity allocation (4+5+7) 65% By computation  34.03% 94.61% 
Sponsor allocation 5% OPP2 art. 57-2  1.41% 40.78% 
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Table 4.5. 
Pairwise correlation coefficients between asset allocation variables. 
This table presents the pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the asset allocation variables to be used in the empirical 
analysis on the full sample (2012-2010). The statistical significance at 1% of the correlation coefficients is highlighted with (*). 
 
  -1- -2- -3- -4- -5- -6- -7- -8- -9- 
          
-1- Cash 1 
        
-2- Swiss bonds -0.349* 1 
       
-3- Foreign bonds -0.355* -0.163* 1 
      
-4- Swiss stocks -0.386* -0.021 0.081 1 
     
-5- Foreign stocks -0.525* 0.072 0.247* 0.253* 1 
    
-6- Real estate -0.262* -0.360* -0.150* -0.121* -0.207* 1 
   
-7- Alternatives -0.152* -0.084 -0.083 -0.130* 0.092 -0.055 1 
  
-8- Equity allocation (4+5+7) -0.587* -0.009 0.148* 0.664* 0.751* -0.211* 0.427* 1 
 
-9- Sponsor allocation 0.067 -0.141* -0.066 0.101 -0.117* 0.119* -0.066 -0.037 1 
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Table 4.6. 
Does it matter? 
This table presents the results from the estimated regressions with the general index “effectiveness” and the set of control 
variables on the measures of asset allocation under study (“equity”, “sponsor”, and “cash”). For a matter of scale, “total assets” is 
transformed by taking the natural logarithm. Each regression is estimated with a time fixed-effect, cluster-robust standard errors by 
pension fund, and with two methods: (1) OLS with a constant seen as the base model and (2) Fractional logit using quasi-maximum 
likelihood (fractional response model). (1) For OLS, the coefficient estimates and the cluster-robust standard errors are presented 
as well as the adjusted R-squared and the statistical value from the F-test. (2) For fractional logit, the average marginal effects and 
the cluster-robust standard errors are given to facilitate the comparison with OLS coefficient estimates. The value of the log 
pseudo-likelihood and the statistical value from the Wald-test are also presented. For both methods of estimation, the number of 
observations is reported and the null hypothesis to be tested is that all coefficient estimates are equal to zero. 
Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  (1) Base: OLS (2) Fractional Logit 
 Equity Sponsor Cash Equity Sponsor Cash 
    
   
EFFECTIVENESS 0.0995 -0.0145 -0.1858* 0.0988 -0.0109 -0.1936* 
 
0.079 0.015 0.094 0.079 0.015 0.091 
    
   
Total assets (ln) 0.0148 -0.0009 -0.0284* 0.0149 -0.0014 -0.0267** 
 
0.008 0.002 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.008 
Foundation age -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
PRIVATE -0.0133 -0.0381* 0.0243 -0.0135 -0.0332** 0.0322 
 
0.046 0.017 0.041 0.047 0.011 0.042 
Liquidation procedure -0.0545 0.0150 0.1255* -0.0611 0.0098 0.0638 
 
0.029 0.017 0.059 0.032 0.009 0.035 
Coverage ratio 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0010* 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0010* 
 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Beneficiaries ratio -0.0004 0.0000 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 
 
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
DEFINED-BENEFITS -0.0089 -0.0070 0.0172 -0.0092 -0.0089 0.0134 
 
0.021 0.005 0.026 0.021 0.005 0.022 
MULTI-EMPLOYER -0.0607* -0.0135* 0.0867 -0.0616* -0.0182* 0.0771 
 
0.025 0.006 0.047 0.025 0.007 0.040 
AUTONOMOUS 0.0232 0.0073 -0.0020 0.0219 0.0076 -0.0168 
 
0.023 0.006 0.021 0.022 0.005 0.021 
       
constant 0.2727** 0.0642** 0.3593***    
 0.097 0.023 0.086    
    
   
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
# Obs. 569 599 569 569 599 569 
       
Adj. R-squared 11.14% 6.06% 20.27%    
F-test 5.10 1.65 3.36    
Log pseudo-likelihood    -362.58 -40.82 -193.48 
Wald-test    54.61 35.65 67.81 
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Table 4.7. 
What matters exactly? 
This table presents the results from the estimated regressions with the three dimension indices (Panel A) and the six solution 
indices (Panel B) as well as the set of control variables on the measures of asset allocation under study (“equity”, “sponsor”, and 
“cash”). For the estimation, all the governance indices from the same group are integrated into the same regression. Only the 
results related with the governance indices are reported in this table. For a matter of scale, “total assets” is transformed by taking 
the natural logarithm. Each regression is estimated with a time fixed-effect, cluster-robust standard errors by pension fund, and 
with two methods: (1) OLS with a constant seen as the base model and (2) Fractional logit using quasi-maximum likelihood 
(fractional response model). (1) For OLS, the coefficient estimates and the cluster-robust standard errors are presented as well as 
the adjusted R-squared and the statistical value from the F-test. (2) For fractional logit, the average marginal effects and the 
cluster-robust standard errors are given to facilitate the comparison with OLS coefficient estimates. The value of the log pseudo-
likelihood and the statistical value from the Wald-test are also presented. For both methods of estimation, the number of 
observations is reported and the null hypothesis to be tested is that all coefficient estimates are equal to zero. 
Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 (1) Base: OLS (2) Fractional Logit 
 Equity Sponsor Cash Equity Sponsor Cash 
    
   
Panel A: Three dimension indices          
    
   
INTEGRITY -0.0379 -0.0131 0.0086 -0.0393 -0.0158 0.0122 
 
0.054 0.010 0.078 0.053 0.011 0.065 
COMMITMENT -0.0401 0.0173 0.1049 -0.0441 0.0198 0.0635 
 
0.044 0.012 0.057 0.044 0.012 0.046 
COMPETENCE 0.1789* -0.0198 -0.3076**  0.1836** -0.0172 -0.2743** 
 
0.069 0.014 0.109 0.070 0.014 0.089 
       
# Obs. 569 599 569 569 599 569 
Adj. R-squared 14.34% 7.07% 25.34%    
F-test 5.01 1.54 3.35    
Log pseudo-likelihood    -361.83 -40.42 -189.63 
Wald-test    59.95 46.99 89.22 
    
   
Panel B: Six solution indices          
    
   
Compliance -0.0195 0.0105 -0.0486 -0.0186 0.0089 -0.0516 
 
0.031 0.007 0.035 0.030 0.007 0.034 
Representativeness -0.0237 -0.0238* 0.0689 -0.0260 -0.0247* 0.0658 
 
0.049 0.011 0.077 0.049 0.011 0.056 
Incentives -0.0604 0.0109 0.1471* -0.0643 0.0163 0.1080* 
 
0.048 0.011 0.063 0.047 0.012 0.050 
Organisation 0.0086 0.0065 -0.0145 0.0079 0.0062 -0.0204 
 
0.027 0.005 0.024 0.027 0.005 0.021 
Expertise 0.018 0.0097 -0.071 0.0203 0.0151 -0.0543 
 
0.040 0.014 0.058 0.040 0.015 0.044 
Framework 0.1440** -0.0286 -0.1956** 0.1461** -0.0276* -0.1664*** 
 
0.051 0.016 0.065 0.051 0.013 0.051 
       
# Obs. 569 599 569 569 599 569 
Adj. R-squared 15.17% 9.37% 27.10%    
F-test 4.44 1.25 2.83    
Log pseudo-likelihood    -361.56 -39.63 -187.97 
Wald-test    64.58 64.42 89.90 
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h
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